*1
thаt are “connected
exemption
buildings
created an
for
Assembly
The General
with a view to
buildings
of whether the lessor leases
colleges, irrespective
with”
Perk,
55 O.O.2d
Univ. v.
26 Ohio St.2d
See Cleveland State
profit.
5709.07(A)(1)
Assembly could amend R.C.
Eastman & Graham Charles Borman, for appellees. Pratt, General, D. Barton A. Cordray, Attorney
Richard and Lawrence Hub- bard, Hussain, General, Attorneys Assistant for Sophia appellant.
Doe v.
Ronan, Superintendent,
et al.
Ronan,
as Doe v.
[Cite
United States Court in follow, that contractual adminis- obligations reasons that we conclude For the by R.C. by governed contracts entered into school districts trative-employment 3301-20-01, 3319.391 and Ohio Adm.Code impaired by 124 are not Chapter law. 3319.391is not a retroactive
I. Facts to this court and the facts certifying questions to the order the According briefs, Doe,1 in was convicted in petitioner, their John agreed upon parties years three in a drug trafficking spent 1976 of violation of R.C. 2925.03 released, a facility. college degree, correctional After he was Doe obtained worker, chemical-dependency a and was certified as a became licensed social 1997, In to R.C. 2953.32. expunged pursuant counselor. Doe’s conviction was Doe has had no other criminal convictions. 1997, respondent In his Cincinnati Public began Doe (“CPS”) began Doe to work drug-free-school specialist.
School only In this Doe’s direct hearing position, an administrative as a officer. capacity hearings, guardians contact with students was at administrative and the students’ at those present hearings. were also contract with two-year administrative-employment Doe into a entered August employ- on 1. The July two-year beginning
CPS in tеrm certifica- “subject appropriate to confirmation of state ment contract was made confirmation Doe to submit to Beginning process required tion.” this requirement previously applied only background check. This in 2007 extended it to include legislation to licensed2 but enacted positions, the school district. R.C. 3319.39 and employees administrative within pseudonym granted plaintiffs proceed it determined motion to under because The district court lawsuit, pursue plaintiff compelled information and that would be to disclose intimate that to plaintiff. prevent public tying pseudonym that information to the would consistently hеrein with the definition R.C. 3319.31. The term “license” is used 190 (“H.B. 190”). No. Nov. H.B. Sub.H.B. 190 also authorized (“ODE”)
respondent Department promulgate Ohio of Education administrative background-check process, including specifying rules related rules circum- stances under which with certain convictions could still persons be hired. R.C. 3319.39(E). In November notified Doe that 32-year-old drug-traffick CPS
5}{¶ ing conviction was discovered during background check.3 CPS further recently legislation advised Doe the same enacted that now required CPS to conduct on checks administrative also required CPS terminate its employment relationship with Doe because of the conviction. prior Doe filed suit on Hamilton April County Court of Common Pleas. Doe alleged July CPS breached the violated,
that the recently legislation expressed enacted in H.B. 190 among other *3 things, Constitutions, the Contracts Clauses the United States and Ohio Ex Constitution, Facto Post Clause of the United States the Retroactivity and Clause of the Ohio Constitution. removed CPS the case to the federal district court 28, 1441, U.S.Code, pursuant Section Title and on April Doe filed an amended in complaint Respondent Mary federal court. Ronan was the interim superintendent at the complaint time the amended was filed. Thereafter, certify Doe filed motion to retroаctivity state-based and
contract-impairment claims as
questions.
