22 N.W.2d 217 | Minn. | 1946
The trial court's order states that plaintiff's motion for a new trial was granted "for the reasons particularly specified in plaintiff's notice of motion and hereby made a part of this order by reference." Incorporated as a part of the order is the trial court's memorandum setting forth that a new trial had been granted because of certain errors in the charge to the jury and because of the prejudicial effect of the withdrawal of defendant Duncan's attorney from the trial and the apparent absence of effort to prove a case against Duncan. Plaintiff's notice of motion contained nothing more than certain specific assignments of error. There is no direct statement whatever in the order, the memorandum, or the notice of motion to indicate that the granting of the new trial was "based exclusively upon errors occurring at the trial."
There can be no exceptions to the rule requiring strict compliance with Minn. St. 1941, §
"from an order refusing a new trial, or from an order granting a new trial if the court expressly states therein, or in amemorandum attached thereto, that the order is basedexclusively upon errors of law occurring at the trial and uponno other ground the court shall specify such errors in itsorder or memorandum; but upon appeal, such order granting a new trial may be sustained for errors of law prejudicial to respondent other than those specified by the trial court;" (Italics supplied.)
In Miller v. County of Steele,
"* * * The statute does not leave the appealability of an order granting a new trial to inferences that it is based upon errors of *400
law alone. Pust v. Holtz,
Failure to comply with the statute is fatal to this appeal. See, Seorum v. Marudas,
The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted.
Appeal dismissed.