*1 L. WILSON Beatrice DOLPHIN Jimmie Henrietta Wilson J.
97-1391 Arkansas Court of 12, 1998 delivered November Opinion denied December rehearing 1998.] [Petition *2 Solomon, David for appellant. Wilson, & E. Dion by: appellees. Valley, Robert L. This is the second appeal Brown, Justice.
we have had
regarding
parties’ dispute,
relates to an
oral contract for the sale of land. See
alleged
*3
Wilson,
328 Ark.
When
all the
we conclude that the chan-
considering
cellor
erred in
that there
clear and
clearly
was
finding
convincing
evidence that an
existed
the
agreement
between
Under
pаrties.
circumstances,
these
we hold that the Wilsons’
was
complaint
frauds,
barred
the statute of
and reverse and
by
remand
entry
of
an orderconsistentivith this opinion.
I,
at
Wilson
328 Ark.
It is therefore ordered and decreed the Court that the be, decree of said Court in this cause rendered Chancery the reversed, same is annulled and set aside with hereby costs and that this cause be remanded said Court for further Chancery pro- to be therein ceedings had to the оf according principles equity and consistentwith the delivered. ours.) herein (Emphasis remand, When the case returned trial court on L. Wilson and Henrietta filed a Wilson appellees Jimmie J. Motion For Refund of Funds wherein claimed Expended they that Beatrice was enriched in the appellant unjustly $13,200, amounts had to the Farmers Home they paid land, Administration for the removal of liens on the farm $1,239.40, had to the United States which they Department paid that she be ordered to reimburse for costs. They prayed Justice $14,439.40. to the in the amount of them Dolphin responded that had those amounts as motion and asserted Wilsons paid volunteers, decreed there no that Court had was Supreme and that the trial contract that could be specifically performed, court should enter an order into effect Court placing I. The mandate Wilson Wilsons following replied and that were for benefit Dolphin’s Dolphin’s expenses paid be struck for lack of factual or Wil- should legal support. response amended reimbursement motion to claim relief under son then his doctrine of meruit. quantum equitable motion and briefs Legal accompanied parties’ response, order, and the trial court entered its granting judgment $14,239.40 the amount of under the enrichment. theory The trial court relied on Townsend v. Arkansas Commis Highway sion, 317 Ark. that it had (1994), finding to hear the Wilsons’s motion. We jurisdiction quote pertinent of the trial court’s order on jurisdiction: part Townsend, In Arkansas State Commissionv. Townsend Highway 702, (1993), the Arkansas Commission Highway peti-
tioned this court for
relief to have a structure removed
injunctive
from a
held
the Commission. This court denied
right-of-way
relief. The matter was
to the Arkansas
requested
appealed
*4
Court, and the denial of
relief was reversed
Supreme
injunctive
and the case “dismissed”
the Arkansas
Court.
In a
by
Supreme
case,
later
filed in the same
the Commission
proceeding
peti-
it the
tioned this court to
relief that it had
grant
injunctive
origi-
and felt
entitled
the
nally
itself
because of
reversal
requested
by
the Arkansas
Court. This court declined to act on the
Supreme
matter because the Arkansas
Courts mandate reflected
Supreme
law,
been
that the case had
dismissed.
to the
as it was
According
time,
understood
this court at that
a dismissal removed
by
juris-
diction from the trial
to act for
court
any purpose.
Supreme
Court,
on the second
of this
Townsendv. Arkansas
appeal
Commission,
II,
Ark.
held
(1994)
Townsend
Highway
To
the
in
otherwise.
Arkansas
Court
that case:
quote
Supreme
“When the Arkansas State
Commission
Highway
pеtitioned
decision,
for an
to our
the
injunction subsequent
original
new case rather than as
could have treated it as a
chancellor
Under
original
under the
of the
aegis
fihng.
continuation
circumstances,
assumed jurisdiction
she would have
those
court in
of the mandate from this
Townsend
independendy
Thus, the of this court would almost cer- although opinion different the Arkansas Supreme have been before Court’s tainly II, it in Townsend is now that it pronouncement opinion has the to render such further orders as be neces- may authority the the Arkansas sary to effectuate decision of fully Supreme has the act Court. If this court where the case has authority Court, been the it by “dismissed” Arkansas Supreme surely may where, here, act the as case has been remanded. This court has such relief grant under the authority required fully Arkansas Court’s mandate to resolve Supreme finally Therefore, the matter. since the relief by plaintiffs requested with, consonant and in conflicts entirely way no with the Arkansas Court’s finds that it ruling, court hasjuris- diction as “a to treat this new case” within meaning Town- send II.
