94 Mass. 421 | Mass. | 1866
It appears by the record of the judgment and sentence under which the petitioner is held in custody, that he was convicted of being a common seller of spirituous and intoxicating liquor in the superior court for the county of Norfolk ; and for that offence was ordered to pay a fine of fifty dollars, and also to be imprisoned for the term of three months in the house of correction for that county. This judgment was rendered subsequent to the time when the St. of 1866, c. 280, “ in regard to the sentence of criminals,” took effect; and the question for our determination is, whether, by reason of any of the provisions in the latter statute, the sentence is invalid, so hat the petitioner cannot be legally held thereon.
There can be no doubt that the sentence in question was awarded under Gen. Sts. c. 86, § 31; it being the minimum penalty thereby provided for a first conviction of being a common seller of spirituous and intoxicating liquor. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that that section of the General Statutes, although not repealed in express terms by St. 1866, c. 280, is nevertheless abrogated under § 4 of the latter statute, which repeals all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with its previous
But by the first section of St. 1866, c. 280; it is provided that when an offender is made subject to the punishment of fine and imprisonment in the house of correction or common jail, the court may in its discretion inflict only the penalty of the fine Without the imprisonment or the imprisonment without the fine, in all cases .where the offender shall prove, to the satisfaction of the court, that he has not before been convicted of a similar offence. It is obvious that this provision is applicable only to a certain class of cases. It does not extend to and include every case where a party convicted is liable to fine and imprisonment in a house of correction or common jail, but only to cases where the offender shall show to the court that he has not before been convicted of a similar offence. As to all other cases, the provisions of previous statutes in relation to the punishment of criminals remain unchanged.
Now there is nothing in the present case to show that the petitioner came within the class of offenders to which the new statute is applicable. It does not appear by the record or otherwise that he brought himself within that category, by proving to the court by which the sentence was imposed that he had not before been convicted of a similar offence. Certainly there is no presumption that the offence charged in the indictment, of which the petitioner stands convict, is his first conviction of a like offence. On the contrary, the statute imposes the burden of establishing this fact on the accused party, in order to entitle him to ask for the exercise of the discretion of the court in
But, in a broader view, we are clearly of opinion that the first section of the statute in question does not operate as a repeal of any previous provision of law in relation to the punishment of criminals. In the construction of statutes, the main objects to be kept in view are, that the intention of the legislature is to be carried out if it can be done by a fair and reasonable interpretation of the language used, and all repugnancy and inconsistency between different provisions relating to the same subject matter are to be avoided, if possible. When a statute is to be construed in reference to or in connection with a previous enactment, it is necessary to consider whether the two can have full operation and be carried into effect harmoniously. If they can, then both are to stand. Repeals by implication are not favored. It is not at all material, as the counsel for the prisoner seems to suppose it to be, that the two provisions, when brought together, cannot be read grammatically. It is the substance of the different enactments that is to be regarded, in order to ascertain the intent of the legislature as to their operation and effect.
Guided by these rules of interpretation, there is no room for doubt, not only that the legislature did not intend to repeal that clause in the General Statutes which prescribes the punishment for being a common seller of intoxicating liquor, or any other previous enactment by which fine and imprisonment are imposed as a penalty for an offence, but that the first section of St. 1866, c. 280, is not inconsistent with or repugnant to any other provision of law relating to the sentence of criminals. It does not change any previously prescribed penalty, nor does it substitute a new or different kind of punishment in the place of that which former statutes had affixed to certain classes of offences.
