Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo

2007-NMSC-008 DOE, by through parents

Jane her friend, J.H.,

and next Plaintiff-

Respondent,

v. PUEBLO,

SANTA CLARA Santa Clara

Development Corporation, Big d/b/a Casino, Rock Defendants-Petitioners. Lopez Lucy Lopez,

Ivan

Plaintiffs-Respondents, Felipe Felipe

San Pueblo San Ca- d/b/a Hollywood sino and CIS Insurance

Group, Defendants-Petitioners. 29,350, 29,351.

Nos.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Feb. Fe, NM, Velasquez, Maxine

Hughes, Santa NM, Felipe, for Petitioners. San Fe, Kosh, Bennett, & Merit Santa Bennett NM, Respondent Doe. for Han, P.C., Kennedy, Kennedy Paul & J. Han, Ostrochovsky, Albu- Mary Y.C. Rene NM, Lopez. querque, Respondents for Browde, Occhialino, Albu- B. M.E. Michael NM, Amicus Curiae New Mexi- querque, for Lawyers co Trial Association. NM, Stetson, Albuquerque, B.

Catherine Tesuque, Pueblo for Amici Curiae Pueblo Felipe. of San P.C., & Associates. John John D. Wheeler NM, Wheeler, Alamogordo, for Amicus D. Apache Tribe. Curiae Mescalero Chestnut, Offices, Peter C. Chestnut Law NM, Albuquerque, for Berkley Rodgers, Ann Amicus Curiae Pueblo of Acoma. Nordhaus, Haltom, Taylor, Taradash & Bladh, Bladh, Wayne H. Thomas J. Peck- Cave, NM, ham, Albuquerque, Rodina Cole Nation, Apache for Amici Curiae Jicarilla Ana, Laguna, Pueblo of Santa Taos Pueblo of Pueblo. Chambers, Sachse, &

Sonosky, Endreson Mielke, Mielke, Albuquerque, David Charles Isleta, NM, Pueb- for Amici Curiae Pueblo lo of Sandia. L.L.C., Offices, Leander Ber-

Bergen Law NM, Albuquerque, for Amicus Curiae gen, Pueblo San Juan. Fe, NM, Werner, Ami-

Jana C. Santa Pojoaque Legal Depart- cus Curiae Pueblo of ment.