The first issue raised on is whether appeal trial court exceeded its authority hearing deciding after unjust-enrichment claim our in Wilson I had come opinion down and the had mandatе issued. We that it believe did. instructive,
It is to turn to our once more decision in initially, Wilson I. Our that case discussed sole issue on which concerned the existence appeal, of an oral contract to sell farm land. An I; claim was not in Wilson unjust-enrichment pled nor was Moreover, relief the form of meruit quantum requested. the Wilsons do not that the contend claim was unjust-enrichment tried or consent of the express implied parties during Also, first trial. P. See Ark. R. Civ. 15(b). Wilsons did not make a motion trial in the first to amend the to conform pleadings this, to the evidence. Id. Because of court the trial did not con- a claim *5 sider enrichment or it аs address part decree. This the the us issue before is whether being today the Wilsons new can raise a cause of the action after case on appeal
118 mandate both has been decided and when the and require opinion with the an order consistent opinion reviewed of the mandate rule was recently history Planned the Court of See v. Casey Third Circuit Appeals. by Parenthood, the 1994). F.3d 848 In Third Cir 14 Cir. (3d Casey, cuit observed: rules, the This
Of these
most
is the mandate rule.
compelling
rule
rulings
fundamental
binds
court to honor
in the case
every
stated,
has
“In its ear-
by
courts. As the
Court
superior
held
no
this Court
that an inferior court has
days
consistently
liest
the mandate issued
an
authority
by
or
to deviate from
power
Co.,
304,
court.”
R.
334 U.S.
Pennsylvania
appellate
Briggs
1040,
L.Ed.
(1948).
68 S.Ct.
from
Co.
A must both implement spirit mandate, into account the court’s taking appellate opinion it embraces. circumstances at 14 F.3d 857. Casey, decision is accord with blackletter Casey
law on which we from mandates American See Jurisprudence. garner Review, 5 Am. 2d 776-794 We take this Appellate §§ Jur. to cite with few of opportunity major approval precepts mandates: regarding A “mandate” the official notice action of the appellate below,
court, directed the court that court of the advising court, action taken directing lower court appellate to have the judgment recognized, court’s appellate duly obeyed, and executed. 2d,
5 Am. 776. § Jur. However, the is vested jurisdiction lower court with only extent conferred court’s and mandate. appellate Therefore, the of whether the court question lower followed is not mandate one whether the lower court was cor- simply
119 rect in of the its construction but also involves question the lower court’s jurisdiction. 2d,
5 784. Am. § Jur. instructions, If an court with remands appellate specific those instructions must be followed to ensure that the exacdy, lower court’s decision is in accord with that of the appellate court. determination,
Where a remand limits the issues for issues, court on remand is from precluded other or considering matters, Thus, new the cause. affecting where the case is remanded for of the disposition remaining issues that post-trial court, were not addressed the trial issue the trial any court had previously addressed not be may considered оn remand. Simi- act, when a larly, case is remanded for a the entire case is specific but rather the reopened, lower tribunal is only authorized to mandate, out the carry court’s and the appellate trial court may powerless undertake any those proceedings beyond specified. 2d,
5 Am. 787. § Jur. Any on remand proceedings which are to the contrary directions contained in the mandate from the court appellate be considered null and void. 2d, 5 Am. 791. § Jur. cases,
Two
have touched on
particular,
this issue in Arkan-
sas. See Little
Moore,
Red River Levee
Dist. No. 2 v.
199 Ark.
McKee,
S.W.2d 234 (1940); Felkerv.
241 S.W.
Felker,
In
we refеrred to a
in that case
previous appeal
where we overruled the trial court’s
of a demurrer and
sustaining
reversed and remanded “with
demurrer,
directions to overrule the
and for further
to be therein had
proceedings
to the
according
and not inconsistent
principles
with the
equity
Felker,
court.”