state-law
The federal district court
motion,
granted the
and this court accepted
questions.4
the certified
124 Ohio
1440,
3. When an offense is inspection record is sealed. R.C. permitted conducting background sealed records when a school board is check. R.C. 2953.32(D)(8). questions 4. The certified of law are as follows: § § “I. [Do] Ohio Revised Code 3319.391 and Ohio Administrative Code 3301-20-01 violate the II, Retroactivity Clause of Article Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution?” § “II. [Do] § Ohio Revised Code 3319.391 and Ohio Administrative Code 3301-20-01 violate the II, Contract Clause of Article Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution?” questiоn pertaining retroactivity question, however, The district court’s certified to the does not allegations complaint. match in complaint, alleged the amended In the amended Doe that both Further, unconstitutionally R.C. 3319.391 and R.C. 3319.39 were retroactive. Doe did not assert unconstitutionally that now-former Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01 was retroactive. phrasing question are unclear regarding We the rationale behind the district court’s retroactivity why question comport allegations unconstitutional the certified does not complaint. advisory rendering opinion question Doe’s amended In order to avoid on the retroactive, unconstitutionally
whether Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01 is we limit our discussion to the presented complaint, issues in the amended but we decline address whether R.C. 3319.39 is retroactive, unconstitutionally by parties. because this issue was not briefed Regulations Legislation and II. criminal checks for required background this state has many years, For who have for the responsibility school-district
licensed and certificated 3319.39(A)(1), care, control of a child. See former R.C. Am.Sub.S.B. custody, and (“S.B. 38”). Laws, I, 367, 383, 29, If the 38, Part eff. Oct. No. 145 Ohio a conviction of an offense listed former R.C. check uncovered 3319.39(B)(1)(a), employee to release that required the school district was were met. For regard the “standards to rehabilitation” employment, unless 3319.39(B)(1) (E), In with the ODE’s concern keeping mer R.C. S.B. 38. may on their record jeopardize have convictions persons drug-trafficking who students, under the health, no rehabilitation was available safety, or welfare drug-traffick who committed a for a licensed administrative 20—01(B)(1),1993- 2925.03. Former Ohio Adm.Code ing offense under R.C. 3301— 3301-20-01(E)(1)(c) Record eff. Mar. Monthly 1994 Ohio (E)(2)(e), Monthly Sept. Record 2005-2006 Ohio require, statutes to expanded H.B. 190 administrative, checks for or nonli- among things, criminal-background other 3319.391(A), censed, Former R.C. H.B. No. 190. The employees. school-district 3319.39(B)(1) and the effect that a conviction list of enumerated offenses R.C. had on an within employee’s of one of the enumerated offenses 3319.391(C), (stating H.B. 190 that a district were not revised. Former R.C. 3319.39(B)(1) not be hired or convicted of an offense listed R.C. “shall person the rehabilitation employment” person shall be released from unless the meets 3319.39(E)); pursuant standards to R.C. and former promulgated ODE (enumerated 190). 3319.39(B)(1)(a), in H.B. H.B. 190 offenses revised *4 offense, an an drug-trafficking R.C. 2925.03 offense remained enumerated an of such an could not and who had been convicted offense be the school district unless the rehabilitation standards were met. employed by 27, 2009, August promulgated only regulation Prior to the ODE had one a an person prior to address how a with conviction of enumerated offense could rehabilitated, that allowing person employed be to be with the school district. However, the that for a conviction of an R.C. 2925.03 regulation provided drug- offense, to from trafficking person no rehabilitation was available relieve 20—01(E)(1)(c) employment disqualification. Former Ohio Adm.Code 3301— (A)(11), Monthly Sept. 2005-2006 Ohio Record August Effective the ODE revised its to to the 2007 revisions to the statutes. Rather than have regulations respond check, subject one to all to a the ODE regulation apply persons one to who hold promulgated regulations: applicable employees positions two licenses, that to who hold nonlicensed require applicable and one Both of the detail how a with a conviction of an positions. regulations person may offense to person’s enumerated demonstrate rehabilitation relieve the person employment disqualification with school district. Ohio Adm.Code 20—01(E) 3301-20-03(D). 3301— The that to licensed a continua- regulation applies positions essentially
tion of the original, pre-August regulation. ODE Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20- In this with regulation, prior respect drug- rule to R.C. 2925.03 trafficking offense is maintained: no is permitted. rehabilitation Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01(E)(l) (A)(10)(c). The second сreated the ODE was new and applied positions
nonlicensed within a school district. Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-03. For positions, these the rehabilitation rule for R.C. 2925.03 drug-trafficking offenses is different. If the offense drug-trafficking years occurred within ten check, permitted. criminal-record no rehabilitation is Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20- 03(D)(1) (A)(6)(e). But if person committed the than drug offense more check, years ten before the criminal-record may district if employ person 3301-20-03(D) the rehabilitation conditions contained in Ohio Adm.Code are met. 3301-20-03(A)(6)(e). Ohio Adm.Code But even if a person meets the rehabilita- tion conditions so that may rehabilitated, the school district deem that рerson “district maintains the discretion whether to or employ retain 3301-20-03(D). individual.” Ohio Adm.Code [that] Analysis
III. (¶ argues Doe R.C. 3319.391and Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01 unconsti- 14} tutionally impaired Doe argues CPS. also that R.C. 3319.391 is unconstitutionally retroactive. After consideration of the arguments case, presented in this agree we cannot with Doe.
