Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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JOHN DOE, :
:
Plaintiff, :
: MEMORANDUM & -against- : ORDER :
UNITED STATES, et al., : 3:24-CV-1146 (VDO)
:
Defendants. :
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VERNON D. OLIVER , United States District Judge:
Plaintiff John Doe brings this action against various federal and state governmental entities and individuals (collectively “Defendants”) asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Before the Court are two motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 by Defendants. For the reasons that follow, the motions are granted . In addition, the Court sua sponte dismisses the claims against the Director of the National Conference of State Legislators and denies Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint a third time. I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The facts in the operative complaint are sparse. The pleading itself is titled “Amended Complaint[.] This is a Federal Lawsuit Brought Forth Under $1983 Of 42 U[.]S[.]C[.] and Under $1985 Of 42 U[.]S[.]C[.] for Violations of Constitutional and Human Rights by the Defendants of this Action, Violations by the Enactment and Ongoing Effort to Ingrain into the American Way of Life of the United States the US and State Sex Offender Registries . . .” [2]
As the Court can best discern and as potentially relevant in deciding this motion, Plaintiff, in his Complaint, alludes to:
• Having “35 years on the registry.” [3]
• Having to “Register for the Registry,” purchase postage stamps, and spend time in the line at the post office to mail a registry form. [4]
• Being arrested and convicted of criminal trespassing and loitering on school grounds after he was “approached by the police after a woman told another woman [he] was on the registry.” [5]
• “On or about August 8, 1994, . . . [t]he police then returned to the car and drove me downtown and booked me for exposing myself to 3 young boys . . . After reali[z]ing that my Public Defender had no real interest in me, and who is now a Judge, I asked him “Can you just give me 10 years and get this over with”. And I thought he understood. I was sentenced to 16 years, suspended after 6. I did the 6 years and was released. . . . My Norwalk probation officer informed me that he had a report that I was at the Cove park. He then initiated Violation of Probation papers and had me sentenced to the remaining 10 years. Of course this is years later.” [6]
However, throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff does not clearly allege that he was convicted of a crime that requires him to register as a sex offender, what the conviction was or when it occurred, or that he is presently required to register as a sex offender in Connecticut or elsewhere. Plaintiff does not define the term “United States Sex Offender Registry,” “US and State Sex Offender Registries,” “this registry,” or the “Sex Offender Registry” in the Complaint.
The Complaint also makes numerous references throughout to various states’ sex offender registry requirements, requirements for international travel, and the Department of Defense’s requirements for offenders convicted of Uniform Code of Military Justice offenses. [7] The Complaint alleges that former Presidents Bush and Clinton signed (or influenced or instructed the passage of) the passage of “[t]he US and State Sex Offender Registries” and “laws that violate the Constitution.” [8] While naming former Presidents Bush and Clinton in both their official and personal capacities, the Complaint makes no personal capacity allegations against former Presidents Bush and Clinton. The Complaint also makes no specific allegations against any federal official or Member of Congress, despite naming dozens of such officials and members.
The Complaint is difficult to follow and relies heavily on conclusory assertions and baseless factual contentions. For example, Plaintiff cites to “facts in support of amended complaint” that include references to a YouTube video entitled “I killed my pe[]dophile husband” and various comments posted in response to that video. [9] Plaintiff references another YouTube video which he describes as “entitled: ‘Five mothers who took revenge on child molesters.’ And it shows a bare chested man with the letter ‘Z’ carved on his chest with the superscription: ‘She cut off his d#ck.’ [How does this sort of absurd assault make the world we live in safer . . . ]” [10] It is entirely unclear how these materials—or Plaintiff’s commentary about them—bear any relation to the legal claims asserted in this case.