154 Ark. at
remand,
Ample opportunity a reversal To construe pleadings. all issues presented had been sub- for further proceedings, of a cause remand *7 merits, might to mean that appellant originally upon mitted in case him to his enable proceed his cause would further develop ad a reversal time he secured it over try every by piecemeal infinitum. that done, the opinion the court been of and had
Had this been
case,
direc-
develop
specific
entitled to further
was
appellant
included in the mandate.
have been
to that effect would
tions
106,
Felker,
Little Red River Levee 236. with the facts in cases is on all fours
Neither of these either new that but stand for the instant they proposition remand when be raised after they new defenses cannot or proof and mandate. court’s first are with this opinion inconsistent Indeed, undermines of this such to occur finality to allow The same closure on matters decision and denies litigated. court’s a new cause of action after appeal principle raising applies It is that court held the issuance of the mandate. this indisputable consis- I an order be entered trial court Wilson that should tent outside hear a new with our To opinion. go opinion, tried, then cause of which had not been оr enter action pled an order on the new of action cannot be said in wise to cause any with action which conforms this court’s holding. the trial first were court’s instincts
Clearly,
appeal
refrain from
claim.
trial
unjust-enrichment
entertaining
however,
court,
our
relied on
in Arkansas State
opinion
Highway
Townsend,
Comm’n v.
Ark.
(1994)
II,
In
(TownsendII).
Townsend
issue was whether the trial
court had
relief which
authority
grant petition
injunctive
was
with
consistent
our
TownsendI
State
(Arkansas
High
*8
Townsend,
Comm’n
Ark.
We with the trial court in TownsendII again disagreed and noted that the TownsendI mandate that stated the trial court had erred in “as set out in the denying injunction Town- opinion.” II, send Ark. at 448. at We further stated that our in I Townsend that the trial court was in language wrong an denying injunction was clear. Highway Department very We in II concludеd Townsend on de novoreview that the trial court
could have assumed of the jurisdiction Highway Department’s of the mandate and treated it new petition as a case. independently We affirmed the trial court’s initial grant petition relief. injunctive II, course,
That situation in Townsend of is categorically There, different from the case us. before relief injunctive granted was consis- entirely trial court to the Highway Department I. of in Townsend In tent the intended result our with opinion order, hand, a new entertained cause case at the trial court’s which action, an mandate and was not order went far beyond in effect to our gave opinion court, further, our and misconstrues trial opinion I, in the “This court has when it order: mandate Wilson says be under the such relief as required authority grant resolve the mandate fully finally Arkansas Court’s an court to the That is incorrect. Directions matter.” appellate must fol trial mandate court expressed by opinion Indeed, into execution. the jurisdiction lowed exactly placed court remand is limited to those directions. The the trial on and the trial court’s was circumscribed this court authority this was to enter an order consistent with court’s only empowered court’s order exceeded those trial opinion. unquestionably bounds.
We
that had this court remanded the
acknowledge
further
without
instructions as
matter for
specific
proceedings
of an order
to our
conforming
opposed
requiring
entry
our
well be different. See
Remand
opinion,
might
holding
generally
—
Fact
Special joins. Paul Justice and J., Special Tester, Special Thorjsiton, Kent Justice Roy dissent. Justice James and not JJ., Newbern, participating. Glaze, Corbin, The issue Justice, dissenting. only Special James Roy, be determined this is whether the Chancellor’s Court in decision v. WilsonII was consistent with Dolphin 12, 1997, mandate in v. Court’s of Wilson May regard Dolphin I. had no that Court argues Chancery Appellant Dolphin to act it in did granting .a authority judgment appellee enrichment in of this and mandate in Court’s unjust opinion light Wilson, of Ark. previous appeal Dolphin The there held Henrietta and Court that plaintiffs clear, had failed to come forward with and Wilson cogent, Jimmie take evidencethat would an oral contract for the sale of convincing frauds, land out of the statute frauds. statute of Both the of ACA case and the law sаme a §4-59-101(a)(4), interpreting require of to remove an oral contract from the statute of quantum proof clear, frauds to be and convincing. cogent, The mandate in I Dolphin provided:
It is therefore and ordered decreed Court that the decree be, of said in Court this causerendered same Chancery and the is reversed, hereby annulled and set aside with costs and this causebe to said remanded Court for further Chancery proceed- to be therein had ings to the of according equity principles consistentwiththe hereindelivered. opinion The mandate did three it remanded case (1) things: Court, case; it not did dismiss the it Chancery (2) directed the Chancellor to act in accordance with the principles equity; it directed the (3) Chancellor to act consistent with the in opinion I. Dolphin
Two
must
answered.