A.
Impairment
Contract
provides
The Ohio Constitution
“general assembly
shall
no
have
* * *
power
pass
impairing
laws
the obligation of contracts.” Section
II,
Article
provision
Ohio Constitution. This
applies to contracts that “existed
prior to the effective date of the statute
issue in the litigation].”
[at
Aetna Life
Schilling
Ins. Co. v.
67 Ohio
contrast,
St.3d
(¶ test two-part has been established to determine a whether statute 16} unconstitutionally impairs question contract. The first is legisla- whether the tion at issue operates impairment as substantial of a contractual relationship. (1986), 71, 77, 125, Middletown v. Ferguson 25 Ohio St.3d 25 OBR 495 N.E.2d
193
is
legislation
is whether
question
is
the next
yes,
If the answer
380.
at 79.
Id.
purpose.
important public
an
to serve
necessary
reasonable
employment
his 2008
terminating
it
Doe that was
advised
When CPS
conviction, it
drug-trafficking
expunged
of Doe’s 1976
reason
contract for the sole
the back-
of the 2007 revisions
requirements
did so
accordance
unconstitution-
that R.C. 3319.391
only
Doe not
claims
legislation.
ground-check
CPS,
asserts that
he further
but
contract
his 2008
ally impaired
termination
at the time of his
in effect
regulation
the administrative
applying
3301-20-01, 2005-
infirmity. Ohio Adm.Code
constitutional
compounds
notice
that
23,
Doe maintains
1261,
2005.
Sept.
Record
Monthly
2006 Ohio
inappropriate
circumstance is
to his
of this administrative
application
were
employees
licensed school-district
only
it
when
promulgated
because was
Doe,
2009
August
if the revised
According to
criminal-record checks.
subject to
promul-
had been
employees
school-district
to nonlicensed
regulation applicable
date,
have
he would
3319.391’seffective
following
than it was
gated sooner
could have
for nonlicensed
rehabilitation standard
met the new
(D).
3301-20-03(A)(6)(e) and
Adm.Code
by CPS. Ohio
employed
remained
regulating
statutes
enacted detailed
Assembly has
The General
18}
{¶
an employment
When
Chapter
employees.
of school
See
to these
pursuant
is made
and its employee
a school district
contract between
are incorporated
the statutes
statutes,
though
must be construed as
that contract
or
any
of
сontract
and conditions
implied
and become
terms
into the contract
553, 558,
(1950),
42 O.O.
See,
153 Ohio St.
v. Secrest
right.
e.g.,
contractual
Jacot
263,
(1884),
two
paragraph
42
31,
1,
Banks v. De Witt
Ohio St.
quoting
N.E.2d
resolution,
(“
must
of a statute or
pursuance
‘A contract made
syllabus
into
incorporated
or resolution had been
though
such statute
be construed
”).5
case,
contract between Doe and
2008 employment
In this
such contract’
legal
statutory
is
artifice.
incorporation
present
law into
that the
of
5. The dissent claims
any
relating
which is in
elementary principle
law
to a contract
contrary,
“[i]t
To the
part
E. Mach.
of such contract.”
thе contract becomes
at the time of the execution of
existence
593;
1, 6-7,
463,
(1954),
v. Preble Shawnee
117 N.E.2d
Bricker
52 O.O.
v. Peck
161 Ohio St.
Co.
