DOE v. SAINT JOSEPH‘S CATHOLIC CHURCH et al.
S21G0549
Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 8, 2022
COLVIN, Justice.
In December 2018, Phillip Doe filed suit against Saint Joseph‘s Catholic Church, Archbishop Wilton Gregory, and the Archdiocese of Atlanta (collectively, “the Church“), asserting various tort claims based in part on childhood sexual abuse Doe allegedly suffered while serving as an altar boy at Saint Joseph‘s in the late 1970s.1 The trial court granted the Church‘s motion to dismiss, ruling, in pertinent part, that Doe‘s “non-nuisance tort claims” were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitation,
[i]f the defendant or those under whom he claims are guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff has been debarred or deterred from bringing an action, the period of limitation shall run only from the time of the plaintiff‘s discovery of the fraud.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. See Doe v. Saint Joseph‘s Catholic Church, 357 Ga. App. 710, 712-715 (1) (a)-(c) (850 SE2d 267) (2020). We granted the Church‘s petition for certiorari, asking
[w]hether the trial court erred in granting [the Church‘s] motion to dismiss [Doe‘s] non-nuisance tort claims based on the determination
that the complaint failed to allege facts that could support the application of OCGA § 9-3-96 sufficient to toll the statute of limitation as to the non-nuisance tort claims.3
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Although the trial court correctly determined that Doe‘s claim seeking to hold the Church vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior was time-barred, the court erred in concluding at the motion-to-dismiss stage that Doe could not introduce evidence of fraud within the framework of his complaint sufficient under
1. Doe filed suit against the Church on December 20, 2018. According to Doe‘s amended complaint, the Church employed Father J. Douglas Edwards as a priest to oversee Saint Joseph‘s day-to-day operations from 1976 to 1981. In that role, Father Edwards was responsible for training altar boys and supervising them during Mass, regular meetings, practices, and overnight trips. Doe alleged that he served as an altar boy under Father Edwards‘s supervision for approximately three years in the late 1970s, from the age of 12 to 15. According to Doe, Father Edwards sexually molested him eight to ten times between 1976 and 1978, during the time period when he was serving as an altar boy.
Doe alleged that, before Father Edwards abused him, the Church knew that Father Edwards and other priests belonging to Archdioceses across the country had a history of sexually abusing children. Nevertheless, according to Doe, the Church engaged in a “systematic cover-up effort” to conceal the danger that the priests posed to minor parishioners like Doe, even as they encouraged Doe and other minor parishioners to serve as altar boys under the care and supervision of such priests.
Doe further alleged that on August 9 and 16, 2018, Archbishop Gregory issued public statements apologizing for “sexual abuse by Church leaders of children, young people and those over whom they exercised authority,” the failure of Church leaders “to protect others from such damaging and deviant behavior,” and the Church‘s disbelief and neglect of those who “came forward to tell Church officials of their torment.” According to Doe, however, he “had no knowledge that [the Church] knew that Edwards had been accused of molesting children” until November 6, 2018, when the Church “formally acknowledged th[e] culture of sexual abuse by its priests” by releasing a list of priests “credibly accused of sexual abuse of a minor.” This list included Father Edwards, who had died in 1997, and showed that, in the 14 years preceding his transfer to Saint Joseph‘s, Father Edwards had served at nine different Catholic churches and taken a year-long leave of absence.4
The Church moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that Doe‘s claims were time-barred pursuant to
Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court rejected Doe‘s tolling argument and granted the Church‘s motion to dismiss. The trial court concluded that, even assuming the Church was in a confidential relationship with Doe and had fraudulently concealed its knowledge of Father Edwards‘s dangerous propensities,
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. While acknowledging that there was “no question that the facts alleged by Doe implicate the [Church] in a fraud involving moral turpitude,” the majority concluded that Doe could not benefit from tolling under
2. We review de novo a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to dismiss. See Love v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 311 Ga. 682, 684 (859 SE2d 33) (2021). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim cannot be granted unless
(1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought.
Stendahl v. Cobb County, 284 Ga. 525, 525 (1) (668 SE2d 723) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss, we construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff‘s favor. See id.
A plaintiff who seeks to toll a limitation period under
(a) To benefit from tolling under
First, Doe alleged that the Church “knew or should have known that any child in
made false representations to [Doe,] with reckless disregard for the truth, as to the safe and spiritual environment provided within [the church‘s] walls[,] with the intent of inducing [Doe] to rely on those statements, remain a member of the congregation, and follow and trust priests like [Father] Edwards.