Plaintiff also makes numerous vague and vacillating allegations without any reference as to what he is specifically referring or makes allegations that are plainly contradicted by allegations within his own complaint or other filings:
• “We, in certain instances and mostly all of the time are not allowed to live or walk within 1,000-2500 feet from a school.” [11]
• “Out of State travel is a guaranteed right to every citizen in the United [S]tates, however, if I or any Sex Offender travels out of state and stays in another state for a duration of time, lets just say 3 days-as I am not sure of the exact number - I or that person on the US and State Sex Offender Registries must register in the state where that person has traveled.” [12]
• “Sex offenders are the most likely of persons in the US to be denied a job because no one chooses to hire me or any sex offender claiming that ‘We don’t practice prejudicial hiring, but we are heading in a different direction.’ This places me and those on the registry several tiers below illegal aliens who are given preferential treatment in all phases of daily affairs.” [13] . Yet, Plaintiff states he is employed with $4,300 monthly income. [14]
• “We are moved away from the mainstream of society by laws directed to force us to live in the Everglade forest of Florida, under bridge overpasses, and in cardboard boxes which i [sic] or they must stay at as if it was our home in all states.” [15] Yet, Plaintiff states he owns a home with an estimated value of $140,000. [16]
With respect to remedies, Plaintiff seeks monetary relief of $35 million in compensatory damages, $50 million in punitive damages, a declaratory judgment that federal and state sex offender registries are unconstitutional, “lawyer fees and other fees,” [17] “to punish those heretofore enforcing the registry. . . ,” [18] and to “put an end to [federal and state sex offender registries] in perpetuity.” [19]
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff, proceeding anonymously, filed his initial complaint in this action against the United States on July 2, 2024. [20] On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff moved the Court to file an amended complaint. [21] The Court granted that motion on August 13, 2024, stating that at that point Plaintiff may amend his complaint as a matter of course, and the amended complaint became the operative complaint in this action (hereinafter the “FAC”). [22] Plaintiff filed the FAC “under 43 US $ 1983 [sic] for Constitutional Violations of Fundamental Human Rights” regarding “the United States Sex Offender Registry,” [23] naming numerous federal and state agencies and officials as defendants. [24] On December 9, 2024, the federal government defendants named in the FAC (“Initial Federal Defendants”) moved to dismiss the FAC on numerous grounds, including under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (2), (5), and (6). [25] The Initial Federal Defendants argued that, inter alia , Plaintiff failed to effectuate service upon the United States and the Initial Federal Defendants. [26]
On December 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed both a response to the Initial Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss as well as a motion to amend his complaint for a second time. [27] In the motion to file a second amended complaint and within the proposed second amended complaint attachment, with the stated purpose of adding a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim, Plaintiff named only the United States as the defendant. [28] On January 28, 2025, the Court granted, over the Initial Federal Defendants’ objection, Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint for a second time and ordered Plaintiff to file his amended complaint on the docket on or before February 18, 2025. [29] On February 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint (the “Complaint”) in which he added numerous new defendants, including former President George Bush in his official and personal capacities, the Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and numerous Members of Congress from across various states. [30]
The remainder of this memorandum refers to the Director of the Norwalk Connecticut Office of Adult Probation and the Director of the Connecticut Department Public Safety as the “State Defendants.” [31] The remaining defendants, except for the Director of the National Conference of State Legislators, are referred to as the “Federal Defendants.”
Federal Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on March 14, 2025. [32] Plaintiff filed two responses to that motion on March 18, 2025, and March 31, 2025, respectively. [33] The Federal Defendants filed their reply on April 8, 2025. [34] Plaintiff subsequently attempted to file a sur-reply. [35] Because he did not seek leave from the Court to do so, that sur-reply was improperly filed, and the Court declines to consider it in the instant opinion. See L. R. Civ. Pro. 7(d) (“No sur-replies may be filed without permission of the Court, which may, in its discretion, grant permission upon a showing of good cause”).
National Conference of State Legislators In his/her Official Capacity, Director of the Director of the [sic] Connecticut Department of Public Safety in his/her Official Capacity, Director of the Norwalk Connecticut Department of Adult Probation in his/her Official Capacity, Director of the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, and Tracking (SMART Office) In his/her Official Capacity, Representative Nancy Pelosi in her Official Capacity, Representative Ken Calvert in his Official Capacity, Representative Steny Hoyer in his Official Capacity, Representative Marcy Kaptur in his Official Capacity, Representative Hal Rogers in his Official Capacity, Representative Chris Smith in his Official Capacity, Representative Frank Lukas in his Official Capacity, Senator Chuck Schumer in his Official Capacity, Senator Mike Crapo in his Official Capacity, Senator Ed Markey in his Official Capacity, Senator Kim Ward in her Official, Senator Ron Wyden in his Official Capacity, Senator Chuck Grassley in his Official Capacity, Senator Susan Collins in her Official Capacity, Senator Mitch McConnell in his Official Capacity” Compl. at 1–3 (citation modified).