4379593,
check. these results indicated that Doe failed to meet the state-certifica- When tion Doe was unable to meet the condition that would requirement, precedent triggered obligation perform Consequently, have CPS’s the contract. binding. contract between CPS and Doe failed to become July employment We further note Doe and CPS executed the eight provisions contract months after the effective date of the of H.B. which the new imposed background-check requirements. employ- Because Doe’s 2008 statutory change ment contract with CPS was executed after the date the became effective, the new requirements employment-disqualifi- cation standards of Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01 became incorporated implied Thus, terms and conditions of Doe’s contract. Doe cannot demonstrate that R.C. CPS, impaired employment 3319.391 contract with because there was no contract between Doe and CPS to substantially impair. on Doe’s reliance R.C. 3319.081 to establish that his employment
contract was a continuing misplaced. applies R.C. 3319.081 to school CPS, however, districts that are not governed by Chapter R.C. is governed 124.01(A) R.C. Chapter and 3319.081. there is no continuing Moreover, contract under R.C. 3319.081. a public employee who meets the 124.11(B) classified-service criteria of R.C. does have from termination protection 124.34(A). cause, without specific as defined R.C. of the specific One causes terminated, however, for which an can felony be is the conviction of a 124.34(A)(2). drug-abuse offense under R.C. 2925.03. R.C. Because the convic- 124.34(A), tion was under it purview falls within the of R.C. and Doe has no statutory right to continued employment. Doe also claims that application pre-August 2009 administrative
rule to his impaired circumstance his 2008 contract with CPS. Had promulgated quickly upon Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-03 been more the enactment of H.B. drug-trafficking Doe’s R.C. 2925.03 conviction would not have offense, constituted a likely nonrehabilitative and he could have met the condi- tions to show could rehabilitation so CPS have maintained its 3301-20-03(A)(6)(e) (D). relationship with him. Ohio Adm.Code Nonetheless, Assembly’s these laws reflect the General conclusion that health, safety, required expansion and welfare of students of the back- *7 administrators, laws to include ground-check nonteaching employees, e.g., cafete- custodians, workers, ria personnel. Unfortunately, delay and maintenance is often an inherent characteristic of rulemaking process. the The effect the in delay rulemaking process the administrative had on Doe’s career is regretta- experiences ble. Doe’s him past appear especial- rehabilitation to have made ly hired, qualified position for the duties of the for which he was and Doe claims in his amended that he complaint “acceptable” has received either or “accom- plished” job every year evaluation since at еmployed he became CPS. When his conviction expunged was Doe was found to be rehabilitated. The district court found that “a being jail.” Doe has been model citizen since released from the Regardless, pursuant statutory grant discretionary ODE acted to its of rulemaking authority obligation and was under no to amend the Administrative Code to make different rehabilitation for provisions positions. nonlieensed R.C. 3319.39(E) 3319.391(C). Based on the foregoing, background-check the revisions to the statutes corresponding administrative regulations substantially impair did not CPS;
contractual relationship they merely between Doe and prevented Doе being able to meet the condition precedent of the contract.
B. Retroactivity
The Ohio Constitution also
provides
“general assembly
shall
power
pass
II,
have no
retroactive laws.” Section
Article
Ohio Constitu
A
tion.
determination that a law unconstitutionally
is
retroactive involves a two-
step inquiry.
substantive,
If the statute is expressly retroactive and is
as
remedial,
opposed merely
the statute
proscription against
violates the
retroac
LaSalle,
178,
retroactive. In Doe’s his vested right employment continuеd was impaired when the Assembly General enacted 3319.391 and caused nonli- eensed school-district be terminated from current if background check disclosed a criminal conviction that predated the employment relationship. Doe’s contention notwithstanding, background-check legislation 3319.391 prospective This application. legislation simply imposed
new restriction on the school district regarding qualifications persons it date, employ could after a specific persons focus on those who have had felony legislation go convictions. This does not back to the date of employ- hire, dаte, ee’s initial that person terminate effective as of the hire and eliminate deprived any pay, not Doe has been accrued benefits. any person’s with CPS. credit, during accrued his tenure benefits he or other retirement i.e., contin- legislation prohibits, Instead, conduct that the check, only occurs criminal-background disqualifying after a ued statute, November the effective date of the after retroactive, we have expressly statute to be Even if we did consider the does analysis that R.C. 3319.391 contract-impairment in our
already concluded circumstances, employment. to continued any right vested impаir, in Doe’s in H.B. expressed conclude that R.C. foregoing, In view of the we retroactive, and thus does not right, did not affect vested expressly is not Article II of the Ohio proscription Section violate the retroactive-law Constitution. *8 Conclusion
IY. discussion, we that as to adminis- applied Based on the above conclude {¶ 29} by by governed contracts entered into school districts trative-employment do not violate the Chapter R.C. 3319.391 and Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01 prohibits in Article II of the Ohio Constitution that the provision Section Assembly impair obligation from laws that contracts. passing General Further, in provision we conclude that R.C. 3319.391 does not violatе the Section Assembly II prohibits Article of the Ohio Constitution General laws. passing retroactive
So answered. Lundberg Stratton, O’Connor, JJ., Lanzinger, O’Donnell, and concur. C.J., J., in in part part. Brown, Pfeifer, concur and dissent Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring. clear, I in I with Doe’s the law is and concur sympathize plight, While by legal questions of the two narrow certified us majority’s disposition court.