This allegation – that the Church induced Doe‘s reliance on Father Edwards for safe supervision by affirmatively misrepresenting that Father Edwards was a safe supervisor, despite knowing that he presented a danger to young parishioners – tracks the statutory elements of “legal fraud.” See
Further, even apart from Doe‘s allegations regarding affirmative misrepresentations, Doe adequately pled actual fraud based on “a fraudulent breach of a duty to disclose that exists because of a relationship of trust and confidence.” Hunter, Maclean, 269 Ga. at 846 (1). A “confidential” relationship exists “where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another or where, from a similar relationship of mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost good faith.”
According to Doe‘s allegations, a confidential relationship between Doe and the Church obligated the Church to disclose to Doe its alleged knowledge of Father Edwards‘s dangerous predispositions toward children, and its suppression of that information therefore constituted actual fraud. See
Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to Doe, as we must at the motion-to-dismiss stage, we cannot say that Doe “could not possibly introduce evidence” establishing the existence of a confidential relationship between Doe and the Church. Stendahl, 284 Ga at 525 (1). We have previously concluded that there are circumstances under which “[i]t can be found that a clergyman occupies a confidential relationship toward a member of his church.” Bryan v. Norton, 245 Ga. 347, 348 (1) (265 SE2d 282) (1980). We have also explained that “[t]he determination as to whether a confidential relationship exists” under a particular set of facts generally “is a question for the trier of fact.” Stamps v. JFB Properties, LLC, 287 Ga. 124, 126 (694 SE2d 649) (2010). Moreover, courts in other jurisdictions applying similar standards for establishing confidential relationships have concluded that a church may have such a relationship with minor parishioners under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F3d 409, 429-430 (II) (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding a jury finding that a confidential relationship existed under Connecticut law between a Catholic Diocese and a minor parishioner, who was allegedly sexually abused by a priest, where the Diocese sponsored the minor-priest relationship knowing that the priest “acted as a mentor and spiritual advisor” and supervised the minor during various
(b) Tolling under
Here, Doe alleged that the Church‘s fraudulent conduct debarred or deterred him from bringing suit because it “hinder[ed] [him] from obtaining information necessary to reveal the existence of [his] cause[s] of action.” Charter Peachford, 233 Ga. App. at 457-458 (c). Specifically, Doe alleged that he was prevented from discovering that he had causes of action against the Church for knowingly putting him in danger, as opposed to merely against Father Edwards for the alleged sexual abuse, because the Church engaged in a “systematic cover-up effort” to fraudulently conceal from Doe its knowledge that Father Edwards presented a danger to young parishioners like him and made “false representations” that he would be safe under Father Edwards‘s supervision. According to Doe, he did not know that the Church had wronged him until it publicly acknowledged in 2018 that it knew Father Edwards had been “credibly accused of sexual abuse of a minor.”
Even taken in the light most favorable to Doe, these allegations are insufficient to support tolling under
We cannot say the same with respect to Doe‘s claims against the Church for negligent supervision, training, and retention, negligent failure to warn and provide adequate security, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment. The Court of Appeals majority reasoned incorrectly that the alleged abuse itself would have revealed to Doe that the Church had wronged him. See Doe, 357 Ga. App. at 714-715 (1) (c). Accordingly, the majority erroneously concluded that the Church‘s alleged fraudulent concealment of its knowledge that Father Edwards was dangerous to children did not prevent Doe from discovering and pursuing his claims against the Church. See id.
However, the elements of Doe‘s potential claims against Father Edwards and the Church were distinct. As a result, the fact that Doe knew of information supporting a potential claim against Father Edwards did not necessarily mean that Doe would have known of potential causes of action against the Church. See Daniel v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 255 Ga. 29, 30 (334 SE2d 659) (1985) (“Various causes of action in tort arising from the same set of facts may commence running at different times depending on the nature of the several causes of action involved[.]“).