[31] As the Court has previously noted, “Plaintiff appears to have named the Director of the Norwalk Connecticut Department of Public [S]afety twice in his amended complaint.” (ECF No. 44.) The Court, in the remainder of this opinion, construes the two as one Defendant, absent its analysis of relevant service issues in Section III(B)(1), infra . See ECF No. 45. See ECF Nos. 49, 50. See ECF No. 52. See ECF No. 66.
The State Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on July 29, 2025. Plaintiff filed his response to that motion on August 19, 2025. State Defendants did not file a reply.
The Director of the National Conference of State Legislators has not yet appeared on the docket.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A party may move to dismiss a complaint for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction[.]”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction may
be either facial or fact-based.”
Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC
,
B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
“A prima facie case of personal jurisdiction requires nonconclusory fact-specific
allegations or evidence showing that activity that constitutes the basis of jurisdiction has taken
place.”
Ferrara v. Munro
,
C. Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient Service of Process
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) is properly
granted when the plaintiff fails to serve a copy of the summons and complaint on the
defendants pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
. Cole v. Aetna Life &
Cas.
,
D. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
A party may move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “On a motion to dismiss, all factual allegations in
the complaint are accepted as true and all inferences are drawn in the plaintiff’s favor.”
Littlejohn v. City of New York
,
The Court also notes that pro se litigants enjoy “special solicitude.”
Ruotolo v. I.R.S.
,
III. DISCUSSION
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The Court begins with subject-matter jurisdiction, focusing primarily on the immunities that bar Plaintiff’s claims against both the Federal and State Defendants.
1. Claims Against Federal Defendants
The Federal Defendants are immune from Plaintiff’s claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3). “It is . . . axiomatic under the principle of sovereign immunity that the United States
may not be sued without its consent . .
.
”
Adeleke v. United States
,
Here, the Plaintiff has established neither a waiver nor consent to be sued. In such cases,
a plaintiff may not maintain his damage claims against the defendants in their official
capacities, and such claims are subject to dismissal.
See
Tanvir v. Tanzin,
Here, Plaintiff makes claims relating to a fundamental power that the Constitution
provides to the President: “recommending to Congress the measures he thinks wise and signing
or vetoing the bills Congress passes.”
See Trump
,
The Members of the House and Senate are also entitled to absolute immunity under the
Speech or Debate Clause.
See
U.S. Const.. art. I, § 6, (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either
House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”);
Eastland
v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund
,
Here, Plaintiff challenges a fundamental function of the legislative process: voting on
and passing laws.
See, e.g., Gravel
, 408 U.S. at 617 (stating that “Committee reports,
resolutions, and the act of voting are . . . covered” by the Speech or Debate Clause). Moreover,
though Plaintiff alleges certain pieces of legislation might be illegal, that “‘familiar’
argument—made in almost every Speech or Debate Clause case—has been rejected time and
again.”
Rangel
,
2. Claims Against State Defendants As it relates to State Defendants, to the extent that Plaintiff brings claims against them for monetary damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), the Court agrees with State Defendants’ argument that those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages against state governments
and state officials when they are sued in their official capacities “in federal court unless they
have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.”
See, e.g., Yerdon v. Poitras
,
Plaintiff sues State Defendants only in their official capacities. Thus, the claims against the State Defendants in their official capacity for compensatory or punitive damages are dismissed, as the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate them.
Nor does Plaintiff successfully invoke the
Ex parte Young
exception to sovereign
immunity—the only avenue through which Plaintiff may raise a federal claim against state
officials acting in their official capacity. Any claim that seeks to implicate the
Ex parte Young
exception must allege an ongoing violation and seek prospective relief.
Vega v. Semple
, 963
F.3d 259, 281 (2d Cir. 2020). The doctrine is “a narrow exception” to sovereign immunity that
exists only to “prevent[ ] state executive officials from enforcing state laws that are contrary
to federal law.”