OPINION BOSSON, Justice. Tesuque, Gallegos v. Pueblo

2002-NMSC-012, 207, 46 10 n. this Court left unanswered P.3d compacts question whether between and various New the State of New Mexico ju- that created concurrent Mexico Pueblos courts over risdiction val- against tribal-owned casinos were actions Donatelli, Dahlstrom, light the Indian Rothstein, and enforceable in Hughes, id (IGRA), Bienvenu, LLP, Act 25 U.S.C. Gaming Regulatory Schoenberg & Richard W. question now answer that shortly, We permits personal discussed affirmative, holding that state against courts suits brought Pueblos to be have actions state court under certain circumstances. filed negligent Pueblos Doe filed suit in the First Judicial District alleged against acts oper Lopez casinos owned and filed suit in the Thirteenth Judi- by ated the occurring pueblo Pueblos and cial District. Both Santa Clara and San doing, lands. In majority so we affirm the Felipe claims, moved to dismiss the arguing opinion Appeals of the Court of subject below. See that state juris- court lacked matter 2005-NMCA-110, Pueblo, Doe v. Santa Clara diction. Each district court denied the mo- 198, 118 dismiss, N.M. P.3d 203. tions to relying express juris- on the diction language in the Compact. BACKGROUND requested Both Pueblos then interlocu- {5} appeal separate This involves two inci- {2} tory appeal. Santa request Clara’s was dents, resulting personal each in a granted, and in a formal opinion written the by lawsuit filed a non-tribal against member Appeals Court of affirmed the district court respective action, Pueblo. In the first Jane Judge Doe, dissenting. Sutin 2005- Doe, a fifteen-year-old girl, through filed suit NMCA-110, 138 N.M. 118 P.3d 203. her against mother Santa Clara Pueblo and later, Doe, One week based on its decision in injuries several individuals for that occurred Appeals the Court of Felipe denied San after she was abducted three men from request Pueblo’s for interlocutory appeal. Big Santa Clara’s Rock Casino sexually petitioned Both Pueblos then this Court for a assaulted. alleges Doe the Pueblo failed to writ of certiorari to determine whether the safety take reasonable protect measures to Compact between the State and each Pueblo her guest while she awas at the casino. validly confers state court Specifically, complaint alleges the that Santa these claims occurring on negligent Clara was in not providing proper pueblo granted lands. We certiorari to de- lighting security parking casino’s important question. cide this lot and in failing then attempts make locate Doe apparent after it became that she DISCUSSION missing. was Compact action, Lucy the second Lopez and {3} The Compact1 negotiated under Lopez her son Ivan filed suit San comprehensive scheme of a semi- Felipe injuries Pueblo for that occurred on statute, nal federal which “established the premises Felipe’s Holly- San Casino framework under which Indian tribes and wood. walking Plaintiffs were arm-in-arm negotiate compacts states could permitting into Lopez the casino when Ivan tripped on ... gaming on Indian reservations located the corner of an unsecured causing floor mat within territory.” Gallegos, state 2002- both him and his mother to fall. Their com- NMSC-012, 9, plaint alleges that the Pueblo failed to ade- (footnote omitted); see S.J. Res. 45th quately secure the floor thereby causing mat (N.M.2001). Leg., 1st Sess. Both the Pueb- injuries. their los and the negotiat- State were involved in plaintiffs, Both sets of Lopez, Doe and Compact the terms of the under the respective chose to sue the Pueblo in Compact Negotiation Act. NMSA (as 2005). court instead of juris- §§ tribal court based on a 11-13A-1 to -5 amended That shifting provision diction contained in negotiation process provi- led to the various gaming compact negotiated by the State and sions of Compact, including Section (the which, Compact) the Pueblos as will be with which we are concerned in this ease.2 purposes 1. For of IGRA and for ease of refer- Compact All of our citations to the text of the ence, Tribes and Pueblos are referred to inter- Proper. were taken from the Record For refer- changeably. gam- New Mexico has entered into ence, Compact the text of the can be found at ing compacts with eleven Pueblos and two www.nmgcb.org/tribal/2001 compact.pdf. http://www.nmgcb.org/tribal/casinos. Tribes. See htm. ¶ 6, Accordingly, Compact, entitled N.M. P.3d 668. Section 8 of the Visitors,” analysis we acknowledges that turn our IGRA. “Protection of to a “safety protection visitors Gaming III Provi- IGRA’s Class Facility parties, of’ Gaming priority is sion “to purpose and that who suffer [visitors] assure such Congress’ compromise “IGRA was so- damage proximate- bodily injury property involving questions lution In- to the difficult Gaming ly conduct of caused gaming.” dian Cal. Grand Artichoke Joe’s remedy have for ob- Enterprise an effective (9th Norton, Casino v. F.3d just compensation.” The taining fair and Cir.2003). solution, Congress part As of this Pueblo, therefore, “waives its defense of sov- separate gaming three of in defined classes immunity ereign in connection with Johnson, ex rel. IGRA. See State Clark v. damages bodily compensatory claims for for (1995). N.M. 904 P.2d Each damage up to amount property or the subject regula- class to a different level of is ($50,000,000) fifty per million oc- of dollars pertains tion. The issue exclusive- before us Doe, 2005-NMCA-110, currence asserted.” ly gaming, heavily to III “the most Class ¶ 6, Pueblo 118 P.3d regulated and most form of controversial carry liability to in that promises insurance gambling under IGRA.” Joe’s Cal. Artichoke amount. Casino, Grand 353 F.3d at 715. gaming banking Class III includes {10} Following up on this concern over (where games monetary card the a house has “safety” remedy” an and “effective for visi game players stake in the because bet tors, ju subject Section addresses matter house, against just against the one anoth- personal injury against risdiction claims er); roulette, games craps, casino such as resulting the Pueblos from incidents occur keno; slot and electronic machines ring on Indian in connection with Class land chance; games parimutuel dog or of horse gaming. language The pertinent III of Sec § wagering; and 502.4 lotteries. 25 C.F.R. 8(A) personal injury allows actions for permits III if it IGRA Class “proceed a Pueblo either in bind (1) by is authorized ordinance or resolution of competent arbitration ... or in a court of governing body the of the tribe the 8(A) jurisdiction.” Section defines a court of Gaming National Com- Chair of the Indian jurisdiction competent include state courts (2) mission, permits located in a state subject following [A]ny to the condition: such (3) gaming, by such a covered tribal- court, brought be claim in state district Secretary compact approved by state the of land, including arising claims on tribal unless 2710(d)(1)(A),(B), § the Interior. 25 U.S.C. finally is determined a state or it federal (C) (2000). only We are concerned here with permit shifting court that IGRA does not the requirement. the third personal injury jurisdiction over visitors’ added.) (Emphasis compact provisions require state As suits to court. IGRA’s demonstrates, compact the a negotiate this for the limited state and tribes purpose personal injury involving governing actions Class III 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(3)(A) safety, (“Any having § parties ju- tribe visitor the jurisdiction upon which agreed to state court unless risdiction over Indian lands a Therefore, conducted, permit gaming activity being does not it. our Class III IGRA is conducted, Congress, inquiry request initial in or is to shall the State whether be in are permit” “does not tribes and states to do as which such lands located to enter into here; negotiations entering have the purpose the Pueblos Mexico done for into New is, negotiate compact provisions governing a tribal- Tribal-State con- compact shifting duct of ... [and] state “the activities State good personal injury negotiate shall with the over visitors’ suits to state Indian tribe court,” including compact.”). faith into such a “claims on tribal to enter compacts may This is of law we include related question land.” terms 2002-NMSC-012, application Gallegos, de novo. of state law and the allocation of review claims, civil between the states and the upon conditioned not allowing IGRA specifically parties shifting, tribes. allows the such but upon prohibiting IGRA not negotiate, regarding shift- 8(A) ing. (“any See Section claim may such application of the criminal and civil brought in state district court ... unless regulations laws and of the Indian tribe or finally it is determined federal that are State court that IGRA permit does not necessary for, licensing regulation visitors’ activity; such court”). suits to state Nothing in the lan- (ii) the allocation of criminal and civil guage prohibits jurisdiction of IGRA shifting. jurisdiction between the State and the In- argue The Pueblos for a different dian tribe for the enforcement interpretation. Sutin, Judge thought his regulations. of such laws and ful Appeals’ majority dissent to the Court of (ii) 2710(d)(3)(C)(i), (emphasis U.S.C. opinion, wrote that the to the Com added). pact actually any agreement did not come to Therefore, under IGRA a tribal-state shifting, they rather that gaming compact may apply state laws that “expected Doe, the litigated.”4 issue to be for, “directly are and 2005-NMCA-110, ¶ 28, 198, 138 N.M. 118 licensing regulation” the and of Class III (Sutin, J., P.3d 203 dissenting). That obser gaming, may then allocate criminal and developed vation is further in Justice Minz jurisdiction civil to the state when it is “nec- True, ner’s litigation may dissent. have been essary for the enforcement” of those laws.3 parties anticipated, what the perhaps jurisdic- IGRA makes no other reference to they only agreed disagree to later on in shifting. tion Applying the mandate of Sec- Tsosie, court. See Negotiating Rebecca Eco 8(A) Compact, of the we must determine nomic Survival: The Consent Principle and permit” if IGRA negotiating “does not the Compacts Tribal-State Under the Indian parties subject to transfer matter Act, Gaming Regulatory 25, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. personal injury state court over claims (1997) (noting compact proce that “the arising on Indian lands. dure, which originally intended avert expensive litigation, contentious and has re Reading Compact Together the and IGRA litigation any sulted pro more than other IGRA”). vision of the correctly The Pueblos note that language expressly this in IGRA does not However, ignore we will not the clear grant the authority, state and the tribes as language Compact, nor can we relieve part of a Class III compact, to shift parties Compact the to the from their obli- jurisdiction to state personal courts over in gations Gallegos, thereunder. See 2002- jury Indeed, ¶ arising suits on Indian lands. NMSC-012, 30, 207, 132 N.M. language (“ the makes no personal mention of duty court’s interpret- ‘[T]he is confined to injury However, point lawsuits. in this ing the parties contract that the made for consequential to the themselves, initial issue before us. any ambiguity, and absent the language agreed the Pueblos may the court agree- not alter or fabricate a new Compact gave state courts parties.’” (quoting over ment for the Ponder v. Compact, expressly agreed In the argument the Pueblos 4. The Pueblos make this as well. they apply personal injury their Brief in Chief guage that state tort law would characterize the lan- Compact agree- "a as conditional against arising suits casinos on Pueblo land. The court, ment that tort cases be filed in state question is whether these only Supreme if New [the Court] Mexico or a Pueblos, against applying lawsuits the finally determine[ ] federal court that IGRA actu- law, may New Mexico tort be filed in state court ally permits jurisdiction-shifting as to such only in tribal court. The Pueblos take the cases.” The Pueblos further assert that the lan- position against lawsuits the guage Section 8 of was the court, may only Pueblos be filed in tribal product "legal tug-o’-war jurisdic- of a over the apply tribal court would then state tort law in issue,” being tional which resulted in a Section 8 adjudicating those claims. disagreement, agreement. a statement of not 2000-NMSC-033, Co., to consent Ins. via authorized Pueblos Farm Mut. Auto.