A key distinction between claims Doe might have had against Father Edwards for sexual abuse and those he asserted against the Church is that the latter claims, with the exception of the respondeat-superior claim, each require a showing that the Church knew or should have known that Father Edwards presented a danger to young parishioners like Doe, which is the very fact that Doe alleges the Church fraudulently concealed. Specifically, Doe‘s claims against the Church for negligent supervision, training, and retention each require a showing that the Church had actual or constructive knowledge of the danger that resulted in Doe‘s injury, namely, Father Edwards‘s dangerous predispositions toward children. See Novare Group, Inc. v. Sarif, 290 Ga. 186, 190-191 (4) (718 SE2d 304) (2011) (“For an employer to be held liable for negligent supervision, there must be sufficient evidence to establish that the employer reasonably knew or should have known of an employee‘s tendencies to engage in certain behavior relevant to the injuries allegedly incurred by the plaintiff.” (emphasis supplied; citations and punctuation omitted)); Advanced Disposal Servs. Atlanta, LLC v. Marczak, 359 Ga. App. 316, 319 (2) (857 SE2d 494) (2021) (“To establish a negligent training claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that inadequate training caused a reasonably foreseeable injury.” (emphasis supplied));
Finally, Doe‘s breach-of-fiduciary-duty, fraudulent-misrepresentation, and fraudulent-concealment claims each require a showing that the Church misrepresented or concealed its knowledge of “a material fact” – here, the Church‘s knowledge that Father Edwards was dangerous to children. See
In sum, aside from the respondeat-superior claim, each of Doe‘s claims against the Church turns on whether the Church knew or had reason to know that Father Edwards presented a danger to Doe. Contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals majority, the fact that Doe knew he had been sexually abused by Father Edwards did not necessarily mean that he had any information about what the Church knew at the time. Accordingly, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, we cannot rule out the possibility that Doe could introduce evidence showing that the Church‘s alleged fraudulent concealment of its knowledge about Father Edwards “debarred or deterred” Doe from discovering his causes of action against the Church for negligent training, supervision, and retention, negligent failure to warn and provide adequate security, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment.
The Church argues that Doe could not introduce evidence supporting a finding of reasonable diligence, given his decades-long delay in bringing suit. Based on Doe‘s allegations, however, we are unpersuaded that Doe “could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint” to show that he exercised reasonable diligence to discover the Church‘s fraud. Stendahl, 284 Ga at 525 (1).
As an initial matter, a lower standard of diligence may apply to Doe. As discussed in Division 2 (a) above, Doe adequately alleged that a confidential relationship existed between him and the Church when he was an altar boy. We have explained that “[f]ailure to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the fraud may be excused where a relationship of trust and confidence exists between the parties.” Shipman, 245 Ga. at 808-809. That is, “[w]here a confidential relationship exists, a plaintiff does not have to exercise the degree of care to discover fraud that would otherwise be required” and instead has “a lessened duty . . . to discover what should be discoverable through the exercise of ordinary care.” Hunter, Mclean, 269 Ga. at 848 (1). Doe‘s complaint does not describe what relationship, if any, Doe maintained with the Church after he stopped serving as an altar boy, and it is possible that his alleged confidential relationship ended at that point or at a later time. See McClure v. Raper, 266 Ga. 60, 60 (463 SE2d 125) (1995) (“A failure to exercise ordinary diligence may be excused when there exists an ongoing relationship of trust and confidence that deters the discovery of the fraud. The fact that the parties once were guardian and ward, however, may not forever excuse the former ward from the duty to exercise the required degree of diligence.” (citations omitted)).8 However, the “framework of the complaint” leaves open the possibility that Doe could produce evidence that a confidential relationship with the Church continued after that point in time. Stendahl, 284 Ga at 525. Thus, at this stage of the proceedings, Doe‘s allegations need satisfy only the lesser duty of diligence to investigate his claims.9
In any event, Doe alleged facts suggesting that the Church‘s active concealment efforts would have thwarted any attempt by him to discover the Church‘s alleged knowledge about Father Edwards‘s dangerous predispositions toward children. See Bahadori v. Nat‘l Union Fire Ins. Co., 270 Ga. 203, 206 (507 SE2d 467) (1998) (“[W]here the fraud of an employee and his employer thwarts an insurer‘s reasonably diligent investigation, the time within which the insurer could controvert the claim is tolled.“). Specifically, Doe alleged that the Church engaged in a “systematic cover-up effort” and an “elaborate scheme to actively conceal [Father] Edwards‘s crimes and the prevalence of child sexual abuse by priests.” As a result of the Church‘s concealment efforts, Doe alleged,
Further, although Doe‘s amended complaint did not identify what specific actions, if any, he took to discover the Church‘s alleged fraud, it included one allegation suggesting that he attempted to find information that might have revealed the Church‘s knowledge about Father Edwards‘s dangerous predispositions toward children. Specifically, he alleged that “he discovered that he was not Edwards‘[s] only victim,” “that multiple children had been abused by Edwards over multiple years,” and “that [the Church] did nothing to protect him or the other victims.” But he alleged that he made this discovery “within the statutory period,” meaning within two years before he filed suit, so that even if the tolling provided by
What else Doe did, or did not do, to discover the Church‘s alleged fraud in the decades between the time he became an adult and November 2018 will affect the ultimate determination of diligence for purposes of tolling under
3. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed as time-barred Doe‘s respondeat-superior claim against the Church (Count 7). However, because Doe might be able to introduce evidence supporting tolling under
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices concur, except Peterson, J., disqualified.