JAMES DOE and JANE DOE, Individually, and as Natural Parents and Next Friends of JOHN DOE v. RHODE ISLAND INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE
C.A. No. 23-414 WES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
May 28, 2024
WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge.
WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge.
Youth in this country are experiencing a mental health crisis.1 The rates of depression and anxiety among teens have skyrocketed, along with the rates of teens considering and committing suicide.2 Research suggests that these alarming trends
stem from the increased use of phones and social media among teens
Extracurriculars can serve as a remedy to these damaging trends in teen mental health. One study examined the mental health of students during the COVID-19 pandemic and found a correlation between students’ participation in extracurricular activities and lower rates of anxiety, inattention, hyperactivity, and depressive symptoms.6 These results reflect previous research finding an
association between participating in sports and positive post-high
The plaintiff here, John Doe, is like many of his generation. He experienced some of high school on a screen at the height of the pandemic. His parents, James and Jane Doe, wanted better. After spending a year at a parochial school where there was remote learning, John‘s parents enrolled him in an out-of-state boarding school — where he would repeat freshman year — with the hope that he would have a better academic experience and forge in-person social connections with other students of his age. Unfortunately, his experience did not pan out as John‘s parents had hoped. While in boarding school, John‘s academic performance and social and physical health took a steep decline. That summer, John was diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and Attention-Deficit /
Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD“), among other learning
John will be a senior next year and wants to continue playing on his respective teams. The only problem, however, is that the Rhode Island Interscholastic League (“RIIL” or the “League“) — the organization that administers competitive sports in the state — has an Eight-Semester Rule (the “Rule“). Under the Rule, a student becomes automatically ineligible to play competitive sports eight semesters from when he enrolls in ninth grade. John will be enrolled in his ninth and tenth semesters of high school next year because he repeated freshman year at the boarding school.
Despite the mental health crisis that has afflicted John and other students in this state and across the country, as well as the universally recognized benefits of participation in high school sports,9 the League put its foot down and denied John‘s
request for a waiver of the Rule. It avers that he is not entitled
Instead of having John be fully part of a team, the League wants John to sit on the sidelines, despite the demonstrably profound benefits that extracurriculars, like team sports, have on students’ mental health. The League insists that the Rule applies even though there is no evidence in the record suggesting John‘s playing would give him or his team an unfair advantage or would pose a risk to other students’ safety, or otherwise adversely affect other players or teams in any way. Their justification? Well, that‘s the rule, and rules are rules.10
As the Court explains below, John‘s learning disabilities
John is not an all-star and his school‘s athletics program is not positioned to win a state championship. It‘s simple: John wants to be part of a team during his senior year of high school. Like Daniel Ruettiger in the beloved film Rudy, John wants the memory of playing on the field (or court) with his teammates.11 He is not trying to be the best, take someone else‘s place, or gain an unfair advantage. He just wants to play. For that and the reasons below, the Court GRANTS John‘s Motion for a Permanent Injunction, ECF No. 6.
A. John‘s Academic History
In the fall of 2020, John enrolled in a Rhode Island parochial school as a freshman. Verified Compl. (“VC“) ¶ 6, ECF No. 1. Like much of the country at the time, the school had transitioned to remote learning because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Id.; DXB, James Doe Dep. (Jan. 10, 2024) (“James Dep.“) 28-29, ECF No. 11-2. The pandemic also prevented John — who is involved in competitive football and basketball — from playing interscholastic sports during the fall semester of his freshman year. VC ¶ 6; James Dep. at 30-31. Instead, students played fall-semester sports during the spring semester. VC ¶ 6; James Dep. at 30-31. John ended his first freshman year with a grade point average of 89.0 out of 100. DXC, John‘s Boarding School Application (Jan. 15, 2021) (“Application“) 47, ECF No. 11-2.
