| Aрpellants Bertha and Fredric Dohle and Kathy and James Dohle appeal the order of the Benton County Circuit Court establishing prescriptive easements over their property in favor of appellees Sue Ann Duffield, Frances Augusta “DeDe” Duffield Johnson, and Jim Johnson. Appellants argue that the trial court clearly erred in awarding the prescriptive easements because appellees’ use of the appellants’ property was neither continuous nor adverse. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Title to all of the land at issue (an eastern and western tract) was once held by appellee Sue Ann Duffield and her husband Otto Duffield. On January 2, 1985, the Duffields conveyed the eastern tract of their property to their daughter, DeDe Duffield Johnson and her husband Jim. The Johnsons reside in a house on the eastern tract. Water for their residence is pumped from a storage tank located in a spring house (built by the Duffields) on the [¿western tract. A pipe extends from the spring house to the Johnson residence, and the pump in the spring house is served electrical power by means of a power line extending from an electric pole also located on the western tract. The Johnsons pay for electrical service to the spring-house pump.
When the western tract of the Duffields’ property fell into foreclosure, it was purchased by Bertha and Fredric Dohle in 1989. Within the Dоhle tract is a two-acre cemetery plot, where members of the Duf-field family have been buried. Access to the cemetery is by means of a road also located on the Dohles’ property. In 1996, the Dohles conveyed title to the cemetery, as well as ingress, and egress to the cemetery, to appellee Sue Duffield. Between the parties’ shared boundary line and the cemetery-access easement, there is a seventy-five-foot gap (the gap) that rests entirely on the Dohles’ property. Over the years, appellees have crossed the gap to enter the cemetery and to access their own property when inclement weather prеvented them from using their own private, steep driveway.
On three separate occasions — September 23, 2000, April 18, 2004, and October 23, 2009 — appellants barricaded appellees’ access to the gap. Also, in October 2009, appellants padlocked the spring house, which resulted in a lack of water running to appellees’ house. In response, on October 28, 2009, appellees filed suit for trespass,
After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court entered a letter opinion on April 1, 2010, dismissing appellees’ claim for trespass but granting appellеes easements by prescription in the gap and the spring house. In the letter opinion, the trial court found that the relationship between the parties was not one of “good neighbors.” The court concluded that ap-pellees used the gap and spring house “openly and notoriously” and found “the blocking of the [gap] by Dohle from time to time to be real proof and acknowledgment of the adverse nature of [appellees’] use of the Dohle land.” An order establishing prescriptive easements was entered by the trial court on April 9, 2010. Appellants appealed. On February 23, 2011, our court dismissed appellants’ appeal for lack of a final order because it fаiled to define the boundary lines of the easements. Dohle v. Duffield,
We review equity cases de novo on the record and will not reverse a finding of fact by the trial court unless it is clearly erroneоus. Carson v. Cnty. of Drew,
At issue in this case is the trial court’s finding that appellees established prescriptive easements over the property of appellants.
A prescriptive easement may be gained by one not in fee possession of the land by operation of law in a manner similar to adverse possession. Like adverse possession, “prescriptive easements ... are not favored in the law, since they necessarily work corresponding losses or forfeitures in the rights of other persons.” In Arkansas, it is generally required that one asserting an easement by prescription show by a preponderance of the evidence that one’s use has been adverse to the true owner and under a claim of right for the statutory period. This court has said that the statutory period of seven years for adverse possession applies to prescriptive easements. That statutory period for adverse possession is set out in Ark. Code Ann. § 18-61-101 (1987). «See also Ark.Code Ann. § 18-11-106 (Supp.1999) (enacted as Act 776 of 1995).
Carson,
Overt activity on the pаrt of the user is necessary to make it clear to the owner of the property that an adverse use and claim are being exerted. Id. at 626,
The order of the trial court granting appellees a prescriptive easement in the spring house found that appellees’ use of it was adverse. On appeal, appellants challenge this finding.
This evidence — that appellees were maintaining two utilities on appellants’ property — establishes that appellees’ use of the spring house was adverse. Such advеrse actions are charged to the landowner.