State 698, jurisdiction.{18} 12 P.3d to state court 129 N.M. 960)). “is a contract between that, agree general as a We Pueblos], [the the State New Mexico proposition Indian law derived from the (citing Id. Tex Legislature.” codified tribes, sovereign of Indian tribal status Mexico, 128, 107 v. New 482 U.S. as claims courts have exclusive (1987)); also L.Ed.2d see tribes, on tribal lands Reserva Tribes Chehalis Confederated members, v. or tribal entities. See Williams Johnson, 734, 958 P.2d tion v. 135 Wash.2d Lee, 217, 219-20, 269, 3 79 S.Ct. 358 U.S. (1998) (“Tribal-state gaming com (1959); Found. Ins. Co. L.Ed.2d 251 Reserve. agreements, legislation, and are pacts are Garcia, 105 N.M. 734 P.2d contracts.”). interpreted As with oth recognize Mexico New courts contract, pivot choice of words can be er general Apache principle. this DeFeo v. Ski al. Resort, 904 P.2d begins analysis Our with the (holding (Ct.App.1995) injured skier su agreement. utilized ing ski resort limited to tribal tribal-owned The Pueblos the State of New Mexico portion court because occurred on agreed “unless” a the ski located within tribal bound resort per- that “IGRA court determines does not aries). However, principle this the cases seen, nothing it. As we there is mit” have give usually it do not involve the rise to permit” Pueblos “does not express kind of consent to shift exactly they agreed and the State do what by compact given that the Pueblos have Thus, to do here. based on sole condi- context of casino stipulated Compact, in we that hold argue The Pueblos that this distinc- {19} the Pueblos have consented to state court They tion is that irrelevant. assert without jurisdiction purpose person- for the limited of pur- express authority Congress from their against impli- al casinos that actions ported jurisdiction in consent to state court However, safety cate visitor concerns. we ineffective. Pueblos de- is The stop analysis Compact. at the cannot our argument rive from the United States their follow, again For the reasons that we focus Supreme Kennerly of Court case v. District on IGRA. Court, 423, 91 27 L.Ed.2d 400 U.S. S.Ct. (1971). 507 Compact, Notwithstanding the must Con- gress jurisdiction shifting? authorize in question Kennerly was wheth- gener- jurisdiction that a court assert under er Montana state had Pueblos principles arising law “there over a land and al of Indian is no basis civil suit Indian case, jurisdiction” involving court in this un- members. Id. at 424. Allo- for state jurisdiction gov- less Plaintiffs “can show that is a cation of civil between the tribes there erning Congress governed by act of that a authorizes such the state was federal words, statute, (PL 280), jurisdiction.” regardless of Public Law No. 18 other 280 (1970, 1953), promulgated § and their consent U.S.C.A. 1162 therein, position option assuming gave the Pueblos take the that which states the of “jurisdiction ... civil compact language granting the state courts causes of action Washington jurisdiction country.” absent “ineffective” an affirma- v. Confederat- grant authority of to do ed Tribes Yakima Indian Na- tive Bands & tion, 463, 472-74, To issue we first 99 58 so. address this must 439 U.S. congressional PL a prescribed examine whether au- 740 280 without L.Ed.2d thority agree specific to do so tribes can to state course of action tribes and states jurisdiction jurisdiction civil court over claims would tra- follow to create state Second, ditionally arising fall courts. courts claims on Indian land and to tribal Kennerly, inquiry comprehensive involving ensure our is as tribal members. See 424-25, 480; possible, Congress, whether U.S. at 91 S.Ct. 18 U.S.C.A. we address In Kennerly, authority 1162.5 the Blackfeet tribal suggests Other that Ken- adopted provision nerly quite council had in its laws does not reach so far. See Clark, (9th giving jurisdiction concurrent to Montana Williams v. 742 F.2d Cir.1984) (“[T]he Supreme state implied courts over suits tribal mem- Court has bers, that a unilaterally but neither the state nor the tribe tribe relinquish had jurisdiction specific requirements explicit followed the PL absent congressional 280. au- (recognizing compliance 400 U.S. at 91 S.Ct. 480 thorization strict with statu- tory requirements.” added.)); (Emphasis state had legislative not taken formal action Lewis v. Sac & Fox Tribe and the tribe had not Okla. Hous. consented to state Auth., (Okla.1994) (Kenner- 896 P.2d by majority court vote of its members). ly authority “does not stand as defeating prerequi- enrolled Because the concurrent in all civil sites set forth in the federal statute were not met, solely cases. Its thrust ‘is concerned Supreme Court disavowed concur- procedural mechanisms which tribal rent in state court notwithstand- ” (Citation registered.’ consent must be omit- 429-30, tribal consent. Id. at 91 S.Ct. ted.)). Arguably, Kennerly stands more for question procedure: when some, According Kennerly stands requisite steps implement juris- sets forth proposition for the that a tribe can never shifting, diction then the state and the tribe consent to state court over civil strictly must requirements. adhere to those matters on tribal lands without the 480; U.S. 91 S.Ct. see also Con- express Congress. consent of au- There is Bands & Tribes Yakima Indian federated thority proposition. for this See State ex rel. Nation, 439 U.S. at 99 S.Ct. 740 Court, Peterson v. Dist. 617 P.2d 1066 (examining Washington’s assump- whether (Wyo.1980)(stating Kennerly major- that the tion of over the Yakima Nation ity emphasized very “a policy vivid federal 280); complied with PL McClanahan v. State mandating the exclusive of tribal Ariz., 164, 180-81, Tax Comm’n courts in involving cases internal tribal af- 93 S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d (holding self-government fairs or tribal unless there Arizona could not tax income earned Indi- express delegation by has been an Congress ans from reservation sources because the allowing jurisdiction”). the state to assume tax strictly comply state statute did not generally See Cohen’s Handbook Federal 280). view, of PL Under this more limited (5th 2005) (“Because Indian Law 6.05 ed. Kennerly govern would what states and affairs, of supremacy federal over Indian clearly tribes must do when has may tribes and states agreements not make spoken, necessarily but not they what must altering scope jurisdiction the of their in do when remains reticent. country congressional Indian absent con- Arguably, Congress’ adopt decision to {24} (Citation omitted.)). sent.” legislation, specifically such as that appear posi- The Pueblos to take this jurisdic- allows states and tribes to enter into Reasoning tion. that IGRA is like a modern agreements, tional leaves the circum- day equivalent PLof the Pueblos assert define, up stances to is mark- they authority jurisdic- have no to cede edly global, different from the one-size-fits- beyond tion to state specifical- courts what is jurisdiction shifting all involved in PL 280. ly expressly in Cohen’s, allowed IGRA. Because supra § (noting See 6.05 the expressly does not refer to Indian Act Child Welfare and IGRA are such suits, for visitors’ the pieces legislation). Kennerly court conclude, Kennerly, Pueblos as in that their may simply anything not have envisioned like Thus, contractual consent in the was un- ways IGRA. based on the different authorized, interpret holding, and is therefore ineffective. courts its and the added noted, Appeals correctly 5. As the Court of New cannot derive from that statute. See Doe, 10, 8, Mexico has never elected to assume 2005-NMCA-l 118 Thus, over tribal under lands PL 280. the State P.3d 203. 276 decision, making far no reference to impact, it seems unanimous