Did
questions
the Chancellor act
(1)
to the
in
according
principles
equity
awarding
judg-
enrichment,
ment
on
based
was the
unjust
(2)
chancellor’s
II consistent with this
Dolphin
Court’s mandate in
I?
answer to both
these
questions
“yes.”
While the
did
Wilsons
for the relief of
pray
enrichment
their original
remand to the
complaint, upon
Court the
so
Wilsons
amended their
Chancery
pleadings.
to such amendment
on
Dolphins timely
based
objected
However,
decision in
chancellor,
Court’s
relying
on this Court’s decision in Townsendv. Arkansas
Commis-
Highway
sion,
as Townsend authority amendment. chancellor, nor neither Mrs. Dolphin
After the ruling by additional her made to the court to submit attorney any request in an offer of way nor even made additional any proof proof, I, In all the facts record made in Dolphin modify Dolphin her the chancellor relied were on which making developed award on remand for enrichment. I reflect that Mrs.
The facts Dolphin developed Dolphin deceased were several hundred thousand dollars her husband Flome Administration for agricultural indebted to Farmers’ of filed Beatrice The United States America suit against loans. deceased, in wife of January Dolphin, Leroy Dolphin, surviving at that filed a lis on the which is 1994 and time pendens property matter of this litigation. subject took action to defend Mrs. was served but no duly Court, fact, the U. S. District herself. In issued by judgment Arkansas, Division, in to this Eastern District of Eastern regard H-C-94-5, matter in Case No. held: specifically defendant, That said after waived as reflected having service herein, answered, has or the waiver filed otherwise appeared made defense to and is any plaintiffs complaint wholly default. . . . Beatrice
The Court thereafter entеred judgment against Dolphin: $136,114.34
in the amount of and interest in the sum 29, $135,268.98 accrued to at thereafter September rate date of $36.2113 to the this and there- daily judgment after at the rate to 28 U.S.C. statutory pursuant plus § made advances and recoverable charges during pendency action maintenance of the subject protection prop- and the costs of this action. erty, 190 of (Tr. I.) had no whatsoever of ever or
Mrs. Dolphin hope repaying a notice of sale was discharging judgment. Subsequently, entered on that the would be April advising property
125 to the on May satisfy at the courthouse steps sold judgment. I that had trial she admitted at the
Mrs. Dolphin Dolphin The exact nature take on her behalf. to asked Wilson steps however, was these steps, disputed. behalf
However, interceded on it is that Wilson undisputed and the sale and succeeded in satisfying of Mrs. stopping Dolphin the indebtedness (Tr. 60-61).1 inwas 5 and 6 show that the judgment
Plaintiff’s Exhibits the sale was fact satisfied and stopped. out of their own funds as the money part Wilsons paid 60-61, the demanded that the but U.S. 66) (Tr. agreement 80, 200). in the name (Tr. Dolphins’
payment the that the funds to satisfy There is no govern- question on the checks came from the Wilsons reflected ment’s claim of Defend- (Tr. 160) as Plaintiff’s Exhibit part appear d, salе, the the (2) satisfied ant's Exhibit 9 (Tr. (1) stopped (Tr. 161-162) indebtedness. never did
It is that Mrs. also anything undisputed Dolphin it. the was filed to She entered once lawsuit foreclosure stop issue, the did her she did not contest amount she appearance, claim. of the United States validity contest government’s hired an there is no 190) (Tr. 89), While she she (Tr. says attorney did enter her ever but attorney anything appearance evidence and consent to judgment. to
She further admitted that she took no action whatsoever 179-180, 187, did not or foreclosure she (Tr. 190), sale stop she was not (Tr. 140-141), care if the foreclosure went through to the she was not (Tr. 97), pay sale gоing stop going the sale she was not dollars sale (Tr. 142), pay any stop going 88, 94, and she admitted or to (Tr. 113), satisfy judgment no in the whatsoever after she would have interest property sale (Tr. 145). from pages “Tr” is to the The abbreviation a reference Dolphin transcript admitted further that she had no intention after the sale
redeeming (Tr. 98). property It is clear that Mrs. did not care and was to let going be sold wherever it property go might. *12 However, on the based actions of and Wilson the expendi- funds, ture of his own was not sold at a foreclosure property Even sale. Mrs. did though claims she not want Dolphin to the sale of the she аdmitted she stop property, knew of his Wilson, actions but never contacted yet never to Wil- complained actions, of son his and she never told the federal not government to Wilson’s checks on her to behalf or accept foreclosure stop 100, 122, sale (Tr. 143). sale,
It is further that even to the foreclosure undisputed prior Mrs. did to care for the Dolphin nothing Mrs. property. Dolphin admits that in 1988 she abandoned the (Tr. that 101), property she had not farmed since (Tr. 1985 that property 107), house burned on the on which her son had been property living and that he left in 1990 that (Tr. 125), she never rented the land nor worked the in land after hеr son left any and way (Tr. 124), that she had not cared for the since any she had property way (Tr. left seen the 101) had not in seven until the years property before the I day trial of (Tr. 101). son, testified,
Her who made similar admissions (Tr. 155). The record that reflects Wilson cared for and main- only tained the after his conversation with Mrs. property Dolphin.