Unkechaug Indian Nation v. Seggos
, 126 F.4th 822, 829 (2d Cir. 2025)
(quoting
Silva v. Farrish
, 47 F.4th 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2022)). However, it “does not permit
judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past.”
Puerto
Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.
,
Here, Plaintiff neither alleges an ongoing violation of federal law nor seeks prospective relief. The Court agrees with State Defendants’ assertion that “[a]ny claim that Plaintiff makes against the ‘Director of the Norwalk Connecticut Department of Adult Probation’ is retrospective . . .” [41] Plaintiff refers to his time in probation only in the past tense. For example, Plaintiff alleges that “[w]hen [he] was under the supervision of the Norwalk, CT Department of Probation, [he] was forced to pay for treatment” and that “[d]uring [his] time in Norwalk Probation, [his] then probation officer, forcing [Plaintiff] to take part in counselling, made [him] quit the job that I had . . . .” [42] Plaintiff further states that he was “sentenced to 1 year of Probation.” Coupled with his statement about having “35 years on the registry,” the Court concludes that Plaintiff is likely no longer on probation and has not been for a significant amount of time. In other words, he cannot point to an ongoing violation of federal law.
Nor can the substance of relief sought by Plaintiff be classified as “prospective” in
nature. Allegations of “isolated past incidents, in conjunction with conclusory language
requesting injunctive relief in the form of ‘nullification’ . . . is insufficient for purposes of
Ex
parte Young
.”
Kelsey v. Kessel
, No. 22-CV-03774,
Here, the only injunctive relief requested by Plaintiff, with respect to the State Defendants, is an “end [to the sex] registry in total.” This request, coupled with Plaintiff’s mentions of past incidents that occurred while he was on probation, do not properly implicate the Ex parte Young exception. They amount merely to a rendition of “isolated past incidents, in conjunction with conclusory language requesting injunctive relief in the form of ‘nullification’” of all sex offender registry laws, clearly outside of the scope of Ex parte Young . Thus, the Court holds that any claims raised by Plaintiff for “prospective” declaratory or injunctive relief against the Director of the Norwalk Connecticut Department of Adult Probation are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Any claim that Plaintiff brings for injunctive relief against State Defendants under state
law is further barred under the
Pennhurst
doctrine, which does not permit federal claims
asserting state officials violated state law in carrying out their official duties under the Eleventh
Amendment.
Vega
,
Plaintiff asserts that Connecticut is among fifteen states that has promised the right to privacy within its constitution and that it has comprehensive data privacy laws in place. To the extent that the Court construes this as a claim that the sex offender registry, maintained in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-250 et seq., is in violation of the Connecticut Constitution and some unspecified data privacy laws, these claims are rooted in state law and therefore barred by the Pennhurst doctrine. Thus, they are dismissed.
B. Personal Jurisdiction Plaintiff’s claims also fail for lack of personal jurisdiction. Most of the Federal Defendants—and one of the State Defendants—were never properly served, and Plaintiff’s allegations against former Presidents Clinton and Bush do not establish the minimum contacts with Connecticut necessary to support jurisdiction. These deficiencies provide an independent basis for dismissal as to many of the named defendants.
1. Ineffective Service
Relying on grounds of ineffective service, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (12)(b)(5),
Federal Defendants move to dismiss any claims against the United States and all Federal
Defendants. The Federal Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not comply with the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(2) so as to effectuate service in a proper manner. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(c)(2) mandates that only a “person who is at least 18 years old and
not a
party
may serve a summons and complaint” (emphasis added).
See also Constien v. United
States
,
Federal Defendants also assert that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(2) requires a
plaintiff suing a federal agency or corporation, or federal officer or employee sued only in an
official capacity, to serve the United States “and also send a copy of the summons and of the
complaint by registered or certified mail to the agency, corporation, officer, or employee.” It
is the plaintiff’s burden to prove valid service by providing, among other things, a signed
certified-mail return receipt by the recipient.
See Fuqua v. Turn
er,
Here, Plaintiff appears to have made seven service-related filings since filing the operative complaint in the instant matter. Plaintiff initially served or mailed the Complaint himself to all Defendants, rather than having a nonparty effectuate service. In February, Plaintiff filed proofs of service where, on each proof, he stated that “[he] mailed this service by U.S.P.S. certified mail” and signed his name as the “Servers signature.” The Court subsequently reminded Plaintiff that he “may not personally serve the summons and complaint on Defendants.”