confusion of IGRA’s Kennerly controlling Kennerly, Supreme here. found from clear that is Court that the and had tribe had consented to arbitration Kennerly compre- a did not involve a clause that included choice-of-law had in compact, entered into furtherance hensive in authorizing jurisdiction effect Okla nego- legislation, painstakingly federal therefore, courts, state tribe homa states, in the tribes and the tiated between immunity. its Id. at 121 had waived court civil which the tribes conceded state Thus, by agreement entirely 1589. S.Ct. exchange in for substantial bene- authority, congressional the tribe without ability Class fits —in this case to conduct sovereign immunity, its and more im waived body separate III gaming on tribal lands. A portantly, was “amenable to state-court interpret- developed case law has federal to enforce an award. Id. at suit” arbitration authority in ing context of consen- 414, 121 S.Ct. 1589. case, C & L sual contracts. One recent Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawato- context, Enterprises Taken C & L Okla,, 411, 121 mi Tribe 532 suggests sovereign that when a tribe waives (2001), 1589,149 L.Edüd addresses 5.Ct. suit, immunity from it also its choose the ability immunity by its tribe’s waive resulting litigation in which forum will jurisdic- contract and consent state court occur, court, including state whether not it tion. express congressional authority to has do so. agree L the tribe en Enterprises, In C & In the context of similar business ments, pri appear agree. other tered into a construction contract with courts See Indians, building Bradley to install on a v. Crow vate contractor a roof Tribe Mont. 306, 308, by (holding the tribe. 121 S.Ct. 67 P.3d 311-12 owned Id. contract, sovereign immunity had 1589. In the the tribe consented that tribe waived its agreed agreeing that the contract was and could be sued in state court arbitration place and to “governed the law of the to state law state court located,” Project provision in that case contract where the a standard construction venue); the state of choice of law and Rush Creek outside tribal boundaries within Solu 415, 121 tions, Tribe, (quoted Oklahoma. Id. at Inc. v. Ute Mountain Ute S.Ct. omitted). (hold authority Supreme (Colo.Ct.App.2004) Court was P.3d immunity Tribe had asked to determine “whether the tribe waived its ” immunity legally court court had based on a waived its suit state state agreement. the contractual Id. at contract in which tribe consented based on enforceable added). jurisdiction).6 In a (emphasis court Int’l, Inc., argue Enterprises jurisdiction”); does Diesel The Pueblos C & L ter v. Morse Kizis 46, 498, apply only (2002) ("|T]he here because the concern in that not Conn. 794 502 260 A.2d there a valid waiver of case was whether was immunity implicates sovereign doctrine of sub jurisdiction immunity; court at was not (Quoted jurisdiction.” ject authority matter governed because the contract a construc- issue Co., omitted.)); Funding Sky City Danka LLC v. reservation, project and that was outside the Casino, 357, (Law N.J.Super. 747 A.2d 837 329 clearly jurisdiction. state court thus there Div.1999) (claiming subject lacked that the court 414, We do not U.S. at 121 S.Ct. 1589. 532 had matter because the tribe sover sovereign immunity subject and mat- believe that 6,¶ 2002-NMSC-012, immunity); eign Gallegos, as are distinct as the Pueblos ter 207, (the 46 668 Court 132 N.M. P.3d examined immunity argue. waiver of in state court in- A immunity tribe had from in if the waived its suit subject herently a involves state court’s matter addressing court "whether the district had sub jurisdiction, immunity waiver claims are of- claim”). ject Putting the matter over subject phrased jurisdiction claims. ten matter aside, we this connection between the two issues Techs., Inc., Mfg. Okla. 523 See Kiowa Tribe v. agree immunity with the that a waiver of Pueblos 751, 754, 1700, S.Ct. 981 118 140 L.Ed.2d jurisdic automatically give does not state courts court, (1998) (when sued in state tribe "moved to tion; only apply may the waiver in tribal courts. jurisdiction, relying part on lack of in dismiss for Auth., v. 268 See Garcia Akwesasne Hous. F.3d sovereign immunity”); Campo Band Mis- its 76, (2d Cir.2001) (a 87 contract clause can con Court, Cal.App.4th Superior sion Indians immunity “only in the 175, 183, (2006) stitute a waiver courts Cal.Rptr.3d (discussing a ”). However, sovereign does not asserting immunity the it follow sovereign as a basis "motion immunity dismissing subject an action mat- this between waivers for for lack distinction However, no federal in- “that statute was are Enterprises, volved in C & L unlike IGRA for, licensing regulation” Also, Kennerly. in here and PL 280 in &C compacting parties IGRA also authorizes Enterprises L activity the lawsuit arose from allocate between the state and Thus, outside of tribal boundaries. there (jurisdiction shifting) the tribe that is “neces- appear separate authority to be two lines of sary for the enforcement of such laws and addressing ability a tribe’s to consent to state 2710(d)(3)(C). regulations.” 25 U.S.C. (1) jurisdiction: line, Kennerly court Unfortunately, Congress did not define what specific prescribes where a federal statute it “regulating” gaming activity meant course of action that must be followed might “necessary what for the enforce- jurisdiction, shift any compre- but without regulations. ment” of such laws and There- agreement hensive between the tribes and fore, we congressional look to evidence of state; line, Enterprises the C & L intent to decide whether over agreement where a consensual business ex- something visitors’ suits is ists party, between the tribe and another negotiate tribes states in a governs juris- there is no federal statute that gaming compact. shifting. diction Our case seems to fit some- in where between. gaming, the context of casino we Legislative History contract,

