73 Vt. 380 | Vt. | 1901
The petitioner was convicted of murder in November, 1899. The murder was committed in February of that year. At the trial the petitioner was thirty-three years old.
A petition for a new trial was heard in May 1900 and dismissed. State v. Doherty, 72 Vt. 402. That adjudication does not bar this proceeding, sec. 1998 V. S. The petition is based upon the ground that since the trial, testimony has been discovered showing that the petitioner at the time of the murder was insane. Under the former proceedings the testimony of nine witnesses was filed and under this, twenty-nine. In passing upon the question involved we consider the testimony filed under both petitions.
We have referred to- all the facts in relation to the petitioner’s insanity which the testimony tends in any respect to establish and the question before us is whether the testimony as a whole is of such force and character that upon another trial the result would be different from the result of the first trial. A pertinent inquiry in the outset is, what is the nature of the insanity which exempts one from crime. Writers on medical jurisprudence have displayed much ingenuity in endeavoring to classify the different phases of insanity. Under one heading a writer gathers in one series thirty-one different classes. Another dissatisfied with the above, and contending that utility should govern the classification, while recognizing the impossibility of creating any unassailable fabric of the kind, thinks that a division into- fifty-six classes will best meet the requirements of both the legal and medical profession. The language of the learned,and of the medical experts,in describing its different phases, are apt to confuse the common mind and are really detrimental in the investigation of insanity in its legal sense. “The law does not recognize the division of insanity into numerous varieties, though convenient for purposes of description, insanity in the legal sense embracing all grades and conditions, being synonymous with unso-undness of mind.” St. George v. Biddeford, 76 Me. 593.
Insanity is defined as such a mental condition as either from the existence of delusions or from incapacity to distinguish between right and wrong with regard to any matter under consideration does away with individual responsibility. Web. Int. Die.
Insanity is a defence to any crime. The degree of insanity which excuses is well stated in Davis v. United States, 165
A more concise definition is given in Bish. New Cr. Law, sec. 396 a. “One is insane who, from whatever cause, is incompetent to have the criminal intent, or who is incapable of s,o controlling his volition as to avoid doing the forbidden thing.” If one’s mental and moral faculties are so disordered and deranged that he cannot distinguish between right and wrong, or is not conscious at the time of the nature of the act he is committing, or if conscious of it and able to distinguish between right and wrong, yet if his mind or will is, involuntarily, so completely destroyed that he cannot control his actions, he is in a legal sense insane and is not subject to punishment for criminal acts committed when in such a state. Insanity may be general or it may be partial, but “whether the insanity is general or partial the degree of it must have been so great as to control'the will of its subject, and to have taken from him the freedom of moral action.” Com. v. Mosher, 4 Pa. St. 264.
Such being the rule in regard to the insanity which excuses crime we refer now to the testimony before us and which it is evident must be produced upon another trial. First as to the testimony concerning heredity. It is not probable that it can be found upon the testimony that any relative of the petitioner, unless it may be an aunt of the half blood, “Funny
In passing upon this question we must to some extent at least, place ourselves in the position of jurors: for it is for us to determine whether upon all the testimony in the case a jury upon another trial would arrive at another result from that expressed by the verdict upon the former trial. We have scanned and thoroughly considered all the testimony in the case and considering the serious nature of the charge and the result to the petitioner, if any doubt has arisen we have solved it in his favor. Upon the whole case we can arrive at no other conclusion than that the verdict upon the trial was correct, and that the result upon another trial would be the same as upon the first. The testimony is voluminous, but none of the salient facts are contradicted, there is no controversy concerning the transaction,' nor what took place at the time of the shooting, nor the occurrences for the week before — and during all this time there is nothing that indicates insanity on the part of the petitioner. There is an entire absence of anything to show “delusion of suspicion,” the week of the homicide. An absence of any testimony which tends to show insanity so great as to control his will or to take from him the freedom of moral action according to the rule stated in Com. v. Mosher, supra. At the time of the killing Doherty was under no delusion in respect to Murphy. It is not probable he believed it necessary to kill Murphy in self-defence; there is nothing tending to show that he thought so. There is nothing in the circum
Upon the zvhole case the court are of the opinion that the petition ought to be, and the same is, dismissed. A new trial being refused, the court hereby appoints the first Friday in December next in the year ipoi between the hours of one o’clock and three o’clock in the afternoon of said day as the time for executing the sentence heretofore imposed upon said Charles Doherty, and the clerk is directed to issue an order to the sheriff of Windsor county for that purpose.