In subsequent filings, Plaintiff provided proofs of service filled out by a third party (ECF Nos. 53, 56) and signed return receipts for some of the named defendants (ECF Nos. 58, 59, 68). However, with respect to most of the Federal Defendants, it does not appear that Plaintiff has met his burden to prove valid service by providing, among other things, a signed certified-mail return receipt by the recipient. Specifically, though the Court has identified proofs of service signed by a third-party for some of the Federal Defendants, the Court fails to locate in the record signed return receipts for the following Federal Defendants:
• Former President George W. Bush, in his Official Capacity and in his Personal Capacity
• United States Congressional Members of the House and Senate In their Official Capacity
• Director of the Department of Commerce In his/her Official Capacity • Director of the Office of Justice Programs In his/her Official Capacity • Director of the Department of Defense In his/her Official Capacity • Secretary of Defense In his/her Official Capacity • Director of the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, and Tracking (SMART Office) In his/her Official Capacity • Representative Nancy Pelosi in her Official Capacity • Representative Ken Calvert in his Official Capacity • Representative Steny Hoyer in his Official Capacity • Representative Marcy Kaptur in his Official Capacity • Representative Hal Rogers in his Official Capacity • Representative Chris Smith in his Official Capacity • Representative Frank Lukas in his Official Capacity • Senator Chuck Schumer in his Official Capacity • Senator Mike Crapo in his Official Capacity
• Senator Ed Markey in his Official Capacity
• Senator Kim Ward in her Official
• Senator Ron Wyden in his Official Capacity
• Senator Chuck Grassley in his Official Capacity
• Senator Susan Collins in her Official Capacity Thus, at least as it relates to the above-listed Federal Defendants, ineffective service provides an additional ground upon which to dismiss the Complaint.
State Defendants, meanwhile, move to dismiss any claims against the “Director of Norwalk CT Office of Adult Probation” As previously mentioned, Plaintiff named two, apparently identical defendants in the Complaint: the “Director of the Norwalk CT Office of Adult Probation,” and the “Director of the Norwalk Connecticut Department of Adult Probation.” [52] State Defendants assert that “Plaintiff only served the instant Amended Complaint on the “Director of the Norwalk Connecticut Department of Adult Probation” and the Court should thus “dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims against the supposed ‘Director of the Norwalk CT Office of Adult Probation’ under Rule 12(b)(5) for lack of proper service.” [53] As the Court previously noted:
[P]ursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-64(a), “[s]ervice of civil process in any civil action or proceeding maintainable against or in any appeal authorized from the actions of, or service of any foreign attachment or garnishment authorized against, the state or against any institution, board, commission, department or administrative tribunal thereof, or against any officer, servant, agent or employee of the state or of any such institution, board, commission, department or administrative tribunal, as the case may be, may be made by a proper officer (1) leaving a true and attested copy of the process, including the declaration or complaint, with the Attorney General at the office of the Attorney General in Hartford, or (2) sending a true and attested copy of the process, including the summons and complaint, by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the Attorney General at the office of the Attorney General in Hartford.” [54] The docket reflects that Plaintiff, in line with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-64(a), properly served two copies of his complaint upon the Connecticut State Attorney General, William Tong. [55] While it is technically unclear which two of the three State Defendants he appeared to serve, it is reasonable to infer that Plaintiff intended to serve the Department of Public Safety and only one version of the identically named probation office defendants. Accordingly, because the two probation-related defendants appear to be duplicative, and because service on the Attorney General would be effective for either entity under § 52-64(a), dismissing one of the duplicate entities would clarify the record and promote efficiency. The “Director of the Norwalk CT Office of Adult Probation” is thus dismissed on grounds of improper service.
2. Failure to Establish Minimum Contacts
Aside from lack of personal jurisdiction over those defendants not properly served,
Federal Defendants also assert that “the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over
President Bush and President Clinton in their personal capacities.” The Court agrees. With
respect to the former Presidents, Plaintiff does not allege any acts in or contacts with
Connecticut (save President Clinton being a graduate of Yale Law School), referring only to
their general law-enforcement activities as members of the executive branch. He also
acknowledges that President Clinton resides in New York and President Bush resides in
Texas. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to assert a
prima facie
case that there is personal jurisdiction
over former Presidents Clinton and Bush.