have a tribal-state like C & L En- history leading up passage statute, terprises, and also federal like Ken- of IGRA illustrates what intended Thus, nerly. to determine if the Pueblos had compact provision when it included the authority in juris- to consent to state court in Compact, Although passed 1988, diction IGRA. we cannot focus sole- IGRA was ly Enterprises on the C & L line of cases and legislation contemplated similar had been for look no further than the language. Doe, years. at least five See 2005-NMCA- earlier, For the Kennerly reasons stated 198, (citing exactly point answering on either in (1983)). 34,184 Cong. Rec. generally See specific Nonetheless, inquiry before us. Santoni, Gaming Reg- Roland J. The Indian Kennerly, line with 400 U.S. at 91 ulatory Act: How Did We Get Here ? Where beyond we will look Going?, Creighton Are We L.Rev. if determine IGRA author- time, During that seven different izes the Pueblos to shift over addressing gaming bills were intro- personal injury suits to state court. In so Santoni, Congress. supra, duced See assume, doing, deciding, we without (these 396-403 bills included H.R. H.R. IGRA is similar to PL 280 in the sense that it H.R. S. H.R. S. provides comprehensive governing scheme IGRA). and S. 555 that became In each which includes some allowance version, Congress struggled ques- with the jurisdiction shifting, and like PL 280 must regulatory authority tion of where gam- Therefore, be followed. we turn to whether ing on Indian lands would lie—with the fed- jurisdiction shifting IGRA authorizes states, government, eral or the tribes. context of suits. major dispute involved the reach of the jurisdiction shifting Does IGRA authorize authority regulatory state’s to state court? Indian at land. See id. 398. The tribes had earlier, serious concerns about law that would express As noted {30} ly application impose regulation activity authorizes the of state laws state over tribal on sued, subject juris- compasses merely and consent to state court matter whether it be but ” authority may (quoting diction that a tribe has the to waive where it be sued' Atascadero State Scanlon,

immunity authority Hosp. but does not have the to 473 U.S. 105 S.Ct. (1985))); subject jurisdiction. Bradley, consent to matter See Gar- 87 L.Ed.2d 171 67 P.3d cia, (“courts ("We consistently previously acknowledged 268 F.3d at 86-87 have at have ... applied complementary principles may right two to waivers that Indian tribes waive their to sover- (1) immunity]: sovereign’s eign immunity [of waiver must be and consent to suit in state (2) added.)). unambiguous, sovereign’s (Emphasis interest 'en- courts.” compact- III that the Class strongly suggests (noting that S. at 402-03 land. See id. intended to be broad ing provision was it did not by tribes because 1303was favored and the states enough to allow the tribes gaming III apply law to Class state themselves solutions work out between the federal the tribes and rather allowed Con- that had eluded jurisdictional issues incorpo- gaming while govern government gress. regulations). its rating law into hand, states, complete wanted on the other take a narrower view The Pueblos {34} gaming. III over Class