district under the Although legal questions we have resolved the federal court’s Constitution, may I that on remand the court resolve this case Ohio believe doctrine, “an at a of relation Under this act done resorting to the doctrine back. circumstances, at an is, though treаted as it occurred later time under certain Ed.1999) (8th applies 1314. This doctrine Dictionary earlier time.” Black’s Law 15(C), but I believe that it should pleadings, to the amendments of see Civ.R. in equity. here the interest of apply
197 formulate authority to statutory had of Education Department The Ohio 190, eff. Nov. 2007 No. intent of Sub.H.B. carry legislative out the the rules to 3319.39(E). Adm. 190”). Ohio (“H.B. department promulgated The 2007 Unfortunately, H.B. 190. intent of legislative out the carry Code 3301-20-03 department’s law and the of the new between enactment gap Doe fell into agree parties revisions. The statutory to the 2007 response regulations in his effect, position, have remained Doe would regulation been had the should regulation I that the believe he had been rehabilitated. because to the statute’s enactment. relate back interpretation agency’s deference to an give must due Courts Comm., 101 Ohio v. Indus. of the law. State ex rel. Saunders
implementation
¶
650, 41;
Bldg.
Ohio
&
125,
Brown, C.J., concurring part 124, R.C. majority Chapter I that R.C. agree Clause, 28, Article do not violate the Contract Section Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01 However, violatеs II I would hold that R.C. 3319.391 of the Ohio Constitution. Article II of the Ohio against retroactive laws Section prohibition *9 Constitution. long-term holds that a school-district Today majority
{¶ 35} —a in trouble for successfully has turned his life around and has not been person who a law that looks back to years summarily upon over 30 be fired based new —can Contrary majority’s to his to the prior employment. conduct that occurred him with assertions, employment provided to continued right public Doe’s vested summarily which should not be denied. rights, constitutional that Therefore, majority’s holding R.C. I dissent from the respectfully {¶ 36} laws. prohibition against does not violate the retroaсtive 3319.391
Facts court, Doe was questions to this According certifying to the order {¶ 37} jail. That years three ago drug trafficking spent 34 for years convicted expunged conviction was a licensed social and became degree obtained a bachelor’s Doe
{¶ 38} court that is counselor. The federal chemical-dependency worker and certified hearing this case found that Doe “has been a model citizen since being released jail.” 1997, Beginning in Doe spent years working five for the school district
{¶ 39} as a drug-free-school specialist. Doe has since worked in an administrative capacity hearing officer. enacted, R.C. 3319.391was effective November to expand the
categories of school-district who were required undergo criminal background checks. 2007 Sub.H.B. No. 190. Doe was among employees who newly subject were to background checks. However, the statute provided any employee whose background
check revealed crimes requiring termination could avoid termination if that person met rehabilitation standards adopted by Department of Education. 3319.391(C). Doe’s subject termination, 1976 conviction made him then-existing under the regulations, drug offense was nonrehabilitative 3301-20-01(E)(1)(c) offense. Former Ohio (A)(11), Adm.Code 2005-2006 Monthly Ohio Record Sept. In July Doe a new signed employment contract with the school
district; the contract stated that Doe’s employment “subject was to confirmation of appropriate state certification.” In November the school district in- formed Doe that a background check had revealed his former felony and that his employment was terminated. Subsequently, the Department of Education passed regulations permitted
would have Doe to retain employment by demonstrating rehabilitation. (eff. 2009). Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-03 Aug. Had this been in effect November it is unlikely Doe would have been fired. Doe’s termination incongruous was in that had the General Assembly passed Doe fired, would not have been and had the Depart-
ment of Education quickly more promulgated its rule regarding rehabilitation (Ohio 3301-20-03), Adm.Code Doe would not have been fired. As noted court, federal citizen, Doe is a person model who turned his life around remarkable and exemplary way. His life and experiences made him uniquely qualified for his service to the school district. Yet because his background check (when occurred during the gap between November 2007 R.C. 3319.391 was enacted) (when August Department finally Education *10 promulgat- ed the rule that offense), would allow rehabilitation for Doe’s Doe was terminated. court, Doe filed suit state alleging breach of contract
{¶ 45} and violation of constitutional rights. The school district removed the case to federal court. The federal court certified questions of state law to this court concerning the at the time of Doe’s termination. state laws effect
constitutionality of certain accepted questions. the We Analysis
Law and the 3319.391 violates analysis the of whether R.C. majority, For the {¶ 46} employment with Doe’s 2008 begins laws and ends against retroactive prohibition right not have a vested majority, to the Doe did According contract. “ ‘confirmation contingent contract was on because his 2008 employment, ” ¶ 18, quoting employ- at Majority opinion certification.’ appropriate state ment contract. result, the criminal majority equates passing In order to reach this appropriate “confirmation of by R.C. 3319.391 with
background required check majority springboards contract. The employment state certification” under Doe’s the “condition that Doe did not meet holding from this to the proposition right” to and therefore had no “vested in his contract precedent” employment concludes, the law is majority right, Without such employment. continued unconstitutionally retroactive. not Doe’s that the contract makes majority’s I conclusion disagree clearly The contract does background conditional on a check.
