The appellee is a non-profit, charitable corporation which oper *615 ates a boarding school in Atlanta. The appellant’s then 13-year-old daughter (referred to in the litigation as “Jane Doe”) attended this school from October of 1986 through September of 1987. Acting both individually and on her behalf, the appellant brought the present action against the appellee seeking damages for certain emotional trauma allegedly suffered by his daughter as the result of having participated in a consensual sexual relationship with an adult male staff member at the school during this period. The staff member in question, who had been employed by the school as a recreational supervisor, categorically denied having engaged in sexual relations with the child. The appellee moved for summary judgment in the action, and the appellant thereafter dismissed his claim for recovery in his individual capacity. The trial court then granted the appellee’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the appellant’s claim on behalf of his daughter, and this appeal followed.
The appellant testified that he became concerned about the nature of the staff member’s relationship with his daughter during the course of the school year because she frequently talked to him on the telephone on weekends while staying at his (the appellant’s) house, and also because she had some photographs of him, along with a business card pertaining to a part-time job which he apparently held with a radio station. The appellant conveyed his concerns to his daughter’s guidance counselor at the school and was referred by the latter to the school’s director. He testified that the director told him that the staff member was a responsible person who was “engaged to be married or something” and that she did not think he (the appellant) “had anything to worry about.”
This discussion with the director evidently took place early in 1987. It does not appear that the appellant ever brought up the issue again while his daughter was enrolled at the school; and he conceded that except for the factors mentioned above, he had no reason during this period to believe that the staff member’s relationship with his daughter was anything other than professional. It was not until after the daughter transferred to another institution in the fall of 1987 that she told anyone she had engaged in sexual activity with the staff member. It is evident from the appellant’s deposition testimony that a major reason for his earlier concern about the relationship was that the staff member in question is black. The appellant testified that he was “probably” prejudiced against black men and did not want his daughter (who is white) dating blacks.
The school’s director testified that she had conducted an investigation into the child’s allegations but had found “no evidence whatsoever that [the staff member] had acted inappropriately.” While there is evidence that the child told her guidance counselor that she had a “crush” on the staff member, she stated that she never told anyone at *616 the school (including her classmates) that she was involved in sexual activity with him. The child testified that she last engaged in intercourse with the staff member in August of 1987, that she became pregnant by him at about that time, and that the pregnancy terminated in a miscarriage in late October or early November. However, there is no medical or other evidence tending to corroborate the latter testimony. To the contrary, there is evidence that the child underwent a pregnancy test on September 20, 1987, with negative results.
1. The trial court correctly concluded that the appellee could not be held liable for the alleged misconduct of the staff member under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
“This court has repeatedly held that ‘ “(i)n determining the liability of the master for the negligent or wilful acts of a servant, the test of liability is, not whether the act was done during the existence of the employment, but whether it was done within the scope of the actual employment.” ’ [Cits.]”
Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co. v. Sharara,
On the basis of thé foregoing authorities, the alleged misconduct at issue in this case must similarly be considered personal in nature and unrelated to the performance of the staff member’s employment duties. Accordingly, we hold that the appellee was properly granted summary judgment on this theory of recovery. Accord
Big
Brother/
Big Sister
cfee.
v. Terrell,
2. The appellant contends that fact issues remain as to whethei the appellee was negligent in hiring, retaining or supervising the employee. In order for an employer to be held liable for the crimina' conduct of an employee based on such negligence, it must be showr that the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s criminal propensities. See
Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co. v. Sharara
supra,
3. The appellant finally contends that the appellee may be held liable for the alleged molestation of his daughter under the theory that, by allowing it to occur, it violated the duty which “ ‘a business inviter owes ... to protect its invitees from abusive language and conduct’ ” on the part of its employees.
Reveo Discount Drug Centers of Ga. v. Famble,
4. The appellant’s remaining contentions are rendered moot by the foregoing.
Judgment affirmed.