The chancellor’s decision in II that Wilson did not as a act volunteer is a certainly supported by preponderance evidence and is consistent with the of principles equity. chancellor’s award to Wilson to him and a entitling judgment lien $14,439.40 on if in the amount paid property days the record. supported by
Further, even tried de though cases are novoon the chancery record, the Court does not reverse of fact finding the chancellor unless it is Ark. erroneous. R. Civ. P. clearly 52(a); 421, 790 302 Ark. Trust & Bank & Co. Massey, Merchant Planters numerous to cite. other too cases (1990); S.W.2d be the sole determined question The Chancellor was “whether argument reached equitable regard were not enriched if she would be required defendant unjusdy 6 of the opinion). the funds.” Chancellor’s (Page repay clear and is stated The law enrichment is relatively on unjust follows: one, an enrichment is equitable providing doctrine benefit at thе expense that one should not allowed to party error. an or intentional another because of innocent mistake Co., 573, 169 Island 205 Ark. v. Rock Improvement Brookfield Here the chancellor determined correctly S.W.2d 662 Stoddard, that, would restitution Shannon being paid absent the benefits of Stoddard’s labor reap without justification Stoddard, Kistler v. App. . . . See expense.
746 (1985). Therefore, directions whether Wilson was mistaken in his from Mrs. or she deceived him into making intentionally Dolphin him, with no intention of the land to is of no conveying payments is, matter in The to enrichment. regard important thing would Mrs. be enriched allowed to unjustly by being the which she had done to from keep property nothing protect for, had foreclosure and which she done care for over nothing seven The answer to this is a clear and years. resounding yes. Whitener,
A similar decision was reached in Smith v. Smith, 328. In facts are that App. pertinent Patricia Birlson had owned in White which she property County encumbered a favor of Federal with mortgage Newport Savings In all but & Loan. 1980 Birlson sold one acre to Billy property Whitener. In with Ray conjunction purchase prop- Whitener assumed Birlson later sold erty, existing mortgage. one acre to Charles Burress who then sold the acre remaining Smith. Smith constructed a on the house appellant Jimmy and then entered into a contract for with its sale property J.J. Hen Reeves. title search revealed on the Newport’s property sale, acre and to facilitate the Smith obtained a release of his one $5,000 from the certificate of mortgage by signing deposit Federal & Loan. Newport Savings It was Smith’s that the CD would be returned understanding once the note secured was off. by mortgage paid Smith, the note became
Unfortunately delinquent Federal the CD to the Newport indebtedness. applied Smith then suit brought Whitener he against was claiming $5,000 entitled to be his CD since it had been repaid applied Whitener’s loan which had been assumed Whitener when he by from Birlson. purchased property Whitener contended that he would not be enriched unjustly $5,000. his indebtedness reduced by Smith’s being facts, at least in this are similar to regard, very Dolphin. Whitener was to receive the benefit of going Smith’s money would receive the benefit of Wilson’s without money any benefit to the who had person actually to save the paid money property.
The Chancellor with Whitener agreed and held that Smith had failed to meet his burden of and dismissed proof his case.
