97 Minn. 248 | Minn. | 1906
Respondent was in possession of two printing presses, and had in its employment two pressmen, Egan and Burns, who were each assisted by one, and sometimes two, helpers. Egan was foreman of the pressroom, with authority to hire and discharge employees, and during his absence Burns was temporary foreman, with the same general powers, including authority to discharge, but not to hire, men. Upon the occasion in question Egan was absent, and Burns was in charge of the pressroom as foreman, and was personally engaged in running one of the presses, with Fred Doerr as helper, and the two had worked together as pressman and helper for more than a year. It was the duty of the helper — sometimes called “press feeder” — to insert the paper between the rolls of the machine, which was done with the hands when the press was stationary, and when he had done so he would give a signal to the pressman, who started the press after giving warning that he was about to do so. This action is based upon an injury occasioned by the pressman, Burns, who started the machine before he received the customary signal from the helper, who, as a result, had his fingers caught between the rolls and severely injured. There is no dispute about the facts, and upon motion the trial court directed a verdict for respondent.
The case turns upon whether or not Burns was the fellow servant of his helper. If he was, there is no liability; but, if not, then the case
In the case under consideration, the rule may be applied without complication with any of the other principles which are sometimes involved. The machine was not defective, and the parties were engaged in their ordinary duties in its operation. No negligence is charged against respondent for not having used ordinary care in selecting Burns as pressman, and no negligence is predicated upon the complicated character of the work, or that it required the personal supervision of the master to direct the movements of the workmen and proper rules to govern them. The specific act of negligence'charged is that respondent negligently caused the press to start without warning and while the helper had his hands between the rolls. Accepting the evidence to the effect that upon this occasion Burns had general supervision over the employees in the pressroom, it is clear that the work in which he was engaged at the time of the injury was not that of vice principal or foreman, but merely his ordinary duties as fellow servant.
The case of Norton Bros. v. Nadebok, 190 Ill. 595, 60 N. E. 843, 54 L. R. A. 842, cited by appellant, clearly illustrates the distinction between the duties performed by a coservant as such and duties performed as superintendent. There Banning was in charge of the operation of the machine, and had the direction and control of his helper, and an obstruction having become fastened in the wheels, so as to interfere with the operation of the machine, Banning directed the helper to put his hand in and remove it, and before he had done so Banning started the machine in motion, causing the injury. The master was held liable, -under the principle that at the time of the accident Banning was engaged in carrying out the duty imposed upon him as superintendent. The machine had become defective, and it was necessary to exercise ■supervision for the purpose of putting it in order. In this court Borgerson v. Cook Stone Co., 91 Minn. 91, 97 N. W. 734, and Jemming v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 96 Minn. 302, 104 N. W. 1079, are illustrations of the principle here applied.
Order affirmed.