This petition was brought under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 175, § 113B, as amended by St. 1935, c. 459, § 4, to review an order of the respondent commissioner made on December 4, 1950, establishing classification of risks and rates to be charged as premiums by companies for the year 1951 in connection with compulsory motor vehicle liability insurancе as defined by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, § 34A, as amended. A demurrer filed by the commissioner and demurrers filed by two insurance companies that were allowed to intervene were sustained. The answer of these inter-veners sеtting up special matter in the nature of a plea was sustained by the single justice. The petitioner appealed from decrees entered on these interlocutory matters and from a finаl decree dismissing the petition.
All the material and substantial allegations of the petition may be briefly stated. It is alleged that the Legislature in enacting § 113B did not intend that the rates for compulsory automobile liability policies should be different for different districts or zones; that the order of the commissioner dividing the Commonwealth into zones and establishing rates for each zone was discriminatory and violativе of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and of arts. 1,10, and 11 of the Declaratiоn of Rights of the Constitution of this Commonwealth; that the commissioner failed to establish just, reasonable, аnd nondiscriminatory rates for 1951 before September 15, 1950; that it is mathematically impossible to establish adequate, fair, and reasonable rates based upon zones; and that the order fixing the “expеnse loading” portion of the rates on a zone *163 basis is contrary to the provisions of Federal and State Constitutions above mentioned and also “the provisions of G. L. c. 175 and 113B, and St. 1935, c. 459.” The speсific prayers of the petition are for injunctive relief against the enforcement of the order of December 4, 1950, and for an order to compel the commissioner to promulgate a flat rate for compulsory automobile insurance policies and bonds throughout the Commonwеalth.
This summary of the contents of the petition demonstrates that it consists of nothing more than a series of general and broad conclusions, unsupported by any definite and specific averments of facts. It does not attack any subsidiary finding of the commissioner or any particular ruling of law made by him. It wаs said of a similar petition for review that “These words [of § 113B as then appearing in St. 1929, c. 166] do not mean that by simple petition without more parties are entitled to ask the court to review the whole field covered by the commissioner and make its own finding,” and also that “The petition must contain allegations setting out with certainty, brevity and adequate degree of particularity the grounds upon which rеlief is sought.”
Brest
v.
Commissioner of Insurance,
The fact thаt § 113B provides that the commissioner shall annually on or before September 15 fix and establish fair and reasonable classifications of risks and just and nondiscriminatory premium charges does not render invalid the classification and rates which in the instant case were not established until December 4, 1950.
Liberty Mutual
*164
Ins. Co.
v.
Acting Commissioner of Insurance,
The principal object sought by the present petition is to obtain a decision that the commissioner had no authority to establish rates for premium charges for compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance based upon a zoning system in which he divided the Commonwealth into different districts or zones and established a rate for each zone for automobiles where they were principally garagеd. All the bald allegations contained in the present petition attacking this method of determining the rates by zones were considered and decided adversely to the petitioner in
Brest
v.
Commissioner of Insurance,
The interlocutory decrees are affirmed, and the final decree is affirmed with costs.
So ordered