John‘s parents believed there was a “disconnect” between his intellect and his academic performance. James Dep. at 28-29. Consequently, John‘s parents transferred him to an out-of-state boarding school to benefit from a smaller, more structured environment and opted for him to repeat his freshmen year during the 2021-22 school year. VC ¶ 7; James Dep. at 37. His parents believed the boarding school would have a connected community, smaller learning environment, and rigorous academic curriculum. James Dep. 39-42. John‘s parents, based on advice they had
John‘s time at the boarding school, however, only exasperated the disconnect his parents perceived. He struggled academically, did not connect with his peers, and did not receive the individualized support that his parents had expected, though he did play competitive sports during that time. James Dep. at 46-48; DXD, Evaluation Report (Aug. 2022) 94-95, ECF No. 11-2; DXD, John Doe Ltr. (Mar. 2023) 85-86, ECF No. 11-2; DXD, James and Jane Doe Ltr. (Mar. 2023) (“Parents’ Ltr.“) 87-88, ECF No. 11-2. John received grades equivalent to a B+, C+, B+, and B. Application at 47. John became depressed, lost significant weight, and returned home after the 2021-22 school year. James Dep. at 46-48, 53-55; Parents’ Ltr. at 87-88. Subsequently, during the summer of 2022, John‘s pediatrician and psychiatrist formally diagnosed him with certain learning disabilities including ADHD, anxiety, and major depressive disorder, and identified writing and reading impairments. VC ¶ 9; James Dep. at 53-57; Parents’ Ltr. at 88. John‘s pediatrician prescribed medication and regular therapy sessions. James Dep. at 55-57. John also received advice to continue participating in competitive sports. VC ¶ 11; James Dep. at 69-70.
John enrolled at a Rhode Island private school as a sophomore for the 2022-23 school year where he received academic accommodations, an individualized learning plan, and other support to address his learning disabilities. James Dep. at 57-58, 68-69. He also participated in competitive sports. Id. at 57-58; DXD, Attorney Ltr. 83, ECF No. 11-2; DXD, John Ltr. 85-86, ECF No. 11-2. John‘s condition improved, in part, because of his participation in sports. VC ¶ 12; James Dep. at 57-58; Parents’ Ltr. at 88. According to John‘s father, John is “thriving” and has experienced academic, social, physical, and psychological improvements. James Dep. at 57-58. John is currently a junior at the private school for the 2023-24 school year and will enroll at the school for his senior year. VC ¶ 13. Over the past two years, John has been on the varsity football and basketball teams and would like to continue his involvement next academic year. Id.; James Dep. at 80.
B. RIIL and the Eight-Semester Rule
RIIL is a non-profit organization that administers, regulates, and supervises competitive high school sports in Rhode Island. VC ¶ 3; DXE, RIIL Mission Statement 115, ECF No. 11-2; DXG, RIIL Rules and Regulations (“RIIL R&R“) art. 1, § 2, ECF No. 11-2. The League counts seventy-two schools as its members, including public, private, and parochial schools, all of which pay membership dues so their students can participate in competitive
The Eight-Semester Rule is articulated under Article III, Section (5)(B)(2) of the League‘s Rules and Regulations, which limits a student‘s eligibility to play competitive sports to eight consecutive semesters from the time the student first becomes a high school freshman. VC ¶ 21; Lunney Dep. at 21. A student is automatically ineligible for athletic competition four years from the date of entry into ninth grade. Students may seek a waiver of the Rule. See RIIL R&R art. 1, § 16. A waiver, however, is “exceptional and extraordinary relief.”12
The waiver process begins when a student submits a Waiver Request Form that includes accompanying documents such as transcripts, letters of support, medical documents, and documents relating to a student‘s individualized education plan.
convinc[ing] sixty percent (60%) of the [Waiver] Committee present and voting of the extenuating circumstances constituting undue hardship. Undue hardship means a hardship peculiar to the student-athlete or individual caused by unforeseen events beyond the election, control or creation of the student-athlete or individual, his/her family, or school. The Committee interprets undue hardship particular to the situation of the individual which is so severe that normal application of the Rule(s) is not . . . necessary to carry out the spirit or the orderly enforcement of the Rule.
show that his/her inability to meet the RIIL rule(s) is the result of a disability, and that s/he otherwise meets all of the essential requirements of participation in RIIL competition with or without a reasonable modification. The party making a waiver request shall state on the request form that a disability is claimed and specifically identify the disability and hardship. The party making the request shall also provide the Committee with all appropriate evidence documenting his/her disability and hardship, including medical evidence and any applicable [individualized education plan].