regulatory control in- Congress They argue that while IGRA. discussing in S. (noting, that id. at 398 See negotiate gaming com- tended Attorney felt that General the Arizona on what Congress put also limitations pacts, strictly by state governed gaming should be Specifi- compacts. in included these could be law). only Congress cally, the Pueblos assert jurisdiction shifting as it permit intended to provi- compact Congress devised crime, and controlling organized regulation of dispute over to resolve this sion intend to broaden Congress did not 555 that III The version S. Class jurisdiction shifting to include such reach of in ultimately was introduced became IGRA actions matters as extrinsic version to August and was the first against casinos. gaming concept of a tribal-state include the Santoni, supra. generally See compact. See agree with the Pueblos We Wolf, Sidney Killing the New M. purposes IGRA’s primary Buffalo: behind one to En- Amendment State Eleventh to thwart gaming provisions III was Defense Class Gaming Com- IGRA Indian by allowing the introduction organized crime forcement L. Contemp. & pacts, 47 Wash. U.J. Urb. laws, and state ven regulation, state of state (1995) appear- (noting the sudden 85-86 conclu ample support for this ue. There is compact provision). the tribal-state ance of in that one of its IGRA itself states sion. compact negotiated By relying upon a protect gaming tribal purposes is to tended states, Congress was able to take tribes and crime. 25 by organized infiltration from of tribes the diverse interests 2702(2). into account history of legislative § U.S.C. answering without states in the Senate Select as contained juris- regulatory (Senate question of where difficult Affairs Com on Indian Committee mittee) Indian lands would allowing diction over the fear that report, reflects Clark, at 566 rel. 120 N.M. lie. See State ex infiltra open the door to tribal would (“Congress at at 904 P.2d S.Rep. No. by organized crime. See a balance between the attempted (1988), Cong. to strike & Ad U.S.Code sovereigns (“The inter- and the rights of tribes as Fed at 3071 need for min.News regulating so- have gaming, ests that states regulation of eral State and/or gambling.”). of, forms of phisticated regulation, instead addition expressed various State has been Thus, allocating instead ”); .... see law enforcement officials Federal states, the tribes and jurisdiction between Casino, 353 Cal. Grand also Artichoke Joe’s the tribes and compact provision allowed (IGRA passed part F.3d at for themselves negotiate states to and decide organized gaming] [tribal “shield criminal, civil, regulatory the division of crime”); Kelly, 932 Ana v. Pueblo Santa 2710(d)(3); See 25 U.S.C. responsibility. I) (examin (Kelly F.Supp. Santoni, (“Congress supra, at 407 see also gaming com Class III ing purpose behind compact concept, introduced Tribal-State stating that the central pact provision accept state law require than tribes rather against the infiltration protect is “to purpose conducting jurisdiction, a condition to gaming”). high-stakes into organized crime (“In Wolf, supra, at 86 gaming.”); III Class infiltration preventing criminal deciding While sum, ‘punted’ the issue of certainly purpose one gaming was states into tribal jurisdiction to the state versus tribal clearly compact, it was III behind the Class negotiate amongst themselves and tribes to basis.”). S.Rep. 100- No. history purpose. sole See This not the case-by-case on a 5, Committee, 446, explained, Cong. at & Admin.News the Senate “the idea is U.S.Code 1988, (noting agreement at 3075 the views of Senator to create a consensual between activity years gaming that “in 15 of sovereign governments up McCain the two and it is reservations, never been on Indian there has provi- to those entities to determine what clearly organized criminal proven one case of compacts.” Cong. sions will be in the compact- activity”). “Congress looked to the added). (emphasis Rec. S12643-01 ing process primarily balancing a means of as explicitly The Senate Committee ad state and tribal interests.” Artichoke Joe’s reading vanced a broad Casino, at 726. Cal. Grand 353 F.3d shifting provisions, observing that the “sub- in- Senate Committee identified several state may parts of each of the broad areas be more beyond organized terests concerns over inclusive,” compact “may and the tribal-state crime that factor into this balance. A state’s jurisdictional allocate most or all of the re governmental respect to class interests tribe, sponsibility to the to the or to State III on Indian lands include the inter- S.Rep. variation between.” No. 100- play public of such with the State’s 14, Cong. at U.S.Code & Admin.News law, interests, policy, safety, and other as 1988, at 3084. The Senate Committee thus impacts regulatory well as on the State’s negotiating revealed its intent to leave the system, including its economic interest scope regu free to define the of state raising S.Rep. revenue for its citizens. No. latory narrowly broadly as or as added). 100-446, (emphasis at 13 The inclu- 100-446, they may S.Rep. see fit. No. See “safety,” sion of broad state interests such as Cong. at U.S.Code & Admin.News at “law,” policy” “public —references (stating the intention “that to the extent easily encompass personal could the future of governments relinquish rights tribal elect to injury suits tribal casinos—in the compact they might in a tribal —State regulatory authority gam- discussion of over reserved, relinquishment have otherwise ing, suggests that the Committee Senate did rights specific of such shall be to the tribe so scope compact not intend to confine the of added)). making (emphasis By the election” negotiations allowing compact parties ample room to I, prevention organized Kelly of crime. See negotiate regulatory jurisdiction, matters of (“IGRA’s F.Supp. provisions at 1296 re- Congress intended to ensure that the com great pains pro- veal that took pact process was “a viable mechanism for meaningful opportunity vide states to be- setting equal various matters between two intimately regulation come involved in the sovereigns.” S.Rep. No. gaming in protect order to themselves and Cong. U.S.Code & Admin.News at 3083 gaming’s possible negative the tribes added); (emphasis see also Pueblo Santa added.)). (Emphasis effects.” II), Kelly (Kelly Ana v. 104 F.3d legislative history indicates that (10th 1997) (“[T]he legislative history Cir. expansive took more view toward replete with references to the need [IGRA] compact provision, IGRA’s one that would and state inter accommodate tribal afford tribes and states control and both ...”). ests. flexibility shaping aspects the fundamental compact negotiating pro The broad authority regulatory See Congress sought to ensure (“The cess which Cong. Ree. S12643-01 Trib- protect their interests in states could compact language intends that two al/State laws, safety, public policy, reason sovereigns together negoti- in a will sit down ably interpreted include the issue equal equal strength ation on and at terms suits. See up regulating and come with a method of Doe, 2005-NMCA-110, ¶ 17, Doe, 138 N.M. gaming.”); see also 2005- injuries NMCA-110, 4, (“Redressing sustained 118 P.3d 203 sufficiently related the Casino’s visitors is (“Ultimately, Congress adopted a flexible so- regulation gaming____”). Is competing lution that allowed state and tribal law, case-by-case safety, public policy play interests to be balanced on a sues of basis.”). Inouye, significant in tort suits. Personal As Senator then-Chair of role law, law, tort instead of Pueblo meant, expose weaknesses Mexico part, in law is inju- personal arising out of those lawsuits public the safety procedures protect and in action, the Pueb- By that the State and ries. generally Dan B. safety hazards. See of New Mexi- agreed application that the los 5, Dobbs, § at 8 The Law Torts of IGRA; by that it authorized co state law was “can seen as means (indicating [a] tort law IGRA, was, “directly language in of relat- the by control imposing degree of social of to, for, licensing necessary of and ed and it”); compensating or id. preventing activity.” It follows that regulation of such (“Tort ... law is one of number at 10 more than providing a forum or a choice of society contemporary American ways in of is, IGRA, “nec- language in the of one forum safety or at creating incentives for aimed at essary [state enforcement of such for the both.”). or providing compensation for loss laws,” which cannot be enforced tort] activity gaming Tort are thus related to suits Thus, without a forum. context of a lawsuit gaming patrons are helping in ensure that IGRA, Congress foresaw that the states dangers, some- exposed to unwarranted not negotiate a tribes want and the the benefit of the Tribes. thing that inures to along law to of forum with a choice of choice IGRA, drafting In was personal law- accommodate visitors’ majority that the “vast of consumers aware language utilized part As of the broad suits. gaming] be non-Indian citi- would [tribal that envi- we are satisfied to the state.” zens of the State and tourists Gallegos, a choice. See 2002- sioned such (1988). Protecting Cong. Rec. H8146-01 NMSC-012, 36, 46 P.3d 668 safety visitors personal of those outside (“No parties to the disputes one that mutual would seem to be of and consumers sought gaming compacts to ensure a forum to both the state and the tribes. See concern injured compensation for those at the and under entitled (providing section Section added.)).7 (Emphasis tribal casinos.” application for the “Protection of Visitors” dispute such a Again, the Pueblos tort and shift- New Mexico law arguing that interpretation, instead broad necessarily

ing). protection extends to This to, necessary phrase “directly related and injuries patroniz- those sustained regulation III for” the of Class providing and assurances of the casinos to be of limitation on what meant remedy. Congress could ration- an effective agree could the tribes and states fore- ally ought that tribes not be conclude jurisdiction. compacts regarding Class III negotiating provisions per- closed from such Doe, 2005-NMCA-110, ¶ 30, N.M. See interest, in their own and as ceived to be (stating provision of IGRA for, to, necessary “directly related and limit “permissive at in this case is and issue licensing regulation” ed”) (Sutin, J., dissenting). agree that We case, advantage unfair of New the states could not take this State shifting authority pres- agreed apply Pueblos New this Mexico and the brief, However, interpretations opinion found in letters amici Pueblos of 7. In their consolidated Isleta, Sandia, Juan, Acoma, “do not warrant Laguna, Santa "lack the force of law” thus San Ana, Taos, Chevron-style Apache deference.” Christensen v. Harris well as the Jicarilla Nation, County, argue 529 U.S. that this Court should look to the (2000). Interior, agency Chevron involved an Department Office of Indian L.Ed.2d 621 regulation promulgated agency’s Management’s interpretation based on the Gaming of IGRA. letter, agency interpretation. 104 S.Ct. January 467 U.S. In a informed regulation promul- Legislative 2778. This letter was not a Committee on Com- the New Mexico Manage- gated Gaming pacts the alloca- the Office of that IGRA’s “authorization for Supreme Court has ment. The United States would not extend to tion of civil opinion letters do not deserve patron’s it is an area that is made clear tort claim because for, agency regulations the deference afforded to not interpretations ... a formal regulation “arrived at after licensing of class III ac- adjudication judiciary notice-and-comment rulemak- tivity.” should usual- It is true that the Christensen, ing.” responsible agency’s 529 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. ly afford deference to the Thus, U.S.A., may give opinion we while interpretation a statute. See Chevron deserves, Council, consideration as it 467 U.S. letter such Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. "Chevron-style deference.” Id. 81 L.Ed.2d 694 104 S.Ct.

