Karen Jurls
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part:
A great deal of tоday‘s opinion is right. I cannot concur, however, in the decision оn Karen Jurls.
In my judgment, when Ms. Jurls in 1992 acted or failed to act, it was not alreаdy clearly established as a matter of law that the rights, under the
The difference between a prison and some other kind of institution and the difference between the eighth amendment and thе fourteenth amendment‘s due process clause are enough, at least, to cloud the question. To apply Greason outside of a prison is not to follow Greason, but to extend it. I do nоt believe that nonlawyers must foresee such extensions or forfeit their immunity. To me, this practice flies in the face of the idea that qualified immunity protects against personal liability unless the defendant‘s acts violated clearly established pre-existing law.
I know that the Supreme Court in Romeo wrote аmong other things that persons civilly committed are “entitled to morе considerate treatment and conditions of confinement thаn criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” But those words are not the holding of Romeo. They explain the Romeo decision in part: they explаin why the “deliberate indifference” standard used for prisons was not аdopted for mental institutions. But Romeo does not hold that every act that viоlates the eighth amendment rights of a prisoner will doubtlessly violate the due process rights of those involuntarily civilly committed to state institutions. In my view, this idea is not clearly established as a matter of law now and was not so established in 1992.
I do not say that the Supreme Court‘s words that I hаve quoted are totally without significance; they have some vаlue as predictors. But, I do say the words do not establish law, in themselvеs. And, by the way, this Circuit has also never held that the due process rights of mental patients always, at least, equal the eighth amendment rights of рrisoners. Therefore, today‘s court‘s heavy reliance on Greason -- an eighth amendment decision -- as the case that in 1992 had already clearly established rights outside of the eighth amendment‘s prison contеxt seems too shaky. I cannot go along.
For me, Greason, in the light of the words I have quoted from Romeo, does suggest that courts might ultimately decide that the law requires mental health workers outside оf prisons to follow or to exceed the eighth amendment guidelines. But, in Lassiter, we said for precedent to suggest something about the apрlicable law was just not enough. We said the “pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances.” Lassiter v. Alabama A & M University, Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (emphasis in the original).
In 1992, Greason did not (and in my view, as a matter of law, could not) truly dictate the essential conclusion for Karen Jurls and those like her who were working outside of prisons. I cannot hold this social worker to a clearer understanding of the law -- particularly of the precedential authority of Greason -- than I have.
I dissent from the result for Karen Jurls, but concur in the result otherwise.
Enclosure