C. RIIL Denies John‘s Waiver Request
John applied for a waiver of the Rule in March 2023. Ex. A VC, RIIL Waiver Request Form (Mar. 2023), ECF No. 1-1. The League‘s Waiver Committee reviewed his application and held a hearing in April 2023. See Ex. B VC, Waiver Hearing Committee Decision (Apr. 27, 2023) (“RIIL Decision“), ECF No. 1-2. In his
The Waiver Committee unanimously denied John‘s request, which the League‘s Principals’ Committee on Athletics unanimously upheld on appeal. Id. at 4; VC ¶ 19; DXH, Principals’ Committee on Athletics Decision (Aug. 24, 2023) (“Principals’ Decision“) 138-41, ECF No. 11-2; see also RIIL R&R art. 1, § 16(E) (outlining process to appeal Waiver Committee decisions). In its decision, the Waiver Committee reasoned that it was John‘s parents’ “personal choice” to have John transfer to the boarding school and reclassify as a freshman despite receiving good grades while enrolled in the parochial school. RIIL Decision at 2. It also noted that John transferred to the boarding school because he did not receive enough academic support at the parochial school. Id. Moreover, it found that, by the time he becomes a senior, he would have played eight semesters of sports. See id. at 2-3.
Because the Waiver Committee concluded that John‘s ineligibility was not caused by his disability, it applied the undue hardship standard rather than the disability standard. Id. at 3; Lunney Dep. at 65-66. Though the Waiver Committee did not apply the disability standard, it nonetheless considered John‘s learning disability in its calculous. See Lunney Dep. at 66. Consequently, the Waiver Committee did not make any findings concerning whether a waiver would be a reasonable accommodation for John or would fundamentally alter the nature of athletic competition among member schools.
A few months after the Principals’ Committee upheld the denial, John filed this lawsuit, alleging that RIIL violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act as applied, and moved for a preliminary injunction. See generally VC; Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 6. Following a conference, the parties agreed to engage in a brief, 60-day period of discovery rather than conduct an evidentiary hearing. Text Order (Oct. 23, 2024). By agreement, the parties converted the motion to one for a permanent injunction. See Suppl. Mem. Supp. Mot. Inj. Relief (“Pl. Mem.“) 1 n.1, ECF No. 10; Def.‘s Mem. Law Supp. Opp‘n (“Def. Mem.“) 1, ECF No. 11-1. The Court granted leave to Disability Rights of Rhode Island (“DRRI“) to file an amicus brief in support of John. Text Order (Apr. 23, 2024); see DRRI Br. Amicus Curiae, ECF No. 15. The Court
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To obtain a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must first make a showing of “actual success” on the merits, and not “only a showing of likelihood of success on the merits” as is required for a preliminary injunction. NACM-N.E., Inc. v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Credit Mgmt., Inc., 927 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2019); see Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987). Second, the plaintiff must show four additional factors:
(1) that it has suffered [or will suffer] an irreparable injury [absent injunctive relief]; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see United States v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d 36, 50 n.15 (1st Cir. 2001).
III. DISCUSSION
Of the factors above, the parties do not dispute that there are no other remedies at law that would adequately compensate John for his future injury. At its core, John wants to play competitive sports during his senior year. Other remedies, such as monetary damages, would not address the impending harm of being denied the
A. Actual Success on the Merits
John alleges the League violated Titles II and III of the ADA as applied by denying him a waiver. “[T]he ADA forbids discrimination against disabled individuals in major areas of public life, among them employment (Title I of the Act), public services (Title II), and public accommodations (Title III).” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001) (footnotes omitted). “Congress enacted the ADA ‘to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities,’ hoping ‘to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.‘” Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 333 F.3d 299, 303 (1st Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) (first quoting
Title II of the ADA “prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities by ‘public entities.‘” Parker v. Universidad de P.R., 225 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
To succeed on a Title II claim, a plaintiff must establish “(1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity‘s services, programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated against; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff‘s disability.” Parker, 225 F.3d at 5; see
Likewise, Title III provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.”
