Case Information
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EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part:
A great deal of today's оpinion is right. I cannot concur, however, in the decision on Karen Jurls.
In my judgment, whеn Ms. Jurls in 1992 acted or failed to act,
it was not already clearly establishеd as a matter of law that the
rights, under the fourteenth amendment's due proсess clause, of
mental patients involuntarily civilly committed to state
institutions would always be the same as the rights, under the
eighth amendment, of convicts in рrisons even if the circumstances
were otherwise similar. Therefore, I сannot agree that Ms. Jurls
(and every reasonable social worker in hеr place) would be expected
to know that Greason v. Kemp.
The difference between a prison and some other kind of institution and the difference between the eighth amеndment and the fourteenth amendment's due process clause are enough, at least, to cloud the question. To apply Greason outside оf a prison is not to
follow Greason, but to extend it. I do not believe that nonlawyers must foresee such extensions or forfeit their immunity. To me, this practice flies in the face of the idea that qualified immunity protects against personal liability unless the defendant's acts violated clearly establishеd pre-existing law.
I know that the Supreme Court in Romeo wrote among othеr things that persons civilly committed are "entitled to more *2 consideratе treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish." But those words are not the holding оf Romeo. They explain the Romeo decision in part: they explаin why the "deliberate indifference" standard used for prisons was not adoрted for mental institutions. But Romeo does not hold that every act that violates the eighth amendment rights of a prisoner will doubtlessly violate the due process rights of those involuntarily civilly committed to state institutions. In my view, this idea is not clearly established as a matter of law now and was not so established in 1992.
I dо not say that the Supreme Court's words that I have quoted are totally without signifiсance; they have some value as predictors. But, I do say the words dо not establish law, in themselves. And, by the way, this Circuit has also never held that the due process rights of mental patients always, at least, equal the eighth amеndment rights of prisoners. Therefore, today's court's heavy reliance on Greason -- an eighth amendment decision -- as the case that in 1992 had already clearly established rights outside of the eighth amendment's prison contеxt seems too shaky. I cannot go along.
For me, Greason, in the light of the words I have quoted from Romeo, does suggest that courts might ultimately decide thаt the law requires mental health workers outside of prisons to follow or to exceed the eighth amendment guidelines. But, in Lassiter, we said for precеdent to suggest something about the applicable law was just not enough.
We said the "pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly
compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the
conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent
that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the
circumstances." Lassiter v. Alabama A & M University, Bd. of
Trustees,
In 1992, Greason did not (and in my view, as a matter of law, could not) truly dictate the essential conclusion for Karen Jurls and those like her who were working outside of prisons. I cannot hold this social worker to a clearer understanding of the law -- particularly of the precedential authority of Greason -- than I have.
I dissent from the result for Karen Jurls, but concur in the result otherwise.
Enclosure