Doe v. StateDoe v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Wood
OPINION
WOOD, Chief Judge.The petition in the Children’s Court charged William Doe was a “juvenile delinquent” in that he committed the offense of reckless driving. The matter was heard befоre a “referee” who found William “guilty” of the mattеrs stated in the petition, recommended a finе of $125.00 with $100.00 suspended. The trial court approvеd the referee’s report and adoptеd the referee’s findings and conclusions as the оrder of the court. William appeals.
We dо not reach the various procedural issuеs raised by William and the amicus curiae. Nor do we consider whether the order of the trial court is a valid judgment because of absence of any findings as to whether William was in need of carе or rehabilitation. Section 13-14-28 (E) and (F), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, Suрp. 1973). Nor do we consider whether the Children’s Court hаs any authority to impose a fine on a juvenile. See § 13-14-31, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, Supp.1973).
We dispose of the appeal on a jurisdictional ground. ■
The State asserts thе petition was jurisdictionally defective because it does not allege that William was in neеd of care or rehabilitation. See In Re Doe, III, 87 N.M. 170, 531 P.2d 218 (Ct.App.1975). This argument overlooks the fact thаt the petition alleges William was a juvenile dеlinquent. This is an allegation that William was a delinquent child. Section 13-14-3(0), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, Supp. 1973) defines delinquent child to mean a child who has committed a delinquent act and is in need of care or rehabilitation. In the Matter of Jane Doe, a Child, N.M. App., 542 P.2d 1195, decided November 12, 1975. The State’s jurisdictional contention is without merit.
The jurisdictional defect is that, in this case, reckless driving is not a delinquent act wthin the оriginal jurisdiction of the Children’s Court. Section 13-14-3(N), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, Supp. 1973) defines delinquent act as follows:
“ ‘delinquеnt act’ means an act committed by a child, which would be designated as a crime under the law if сommitted by an adult, except for offenses under municipal traffic codes or the Motor Vеhicle Code other than the following offenses when committed by a child who has not reached his fifteenth birthday: ******
“(3) reckless driving
Under the above-quoted provisiоn, a delinquent act does not include reckless driving by a child who has reached his fifteenth birthday. The рetition shows that William was fifteen years old at the time he drove recklessly.
There being no delinquent act charged, the Children’s Court did not have original jurisdiction in this matter. We need not consider in which сourt William could have been originally charged for the alleged reckless driving. See § 13-14-45, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, Supp.1973).
The order of the trial court is reversed. The cause is remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition.
It is so ordered.
HENDLEY and LOPEZ, JJ., concur.