9 Mass. App. Ct. 502 | Mass. App. Ct. | 1980
This is an appeal from a judgment against the defendant, the school committee of Methuen (school committee), declaring that the plaintiff was demoted from his position as principal of Methuen High School in violation of G. L. c. 71, § 42A, and ordering his reinstatement. The judgment was entered on a motion of the plaintiff under Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974).
The issue presented is whether the judge was correct in deciding pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974), that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, that the plaintiff was demoted as a matter of law within the meaning of G. L. c. 71, § 42A, and that he was thus entitled to the procedural safeguards provided in § 42A
The plaintiff was employed as the principal of the Tenney High School in Methuen from July 1, 1971, to September 22, 1975. On September 22, 1975, the students and staff of the Tenney High School, including the plaintiff, were transferred to a new high school building which was designated as the Methuen High School. The new high school included grades nine through twelve. Tenney High School was redes-ignated as the East Middle School, one of two middle schools in Methuen. There was only one high school in operation in Methuen both before and after the relocation.
On November 22, 1976, the school committee, meeting in executive session, voted to transfer the plaintiff from his position as principal of the Methuen High School to the position of principal of the East Middle School, effective November 29, 1976. On December 3, 1976, the school committee voted the same transfer in open session. The plaintiff’s transfer was voted without notice to him of any charges against him and without the opportunity for a hearing before the decision was made.
The plaintiff’s affidavits in support of his motion for summary judgment set forth a number of undisputed facts to support his claim that he was demoted. In them he asserts that under the salary schedule of the Methuen Teachers’ Association, Administrators’ Group collective bargaining agreement, the principal of the Methuen High School is to receive a salary at a ratio of 1.62, while the principal of the East (Tenney) Middle School is to receive a salary at a ratio of 1.56. Although the plaintiff’s salary was maintained at a level of 1.62 after his transfer, the principal of Methuen’s other middle school receives a salary at a 1.56 ratio, and the former principal of the East Middle School, who replaced the plaintiff as principal of the high school, received a raise
The affidavit of the superintendent of schools, submitted by the school committee in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, does not contest any of the specific facts stated by the plaintiff. In that affidavit, the superintendent states that regardless of the differences in detail between the responsibilities of the principals of different schools, each principal is totally responsible for the academic and administrative direction of his school. He contends generally that there is no difference of “great consequence” between the duties and responsibilities of different principals. He asserts that the plaintiff’s responsibilities as principal of the East Middle School are similar to those he had as principal of the Tenney High School before it was relocated and expanded. The superintendent also states that in his opinion as an educator of many years experience and as the holder of a doctorate in education in school administration, the plaintiff’s transfer did not constitute a “demotion.”
The judge below filed a memorandum of decision in which he summarized only those facts bearing on the question of demotion which are set out in the plaintiff’s affidavits. On those facts he ruled that the transfer of the plaintiff was a demotion. In doing so he relied on Glennon v.
Judgment reversed.
General Laws c. 71, § 42A, permits the involuntary demotion of a principal or other supervisor who has served for more than three years only on specified grounds, and requires thirty days’ notice of the charges and the opportunity for a hearing before a demotion vote.
As to the use of opinions in affidavits filed in connection with motions for summary judgment see 6 Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice par. 56.22[1], at 56-1312-1316 (1979); 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738, at 690-694 (1973).