See
Conn Gen. Stat. § 52-59b(a);
see also Leftridge
v. Jud. Branch
, Case No. 22-CV-411 (JAM),
C. Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiff’s claims also fail on the merits. They are barred at the threshold by the applicable statute of limitations, and even if they were timely, the Complaint suffers from significant pleading deficiencies and a lack of cognizable constitutional or statutory claims, relying on conclusory allegations and extraneous material rather than well-pled facts.
1. Statute of Limitations
All of Plaintiff’s sections 1983 and 1985 claims against all Defendants are barred by
the statute of limitations. An “action may be dismissed as frivolous if a complaint is time-
barred on its face under the applicable statute of limitations.”
Speer v. Norwich Pub. Utilities
,
No. 3:19-CV-2005 (JCH),
“Claims for constitutional violations under [sections] 1983 and 1985 are governed by
a three-year statute of limitations.”
Young v. Duncan
, Case No. 18-CV-857 (AWT), 2018 WL
11302943, at *2 (D. Conn. June 4, 2018) (citing
Lounsbury v. Jeffries
,
Given Plaintiff’s reference to events in 1994 and his reference to “35 years on the registry,” it can be inferred that the harm he alleges that is caused by having to register as a sex offender did not accrue within the last three years. His claims are therefore barred by the statute of limitations. Furthermore, the Complaint contains allegations pertaining to laws largely passed decades ago with the most recent, International Megan’s Law, enacted nine years ago. Plaintiff provides no other details of recent harm, only vaguely relating that the past harm of the passage of laws related to sex offenders and his qualification as the same has caused him inconvenience. Thus, the Court holds that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred.
2. Pleading Deficiencies
The Complaint does not meet the basic pleading standards required to state a claim.
Although courts must construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint liberally, such plaintiffs must
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Costabile v. N.Y. City
Health & Hosps. Corp.
,
As discussed in the background of this memorandum, the Complaint is composed
largely of vague and conclusory claims that both Federal Defendants and State Defendants
have engaged in conspiracies and actions with the intent of depriving Plaintiff of unspecified
rights under unidentified statutes. Plaintiff’s section 1985 claims, for example, are composed
entirely of conclusory statements that the Defendants acted “in conspiracy” with other
government entities to enforce laws promulgated by the federal and state legislatures. For
example, he alleges that “then President Clinton, President Bush, State Legislators across the
Country, State and City Governments, City Social Services and local neighborhoods in general
. . . acted in conspiring to influence the passage of laws” and that “[Members of Congress]
have ingrained themselves in conspiracy” but provides no further details as to the referenced
“conspiring” or “conspiracy.”
[58]
Plaintiff also alleges that “the United States Congress and
President Clinton in conspiracy with State and Federal Legislators enacted” Megan’s Law,
again failing to elaborate on the referenced conspiracy.
[59]
And in another example, Plaintiff
states that the “reason for me having no Constitutional protections is a Conspiracy which the
State of Connecticut has taken part of along with the Federal Government to track, monitor,
possibly follow and profile me for being on this illegal US and State Sex Offender Registry.” He again fails to provide details on the “Conspiracy” he mentions. Formulaic recitations that
Defendants engaged in a conspiracy are inadequate to surpass Plaintiff’s Rule 8 burden and
are properly dismissed under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Twombly
,
As mentioned earlier, the Complaint also contains a “Facts in Support of Amended Complaint” consisting of a loose restatement of various supposed news stories and YouTube videos—most if not all of which are apparently related to issues in other states and not one of which is alleged to involve the Plaintiff—and comments on the same. The Court is unable to ascertain how these stories and videos are relevant to Plaintiff’s case; nor is the Court convinced that they provide Defendants with adequate information to allow them to verify Plaintiff’s allegations. In other words, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to put Defendants (and the Court) on notice as to what, if any claims, they shall defend against.