281 surrendering rights many compacts in other sure tribes into tribal-state other states Certainly, there are areas. See id. arising specific provi out of IGRA do include However, legislative history limits. ex- Diepenbrock sions on this issue. See poses exactly are. what those limits The Merkel, 1063, 1068 Kan.App.2d 33 97 P.3d report that in- “[i]n Committee states no (2004) (compact jurisdic giving the tribe civil stance, contemplate the exten- [IGRA] does injuries tion over tort claims from jurisdiction application sion of State or the facilities); patrons gaming Bonnette v. Tu purpose.” S.Rep. State laws for other Indians, (La.Ct. nica-Biloxi 873 So.2d 6 100-446, Cong. No. U.S.Code & Ad- App.2003) (compact requiring the tribe to min.News at 3076. As demonstrated “adopt procedures disposi reasonable for legislative history, purposes” the “other ” gaming facility pa tort claims Congress that intended to exclude from state Kizis, omitted)); (quoted authority trons 794 jurisdiction Compact pat- in the were those (Conn.2002) (tribal compact A.2d at 504 pro ently Inouye unrelated to Senator viding that the tribe will create a remedial negoti- listed these areas could not be which system disposition for of tort claims “taxation, rights, ated environmen- as water it). subject compacts give While all these regulation, Cong. tal Rec. land use.” jurisdiction matter Thus, inference, S12643-01. when Con- tribes, claims to the unlike the here gress jurisdiction tells us what is off-limits grants which concurrent to the sufficiently because related to State, provision granting the inclusion of a regulation, fairly presume we can that other jurisdiction, regardless party of what it is subjects falling express catego- outside those given personal injury that indicates suits juris- ries are not excluded from court See, sufficiently gaming are in related to to be e.g., diction. Andrus v. Glover Const. Co., compacts. cluded the tribal-state (1980) (“Where Congress explic- L.Ed.2d 548 reasons, per- For all of these we are itly exceptions gen- enumerates certain to a Congress that compact- suaded intended the prohibition, exceptions eral additional are not ing provision of IGRA to allow the states and implied, to be in the absence of evidence of a negotiate regula- the tribes broad latitude to intent.”). contrary legislative tory question issues. There is no that when persuasive We also find the Court of Congress specific sets forth conditions for Appeals’ provisions in discussion of other fifty years shifting, as it did over Compact that on their face do not seem to be 280, then, ago Kennerly, in PL as in those regulation However, necessary steps must be followed. Doe, 2005-NMCA-110, ¶ 18, activity. See while IGRA resembles PL 280 in the sense example, if N.M. 118 P.3d 203. For Congress that did envision shift- provisions can include on alco gaming purposes, for it PL is unlike service, conditions, employment hol labor dis specific in that it does not set forth a road- crimination, insurance, liability it then map jurisdiction shifting of how such should would not make sense to read IGRA so nar Rather, accomplished. leaves the IGRA rowly provisions as to exclude related to subject only negotiation issue to to broad claims. Id. provisions guidelines. Congress’ That was choice. It is Those were included Com just pact, shifting provi as the Congress specifici- not for us to demand of included, sion was because the State and the ty unwilling provide. it was or unable to We importance, Pueblos understood their only satisfy that need ourselves parties IGRA allows the two interested envisioned, authorized, tribes to contract work out for themselves. such matters wished, jurisdiction shifting, they if part larger, global of a much settlement of support for con- We find further our complex to make issues clusion that intended tribes and history work. its negotiate states to the issue of state court inquiry. over civil claims in the fact that satisfies our doing so. thing prevent in IGRA them Indian Law Canons of Con- Traditional subject Congress unambiguously left struction for themselves. to determine argue further The Pueblos ambiguity, pre- an Without Blackfeet prevail should interpretation of IGRA their sumption apply. not does presumption, which on the based Blackfeet CONCLUSION requires ambiguities found statutes enact of an Indian tribe to be ed for the benefit reasons, foregoing For we affirm {48} Mon interpreted in favor of the tribe. See Appeals the Court of and remand Indians, 471 Tribe U.S. tana v. respective of district courts for further Blackfeet state 759, 766, L.Ed.2d 753 105 S.Ct. 85 holding. proceedings consistent with our (1985); Bryan County, 426 U.S. v. Itasca IT IS SO ORDERED. {49} 96 S.Ct. 48 L.Ed.2d Casino, (1976); Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand CHÁVEZ, L. WE CONCUR: EDWARD at 729. The Pueblos assert that 353 F.3d SERNA, Justice, PATRICIO M. Chief this, applied canon should be here because MAES, PETRA JIMENEZ Justices. acknowledged this Committee Senate statutory In its construction. standard MINZNER, PAMELA B. Justice IGRA, ex report on the Senate Committee (dissenting). IGRA, that, construing plicitly stated when MINZNER, (dissenting). Justice any ambiguities “interpret on courts should agree most I respectfully these in a manner that will be I dissent. issues Sutin, S.Rep. Judge No. from the Court favorable to tribal interests.” who dissented Cong. majority Appeals’ opinion, at & Ad that the Indian U.S.Code However, (IGRA), “ambigu Gaming Regulatory min.News at 3085. Act 25 U.S.C. (2000), ity application permit § tribes and prerequisite” is a for does not presumption. agree Artichoke Joe’s Cal. to states Blackfeet Casino, at 729. To deter and thus does not Grand 353 F.3d tribal court state court beyond ambiguity mine courts can look allow the State to exercise personal injury and also examine text of the federal statute visitors’ claims Pueblo, “context, history.” purpose, legislative v. its Indian land. Doe Santa Clara Cohen’s, 2005-NMCA-110, ¶ 21, 731; supra at also Id. see 7.02(1)(b) J., ap (Sutin, (suggesting dissenting). § canons should be P.3d not plied Congress’ if intent is clear “either My colleagues to rest their seem through express language through or clear analysis part on what IGRA does least language leg in the and reliable evidence say. say, opposed to what it does not history”). islative ¶¶ 13, majority Maj. Op. opinion 16. The initially open to holds the Pueb- Although “[t]he the text of IGRA is agreed Compact gave interpretation, are convinced after los some we history personal examining legislative that Con- courts allowing upon claims conditioned not IGRA gress’ intent is clear. For the reasons stated earlier, jurisdiction shifting, upon particular this such IGRA intended prohibiting shifting.” Id. provision give the tribes and IGRA opinion, my col- negotiate. Subsequently, The states within the ample states room to regulatory leagues purposes appeal for of this were to resolve assume and the tribes that IGRA must be construed to determine jurisdiction issues for themselves. For earlier, jurisdiction shifting. persuaded are whether it authorizes reasons discussed we ¶29. then, negoti- opinion, later in the intended the Id. Still wished, assumption, my col- ate, for consistent with this they if the choice of laws identify legislative intent. leagues well indicia of suits casinos as ¶¶ seem at Id. 36-41. The indicia identified as a choice of venue for the enforcement ambiguous. attempting to con- Nothing required best After those laws. recognize subject, any- I believe we should negotiate the nor does strue tribes to (vii) any subjects ambiguous, that its text is and under these other that are circumstances, presumption operation of Montana related to the activi- Indians, Tribe ties. Blackfeet (1985), L.Ed.2d 753 105 S.Ct. (vii). 2710(d)(3)(C)(i),(ii), 25 U.S.C. In his applies. Therefore I would reverse the dissent, Judge significant Sutin noted the Appeals Court of and the district court and “regarding absence of discussion wheth remand with directions to dismiss both com- permit er the an IGRA was allocation of plaints. jurisdiction beyond necessary for the dissent, Judge argued In his Sutin regulations directly enforcement of laws and that because tribal courts retain licensing related to and arising over claims on tribal lands regulation of Class III activities.” tribes, and because New Mexico elected not Doe, 2005-NMCA-110, ¶ 34, 138 N.M. lands, juris- to assume over tribal (Sutin, J., dissenting). I agree 118 P.3d 203 authority dictional must come from IGRA. Judge Sutin’s observation that allocat Pueblo, Doe v. Santa Clara 2005-NMCA- ing jurisdiction personal injury over visitors’ ¶ (Sutin, 138 N.M. 118 P.3d 203 “necessary claims would not seem to be for J., dissenting). analyzing Section regulations the enforcement of laws and that 2710(d)(3)(C) he reasoned visi- to, directly necessary are related and for personal injury arising tors’ claims on tribal licensing regulation and III of Class jurisdic- fall scope land do not within the ¶26. Congress in activities.” See id. Had required for the enforcement of laws and included, I tended for such claims to be think regulations directly necessary related to and explicit, IGRA would have been and we licensing regulation for gam- of Class III parse legislative history would not need to its ¶26. ing. Id. He then examined the lan- legislative for indicia of intent. Even allow guage of it IGRA and determined does not ing many for the fact that there were issues expressly allow the to negotiating compacts, be resolved IGRA agree shifting jurisdiction over visitors’ seems to me to take a narrow view of what claims, leg- which indicates jurisdiction shifting, any, likely if to oc preserve islative intent exclusive tribal phrase “directly cur. The ¶ jurisdiction over such claims. Id. 30. Fi- necessary licensing regulation” for the nally, Judge asserted that Sutin because gaming activities seems restrictive rather permit IGRA does not the tribes to consent expansive. than jurisdiction, shifting cannot Judge argued, As Sutin because evade the rule of exclusive tribal jurisdictional expressly grant IGRA does not general arising tort actions on Indian claims, Lee, authority over these we cannot evade land established in v. Williams jurisdic- the Williams rule of exclusive tribal 3 L.Ed.2d 251 Doe Pueblo, 2005-NMCA-110, general arising v. Clara tion over tort actions on Indi- Santa ¶ Williams, (Sutin, J., 138 N.M. an land. See 358 U.S. best, I dissenting). agree. light S.Ct. 269. At of IGRA’s silence rule, on the matter and the Williams we are pertinent of IGRA obliged presump- to adhere to the Blackfeet reads, apparent ambiguities in tion and hold the Any compact negotiated Tribal-State un- construed in favor of the IGRA should be (A) subparagraph may provi- der include argu- accept tribes. If we do not the tribes’ relating sions to— prohibited shifting ment that (i) application of the criminal and it, plainly provide because IGRA does not regulations civil laws and of the Indian be, very we should hold that silence to at the tribe or the State are relat- least, ambiguous, apply then the Black- for, necessary licensing ed presumption. feet regulation activity; of such (ii) Judge Sutin’s determination the allocation of criminal and civil parties expected litigated also this issue be between the State and Pueblo, seems accurate. Doe Santa Clara Indian tribe for the enforce- 2005-NMCA-110, ¶ 28, regulations ... ment of such laws and 8(A) (Sutin, J., dissenting). Section P.3d 203 Compact says, brought in state