The general rule is that whatever puts a party upon inquiry amounts in judgment of law to notice, provided the inquiry becomes a duty as in the case of vendor and purchaser, and would lead to the knowledge of the requisite fact, by the exercise of ordinary diligence and understanding. Or as the rule has been expressed more briefly, where a man has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed | (¡cognizant of it.
Hannah v. Daniel,
Appellants acknowledge appellees’ extensive use of the spring house. Dohle testified that he knew “from the start” that appellees were pumping water from the spring house and that they were receiving electricity there as well. However, appellants claim that appellees’ use of the spring house was permissive. In dismissing appellants’ claim that appellees’ use of the spring house was with appellants’ permission, the trial court in its letter opinion found that “[i]t is also clear that the relationship between [appellees] and [appellants] has not been one of ‘good neighbors.’ Instead, there have been incidents of overt and outright aggravation and interference, separated by periods of simmering, contemptuous quiet.” The trial court’s finding that appellees’ use of the spring house was not with appellants’ permission is а finding of fact. In reviewing a trial court’s findings, we give due deference to that court’s superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony. Carson,
Moreover, there was evidence contrary to appellants’ position that appellees’ use of the spring house was with permission. Dohle testified that he asked appellees for permission to tap into their electricity at the spring house so that he could use his own pump to provide water to his garden. For his use of the electricity, Dohle paid appellees a portion of their electric bills for a six-month period. Finally, DeDe testified that when Dohle asked to use appel-lees’ electricity, he said he would not use appellees’ spring-house water; instead, he said he would be pumping water out of his pond. For all these reasons, we hold the trial court did not clearly err in finding that appellees’ use of the spring house was adverse and in granting appellees a prescriptive easement in the spring house. We therefore affirm on this point.
Appellants also argue that the trial court clearly erred in granting appellees a prescriptive easement in the gap. On this point, appellants contend that not only did appеllees fail to establish adverse use, but they also failed to establish continuous and uninterrupted use for the seven-year statutory period. Because our holding on the latter issue is dispositive on this point, we address it first.
In Kelley v. Westover,
On appeal, our court stated, “any unambiguous аct of the owner of the land [that] evinces his intention to exclude others from the uninterrupted use of the right claimed breaks its continuity so as to prevent the acquisition of an easement therein by prescription.” Id. at 60,
Like the Westovers, appellants herein did not sit idly by and allow appellees to use the property. The facts in the instant case are undisputed that appellants pursued a series of overt acts to obstruct the use of the gap. Dohle testified that he blocked the appellees’ use of the gap.
Q: .Okay. Now, you testified earlier that your use of [the gap] has been interrupted in the past?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. So you agree with me that your use of [the gap] has not been continuous? That there have been periods when you’ve been interrupted; right?
A: Right.
DeDe testified that Dohle interrupted ap-pellees’ use of the gap on three different occasiоns — in 2000, 2004, and 2009 — and she offered examples of how Dohle blocked their use of the gap: he gated the open area of the fence; he padlocked his gate; he took down the gate and put up a fence; he placed a big tree stump, railroad ties, trailers, trucks, and tractors in front of the fence “so that there was no way that we could get through if we wanted;” and he posted no-trespassing signs. These blockades resulted in actual interruptions of appellees’ use that continued for days until Dohle removed them. Moreover, despite appellees’ sporadic use of the gap,
We acknowledge that in Kelley we affirmed the trial court’s finding that the Kelleys’ |10use was not continuous and uninterrupted, and in doing so we stated that the trial court’s finding on such an issue is a question of fact for the fact-finder thаt we will not reverse unless it is clearly erroneous. Kelley,
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Notes
. Appellees alleged that appellants and members of their families were trespassing on ap-pellees' cemetery.
. Appellants concede that appellees’ use of the spring house was continuous and uninterrupted for the required seven-year period.
. We refer back to the finding of the trial court that the parties were not "good neighbors,” which we interpret to be a finding that appellees' use of the gap was not with appellants’ permission. If appellеes' use of the gap was not with permission, then it was adverse. If appellees’ use of the gap was adverse, then appellants’ blocking the gap on several different occasions using several different means can only be interpreted as an interruption of appellees’ use.
. DeDe testified that her driveway is impassable due to weather approximately one month of the year. There was no testimony about how many times a year appellees visit their cemetery.