Further, the Complaint merely references a number of the named Defendants in passing, if at all, without explaining what the respective Defendant has done, or how the respective Defendant has injured Plaintiff. For example, as to the Department of Defense (“DOD”), Secretary of Defense, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), Plaintiff alleges the Appropriations Act of 1998 required BOP to notify states of “released or paroled federal offenders sentenced by court-martial” and required DOD to “track and ensure registration compliance of offenders with certain Uniform Code of Military Justice . . . .” [61] But Plaintiff alleges neither that he was a member of the military and convicted of an offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice nor that he was a released or paroled federal offender sentenced by court-martial. [62] And other than naming the U.S. Department of State (“State Department”), the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), “Bureau of Justice Assistance”, “Smart Program,” and “Office of Justice Programs,” the Complaint makes no discernable allegation of injuries with respect to the State Department, or DOJ and its offices. Nor does Plaintiff allege—despite naming the Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) as a defendant— that he lives in the jurisdiction of a federally recognized Indian Tribe or explain how he was injured by the BIA.
The special solicitude afforded to pro se litigants cannot save the current version of
Plaintiff’s complaint, which is “rambling, verbose, [and] at times incoherent[.]” See
Ruggiero
v. Mobile Crisis Team
, No. 12-CV-499,
3. Lack of Cognizable Claims
While the Complaint is vague, the Court, construing its allegations as generously as
possible, agrees with Defendants that it amounts to an attack on the existence of the
Connecticut sex offender registry. But the Supreme Court has—on multiple occasions—
reviewed and affirmed the constitutionality of sex offender registries on a number of grounds.
See, e.g., Smith v. Doe
, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003) (holding that Alaskan law requiring sex
offender registration was non-punitive, constitutional, did not implicate Ex Post Facto Clause);
id.
at 98 (“Our system does not treat dissemination of truthful information in furtherance of a
legitimate governmental objective as punishment.”);
United States v. Kebodeaux
, 570 U.S.
387, 397–99 (2013) (finding no constitutional violation where law required pre-SORNA
offenders to register; both SORNA and Wetterling Act were properly promulgated under the
Necessary and Proper Clause);
Gundy v. United States
,
Nor is the Court persuaded by Plaintiff’s remaining arguments, which allege violations of numerous constitutional provisions—including the Privileges and Immunities Clause, as well as the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments—the Declaration of Independence, and various state laws. Because Plaintiff has not articulated these claims in a manner sufficient to state a plausible basis for relief and Defendants have in any event comprehensively rebutted them, the Court declines to discuss them at length. The Court is likewise unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s assertions under international law. Plaintiff invokes sources such as the “World Human Rights Commission” and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, but these invocations are vague and unsupported, and Plaintiff does not identify any enforceable cause of action under them. The Court thus declines to address them in detail.
D. Sua Sponte Dismissal of Claims Against the Director of the National Conference of State Legislators
Although the Director of the National Conference of State Legislators has not appeared
on the docket or filed a motion to dismiss, the Court dismisses the claims against this defendant
on its own initiative. Federal courts possess the inherent authority to dismiss frivolous or
legally insufficient claims
sua sponte
, particularly where the defects are apparent on the face
of the pleadings.
See Rolle v. Berkowitz
, No. 03-CV-7120,
E. Leave to Amend Complaint
Ordinarily, the district court should not dismiss a pro se plaintiff’s complaint without
granting leave to amend “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a
valid claim might be stated.”
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 45 and 70) and dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint as against all Defendants. The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his complaint (ECF No. 48).
SO ORDERED.
Hartford, Connecticut
September 26, 2025
/s/Vernon D. Oliver VERNON D. OLIVER United States District Judge
Notes
[1] The operative complaint here refers to the Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter the “Complaint”). ECF No. 35. All citations to documents refer to the ECF document number (i.e., “ECF No. __”) and pagination in the ECF header unless otherwise noted.
[2] Compl., ECF No. 35 at 3–4.
[3] Id. at 4.
[4] Id. at 24.
[5] Id. at 12.
[6] Id. at 54–55.
[7] See generally id.
[8] See id. at 8–10, 15, 38, 41, 49.
[9] Id. at 62–64.
[10] Id. at 63.
[11] Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
[12] Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
[13] Id. at 28
[14] See ECF No. 10.