[A]ny such claim court, including claims

district land, finally determined unless it is that IGRA does

by a or federal court shifting of permit injury suits to state

visitors’

court.1

Therefore, majority I reconcile the cannot ignore will not

opinion’s conclusion that “we Compact,” with the language of the

the clear 8(A), explicitly

language which Section Maj. Op. 15.2 the issue unresolved. leaves Compact’s I conclude the shift- would authorized is not terms, ju-

unambiguous and because injury claims visitors’

risdiction over pre- explicitly authorized jurisdiction over exclusive

sume tribes’ My colleagues prevail. must

such claims view, I

being respectfully dis- different

sent.

2007-NMSC-010 Mexico, Plaintiff- of New

STATE

Petitioner,

v. G., child, Defendant-Respondent

JADE Mexico, Plaintiff- of New

State

Respondent, child, G., a Defendant-Petitioner.

Jade 29,017. 29,016,

Nos.

Supreme Court of New Mexico. 28, 2007.

Feb. history (discussing of the http://www.nmgcb.org/tribal/2001compact. P.3d 1. See 8(A) pdf. Compact). Section of the 1997 jurisdiction shifting. provides explicitly for 8(A) clarity 2. would note the of Section I jurisdiction in the State "[C]oncurrent civil Gaming Compacts entered into in apply to a courts and the Tribal courts shall 11-13-1, comparison see NMSA bodily injury property dam- claim for visitor’s 8(A) entered text of Section age proximately the conduct of the caused generally Doe v. Santa Clara into in 2001. See Gaming Enterprise.” Section 11-13-1. ¶ 5, Pueblo, 2005-NMCA-l

Case Details

Case Name: Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo

Court Name: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date Published: Feb 23, 2007

Citation: 154 P.3d 644

Docket Number: 29,350, 29,351

Court Abbreviation: N.M.