214 S.W.2d 584 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1948
Affirming.
"Any person who had been a practitioner of veterinary medicine, surgery or dentistry in this Commonwealth for a period of one (1) year next prior to March 24, 1916, upon application to the Board and the payment to the Board of a fee of twenty-five ($25.00) dollars, shall be entitled to a license, and said Board shall issue to such applicant a license on the standard form used and approved by the Board, signed by its Chairman and Secretary-Treasurer and attested by its seal, which license he shall have recorded in the office of the county court clerk of the county in which he resides, as provided in KRS
Appellants contend that the inclusion of this section, which was inserted in the act as an amendment after its introduction, violates the requirements of Section 51 of the Constitution because the subject matter embraced in the section is not expressed in the title of the act, hereinabove set out. We think there is no merit in this contention. The title of the act clearly shows that it regulates the entire question of the practice of veterinary medicine, surgery and dentistry. Certainly the qualifications of those who were to practice that profession and the condition under which they were to be allowed to do so is covered by the general title to this act. The purpose of a title to a legislative act is to give notice to all concerned of the matters treated in the act so that no matters foreign to the purposes of the legislation be incorporated therein. We think the section above quoted, sometimes called a "grandfather" clause, bore a natural relation to the remainder of the act, is germane to the title and is clearly not violative of Section 51 of the Constitution. Engle v. Bonnie,
Appellants further contend that the legislation embodied *351 in the amendment, which is the section above quoted, is class legislation, is arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust because it undertakes to grant appellee and his class a license without the necessity of taking an examination as is required by the act for new entrants into the profession; that it violates constitutional provisions which prohibit granting to any man or set of men special privileges or emoluments except in return for public service rendered; that the section in question is nothing but a special privilege act. In discussing this phase of the case it will be necessary to outline some of the historical background of the present litigation.
Prior to 1916, the practice of the profession of a veterinarian was not regulated by law. At the 1916 session of the General Assembly there was enacted a general and fairly comprehensive law regulating the profession and prescribing qualifications for admission to and licensing of members of that profession. The original act is shown as Chapter 71, Acts of 1916, and so much thereof as remained in effect was included in the 1946 edition, KRS, as Chapter 321. That act contained a "grandfather" clause which provided in substance that every person who had been a practitioner of veterinary medicine, surgery or dentistry in this Commonwealth for one year prior to the passage of the act could, upon payment of the prescribed fee, be issued a certificate to practice. Application for licenses under this clause was to be made prior to January 1, 1917. Appellee, though apparently eligible to obtain a license under this clause, did not do so although it is indicated in the record that he continued to practice his profession.
The regular session of the General Assembly of 1946 passed an act, being Chapter 238 of the Acts of that year, which provided for the issuance of a license to Samuel C. Reid, appellee herein, to practice the profession of veterinarian upon the payment of the required fee, the preamble of the act reciting that he had had professional training in that profession for more than one year prior to July 1, 1916, the effective date of the original act above referred to. This act of 1946 was declared unconstitutional and void by this court in the case of Reid v. Robertson,
Clearly that act was a special act which affected Samuel C. Reid alone and was properly stricken down as such by this court. The "grandfather" clause of the 1916 act and the "grandfather" clause of the present act, heretofore quoted, clearly are not special acts as was the 1946 act. On the contrary they made a classification of all those persons who had been practitioners of veterinary medicine, surgery or dentistry in this state :for a period of one year prior to March 24, 1916, and evidently determined that those persons in this class had sufficient experience and qualifications to enable them to continue to practice this profession without further examination and accordingly directed the Board to issue a license to any person in this class. We think the Legislature had the right to exercise its discretion in a matter of this nature and that its action in doing so was not arbitrary or that it granted a special privilege to appellee. In enacting regulatory legislation of the character now under consideration it has always been the custom of the Legislature to exempt from certain provisions of such legislation those persons already engaged in the particular business or profession being regulated. Thus in such regulatory acts as those concerning doctors, lawyers, plumbers, barbers and beauticians, realtors and others that could be mentioned, "grandfather" clauses have always been inserted which exempted from examination as a condition to being licensed in the profession or business, those who were already bona fide engaged in the profession. We cannot say that because the Legislature reached back to 1916 in its exemption in the 1948 act, it did so for the special benefit of appellee. In fact it is said in appellee's brief and not denied in appellant's brief that since the effective date of the 1948 act fourteen others, in addition to appellee, all similarly situated, have complied with the provisions of the section being attacked and have been issued licenses by the Board of Examiners thereunder.
Judgment affirmed. *353