On the Court of held appeal, that Whitenеr Appeals would enriched since unjustly Whitener’s indebtedness was reduced of the application funds from the proceeds CD to Smith. The rightfully belonged Court even held this to be the case in of the fact that Whitener spite didn’t apparently even know that Smith’s had been money to reduce his applied indebtedness, stating: *14 another,
If one has money to belonging and equity conscience, it, good he to ought retain it can be recovered there is no although between the privity Patton v. parties. Brown Co., MooreLumber S.W.2d 383 the enrichment Although was to and at the appellee expense of the enrichment need appellant, not have come from directly source, but could come appellant from a third Newport Federal. The Court went on to state: to an encumbrance to a debt remove onenot bound primarily pay
When so, or to hisown protect hislegalobligation does either nevertheless from enrichment unjust against asserta claim may he secondaryright, of Farms,271 Ark. v. WootenBrothers whois liable. See Cox other Here wasnot (Ark. 1981) App. appellant 601 SD.W.2d . . . mortgage. to to obligated pay anyportion appellee’s appellee of added.) (Emphasis of Wilson was any portion obviously оbligated pay their or but did so based on understanding mortgage, Dolphin’s a Under the doctrine of Kistler v. based on mistake on his part. of Stoddard, one is entitled to benefits of the doctrine unjust supra, an innocent mis- enrichment if such is made based on payment that the acts of take. There is no evidence whatsoever were other than that. anything two,
This us to number were Chancel- brings question P. lor’s actions inconsistent with the delivered determination, In order to make that we must look at the mandate Court’s As out Brown’s excel- opinion. pointed injustice lent the mandate what actions the lower court opinion, governs take once a decision is made court. In this by superior remanded, the case was not dismissed.
Three need considered in whether things determining or not Chancellor violated the mandate: the fact that the (1) Chancellor; case was not dismissed but was remanded to the (2) that the quantum proof required prove specific performance clear, (see and the cogent I) convincing quantum a claim for enrichment ais mere proof required unjust support Stoddard, of the evidence Kistler v. (see preponderance supra); is there (3) in the I that would anything language Dolphin pre- clude the enrichment the Wilsons requеst upon remand. decision of this Court held that the previous merely
Chancellor had erred in “that there was clear and convinc- finding evidence that an existed between the ing agreement parties. circumstances,
Under these we hold that the Wilsons’complaint wasbarred the statute of fraudsand reverseand remandfor an Order consistentwith this opinion. *15 on remand and this the chancellor’s decision
In comparing I, the and mandate on following Dolphin Court’s opinion evident: clear and convincing enrichment does not require
1. Unjust for performance; evidence as is required specific is not barred the statute of 2. A claim for enrichment unjust frauds; the facts for enrichment can be made where
3. An award a claim for specific per- would be insufficient support formance.
Therefore, not inconsistentwith this the Chancellor’s Order was decision in I. Court’s Dolphin
Therefore, 2 is the chancel- the answer to No. yes, question decision in lor’s decision was consistent with this Court’s Dolphin I dealt a different with quantum proof required and did not an award for unjust specific performance preclude i.e., a mere enrichment based on a lower standard of proof, pre- of the evidence. ponderance main that troubles this writer is what if issue rights, any, amend remand. Brown has to its upоn party pleadings Justice 6, Little Red LeveeDist. No. 2 v. cites in his at apdy page
Moore,
106,
137 Ark.
The Court’s act with boththe well as consis- consistently principles equity as. in this tent with the mandate. Chancellor writer’s opinion has done both and her decision should be affirmed. an be distin-
The Townsend case anomaly may it should be limited to its facts or overrulеd guishable. Perhaps III, in Townsend Townsendv. Arkansas Glaze suggested by Justice Commission, 726 (1995). State Highway *16 III the rule in Townsend II and Townsend results Since cure this and lack of the Court want to finality, uncertainty TownsendII as Glaze by overruling suggested by problem Justice II is his dissents in TownsendII and TownsendIII. Until Townsend facts, the chancellor overruled or limited to its it would was appear Further, in her decision. even correct on Townsend relying was not without Townsend chancellor’s decision contrary or this decision in II. In Court’s mandate Court’s fact, Townsend, it to the writer that even without would appear chancellor’s acts were consistent with both the mandate and the as ordered this Court. principles equity Thornton, J., joins. Associate
Special
joins.
Kent Tester
Justice
Charles ALEXANDER v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 98-1412
Opinion