[15] Compl. at 39.
[16] ECF No. 10.
[17] Compl. at 3
[18] Id. at 4
[19] Id.
[20] See ECF No. 1.
[21] See ECF No. 12.
[22] See ECF Nos. 13, 14.
[23] FAC, ECF No. 14 at 2.
[24] ( Id. ) Specifically, Plaintiff named “Former President William Clinton, in his Official Capacity and in his Personal Capacity, United States Congressional Members of the House and Senate In their Official Capacity, Department of Commerce In their Officail [sic] Capacity, Judiciary Department In their Official Capacity, The office of the FBI In their Official Capacity, Office of Justice Programs In their Official Capacity, Department of Justice In their Official Capacity, Bureau of Prisons In their Official Capacity, Department of State In their Official Capacity, Bureau of Justice Assistance In their Official Capacity, Department of Defense In their Official Capacity, Secretary of Defense In his Official Capacity, Norwalk Connecticut Office of Adult Probation In their Official Capacity, National Conference of State Legislators In their Official Capacity, Connecticut Department of Public Safety in their Official Capacity, Norwalk Connecticut Department of Adult Probation in Their Official Capacity, Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, and Tracking (SMART Office) In their Official Capacity” ECF No. 14 at 1 (citation modified).
[25] See ECF. No. 23.
[26] See id.
[27] See ECF Nos. 28 and 29.
[28] See ECF No. 28.
[29] See ECF No. 34.
[30] ( See Compl. at 1-3.) Specifically, Plaintiff named “Former President William Clinton, in his Official Capacity and in his Personal Capacity, Former President George W. Bush, in his Official Capacity and in his Personal Capacity, United States Congressional Members of the House and Senate In their Official Capacity, Director of the Department of Commerce In his/her Official Capacity, Director of the Judiciary Department In his/her Official Capacity, Director of The office of the FBI In his/her Official Capacity, Director of the Office of Justice Programs In his/her Official Capacity, Director of the Department of Justice In his/her Official Capacity, Director of the Bureau of Prisons In his/her Official Capacity, Director of the Department of State In his/her Official Capacity, Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance In his/her Official Capacity, Director of the Department of Defense In his/her Official Capacity, Secretary of Defense In his/her Official Capacity, Director of the Norwalk CT Office of Adult Probation In his/her Official Capacity, Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in his/her Official Capacity, Director of the
[36] See ECF No. 70.
[37] See ECF No. 72.
[38] Standing presents an additional jurisdictional defect, but because it largely turns on the vague and conclusory nature of the allegations, it is more appropriately considered in connection with the Rule 12(b)(6) discussion in Section III(C)(2), infra .
[39] The failure to make any personal capacity allegations raises separate personal jurisdiction concerns, discussed at greater length in Section III(B)(2), infra .
[40] Compl. at 2.
[41] ECF No. 70-1 at 13.
[42] Compl. at 33, 56 (emphasis added).
[43] Id. at 12.
[44] Compl. at 10.
[45] Compl. at 32.
[46] ECF No. 45-1 at 24–25.
[47] ECF No. 45-1 at 24–25.
[48] See ECF Nos. 40, 53, 56, 58, 59, 67, 68.
[49] ECF No. 40.
[50] ECF No. 42. See also Order denying Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 44 (reminding Plaintiff that he “may not personally effect service of process under either Rule 4 or Connecticut state law”).
[51] ECF No. 70-1 at 2.
[52] Compl. at 2.
[53] Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 70-1 at 8–9.
[54] ECF No. 55 (quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-64(a)).
[55] See ECF Nos. 59 at 3, 58 at 7, 53 at 90, 53 at 91.
[56] ECF No. 45-1 at 13.
[57] See Compl. at 60.
[58] Compl. at 10.
[59] Id. at 15.
[60] Id. at 16.
[61] Compl. at 44–45.
[62] Id. at 45, 50.
[63] Plaintiff’s listed address does not appear to be located within tribal territory.
[64] Moreover, as previously indicated, the threadbare nature of Plaintiff’s allegations indicates that
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over them due to lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1)
scrutiny.
See, e.g
.,
Calcano v. Swaronski N. Am. Ltd.
,
[65] See ECF No. 48-1.