employment
subject
background
to a
check
say that Doe would be
unambiguously
that his
says
employment
on the result.
It
instead
he could be fired based
“state
phrase
state certification.” The
“subject
appropriate
to confirmation of
In the context of
school-district
ambiguous.
certification” is
contract,
“licensed,”
school-
easily
could as
mean
since certain
“certification”
“educator licenses.”
jobs
describing
district
licenses. See R.C.
require
best,
ambiguous,
regard
passing
the contract is
at
whether
state
background
equates
appropriate
a criminal
check
to “confirmation
contracts,
of the
ambiguities against
proponent
In
we construe
certification.”
30, 34-35,
(1888),
{¶ 52} (contract law). through the use of a legal implied artifice terms This is not a of proper ability use the court’s to supply implied {¶ 53} contractual terms. imply The court should terms to prevent injustice and to intent, conform the contract to parties’ actual deprive person but his ability when, to enforce his constitutional rights. particularly This is true as here, the being implied terms are from a newly passed law and would significant- ly alter the contractual relationship between the parties. I would Accordingly, not find that Doe’s satisfying R.C. 3319.391was an implied term of his contract. majority The also that states R.C. 3319.391 not is retroactive because it go does not back in time and terminate Doe from the date of his initial hire or deprive him of pay and benefits that he previously acquired. But these facts are irrelevant. What is relevant is that the new required law Doe’s termination
employment based on
past
conduct. We have held that laws are unconstitu
tionally
they impair
retroactive when
right
vested
based upon prior conduct.
Smith,
¶
Smith v.
applies to new and current employees alike and instructs that an employee whose background check discloses a proscribed felony “shall be released from employ- 3319.391(C). ment.” R.C. Our caselaw public Doe, establishes that employees, like have a vested
right to
employment.
continued
AFSCME,
Ohio Assn.
Pub.
Emps.,
School
v.
City
AFL-CIO Lakewood
School Dist. Bd.
Edn.
where,
here,
new law requiring employee’s termination based on the employee’s prior conduct, the law is unconstitutionally retroactive.
Conclusion reasons, For the foregoing I would hold R.C. 3319.391 violated the prohibition constitutional against retroactive lаws. I Accordingly, dissent from prohibition against does not violate the majority’s holding R.C. 3319.391 retroactive laws. J., opinion. concurs in the foregoing
Pfeifer, *12 Beck, Shohl, L.L.P., McDowell, Kimberly R. Christopher Dinsmore & Herron, Sparks petitioner. Sarah for
Taft, Hollister, L.L.P., Hoying, and Daniel J. Stepaniak, Stettinius & Mark J. for Ronan and Public Schools. respondents Mary Cincinnati General, Mizer, General, Benjamin Solicitor Cordray, Attorney
Richard C. Lieberman, Solicitor, Meucci, Solicitor, Mia T. Assistant Deputy David M. Marti, General, Attorneys Nash R. for Amy respon- Golian Todd Assistant dent Ohio of Education. Department Davis, L. in support petitioner
Carrie for amicus curiae American Civil Foundation, Liberties Union of Ohio Inc. Ltd., McGrae, in Royer, Royer; Cynthia
Christina M. and Christina M. Association, support petitioner Employment Lawyers for amici curiae Ohio Cleveland, Legal Society Aid and Towards Inc. Employment,