On the night of June 22-23, 1934, Doherty and Tupper were in the employ of one Albertini driving his truck from Albany, New York, to Boston. Albertini had a contract with Motor Express Agency, Inc., by which he was to furnish to that corporation two large semi-trailer trucks with operators to make round trips between the two cities. Motor Express Agency, Inc., was in the business of transporting merchandise as a cаrrier between Boston and Albany, using for that purpose the trucks which it hired from independent contractors. It was a subscriber under the workmen’s compensation act, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152. Albertini was not a subscriber. Doherty and Tupper were carrying a load for Motor Express Agency, Inc., under the contract of their employer Albertini. Shortly after midnight as they were descending a grade on a curve on the east side of Lebanon Mountain in the town of Hancock the semi-trailer truck left the road, tore through the fence and ran down the embankment, where it turned over and burst into flames. Both Doherty and Tupper perished in the wreck.
Although the immediate employer of the deceased workmen was not insured under the act, it is the contention of their dependents, the present claimants, that if the deceased had been employed directly by Motor Express Agency, Inc., they would have been entitled to compеnsation, that their employer, Albertini, had entered into a contract to do the express agency’s work and therefore that the express agency’s insurer became liable to the claimants under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, § 18. The material portions
No witnesses testified as to how the accident occurrеd, and its precise cause is left in doubt. We need not, however, discuss the question whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of the board that the deaths arose out of and in the course of the employment, because it is plain that these claimants have no rights to compensation unless they are able to bring their cases within said § 18, and we think these cases are excluded from the benefit of that section by the language of its last sentence.
The injury occurred on or about the public highway. Certainly the highway was not¡>“ under the сontrol or management of the insured.” But the claimants strongly urge that the highway was “the premises” on which the contractor had “undertaken to execute the work for the insured.” . We can appreciate the force of the argument that the purpose' of § 18 was to prevent evasion of the act by the letting out of work to irresponsible and uninsured con
The primary meaning of thе word "premises” as indicated by its derivation is "that which is sent before” or "that which is placed first.” Apparently it came to be used in a secondary sense to denote lands and tenements because all that part of a deed which came before the habendum and therefore included the description of the lands conveyed was called the premises. As dеnoting location on the earth’s surface the word' originally had and as now commonly used still has reference to lands or buildings regarded as separate units or entities, with differing characteristics, presumably occupied separately and bounded or limited in some manner and distinguished from other lands or buildings. See Sumner v. Williams,
If the claimants’ argument founded upon the general purpose and intent of compеnsation acts is sound, it would seem that it ought also to apply if Albertini had contracted to carry loads by water or even by airplane instead of by the highway. But we suppose it would hardly be contended that navigable waters or the sky constituted “the premises” on, in or about which the contractor had undertaken to execute the work. Nor can the truck itself оn which the deceased persons were riding be deemed “the premises.” Except possibly' when used in some peculiar context, “premises” does not include personal рroperty. Casey v. Boston Elevated Railway,
The words of § 18 here involved werе copied with slight changes from the English act of 1906. This circumstance gives special force to previous decisions of the English courts as authoritative interpretations of the lаnguage used. Corbett’s Case,
The сommission which framed our compensation act seems to have assumed as correct a construction of the present § 18 which would exclude from compensation thеreunder persons injured while travelling on public ways. In their report they speak of this section (§ 17 of the original act, St. 1911, c. 751, Part III) as providing "that an employer shall be liable to pаy compensation to employees of. a contractor who is performing part of the work of the employer on the premises of the employer or on prеmises under his control.” Report of Mass. Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents, 1912, page 52.
We do not mean to intimate that if the contractor has engaged to perfоrm work in or upon the highway itself, such as construction of the way, paving, laying pipes or other work which is distinct from the use of the way for purposes of travel, those portions of the way upon which such work is actually done might not be deemed to be "the premises on which the contractor has undertaken to execute the work” under § 18. We now decide only thаt § 18 does not apply to work on a public way which consists merely in using the way under the public right for the purpose of travel.
It follows that in each case the decree should be reversed and a decree should be entered for the insurer.
So ordered.