To succeed on a Title III claim,
the plaintiff must show that [1] the defendant has a discriminatory policy or practice in effect; [2] that he (the plaintiff) requested a reasonable modification of that policy which, if granted, would have afforded him access to the desired goods[, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations]; [3] that the requested modification — or a modification like it — was necessary to afford that access; and [4] that the defendant nonetheless refused to modify the policy or practice.
Dudley, 333 F.3d at 307 (citing Martin, 532 U.S. at 663 n.38; Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir. 1999); and Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1058-60 (5th Cir. 1997)). Once the plaintiff bears his burden of establishing a reasonable accommodation, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that such a modification would lead to a “fundamental alteration” of the policy or practice. Massachusetts v. E*Trade Access, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 52, 58 (D. Mass. 2006); see Dudley, 333 F.3d at 307-08 (elaborating that, once a reasonable modification is found, the defendant must implement it unless “doing so would alter the fundamental nature of its business, or
Here, there is no disagreement that John‘s learning impairments qualify as a disability under the ADA. The parties instead dispute whether the ADA applies to RIIL; whether there is a causal connection between John‘s disability and his ineligibility to play competitive sports; and whether John sought a reasonable accommodation.
1. Whether Title II Applies to RIIL
Preliminarily, the Court must determine whether Title II and III of the ADA apply to the League. See Dudley, 333 F.3d at 307. In short, the answer is yes. The League concedes that Title III applies but disputes whether Title II applies. See Def. Mem. 8; Def.‘s Reply Br. DRRI‘s Br. Amicus Curiae 4, ECF No. 16.
Title II covers public entities, which are “any State or local government . . . [or] any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.”
John argues that RIIL is an “instrumentality of the state” and is, thus, a “public entity” under the ADA. Pl. Mem. 24-25. In support, he relies on Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663 (D. Conn. 1996), which found that Connecticut‘s version of RIIL — the Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference (“CIAC“) — was an “instrumentality of a State.” Id. at 670, appeal dismissed, vacated as moot, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996). There, the court placed significant weight on the fact that public schools both “delegate authority to CIAC to direct and control their athletic programs” and play a role in enforcing CIAC‘s policies. Id. In addition to these considerations, the court in Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Ass‘n emphasized that the state‘s athletic governing body (the MSHSAA) received funding from member schools. 857 F. Supp. 654, 661-62 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev‘d on other grounds, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994). The reasoning in Dennin and Pottgen is consistent with how other courts view the role of athletic governing bodies. See, e.g., Isler v. N.M. Activities Ass‘n, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1155 (D.N.M. 2012) (collecting cases), rev‘d on other grounds, No. 10-CV-009 MV/WPL, 2013 WL 12328907 (D.N.M. Sept. 25, 2013); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass‘n, 863 F. Supp. 483, 487 (E.D. Mich. 1994), dismissed in part, rev‘d in part, on other grounds, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995) (“MHSAA is clearly an agency or other instrumentality of the state.“).
Like the CIAC, MSHSAA, and MHSAA, RIIL is an “instrumentality of the state,” and thus a “public entity” for purposes of Title II. RIIL serves as the managing authority for interscholastic
The League argues that John‘s disability did not cause his exclusion from competitive sports. Def. Mem. 10-12. Under Title II, a public entity is liable for disability discrimination if it excludes someone “by reason of [his or her] disability.”
Several courts have had the opportunity to examine the extent to which there is a causal connection between a student‘s exclusion by an age-eligibility rule and his disability. RIIL heavily relies on the Sixth Circuit‘s decision in Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass‘n. There, the plaintiff students stayed backed a year because of their learning disabilities and, as a result, were barred from participating by the MHSAA‘s rule prohibiting students who turn nineteen on or after September 1 from playing. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1028. The MHSAA did not allow waivers of the rule. Id. at 1029. In reversing the preliminary injunction enjoining the MHSAA from preventing the students from playing, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs’ exclusion was a result of their age, not disability. Id. at 1032, 1036. In other words, their disabilities were not what caused the plaintiffs’ ineligibility, but rather it was the “passage of time.” Id. at 1031-33. The Sandison court found MHSAA‘s age-eligibility rule to be “neutral” in that it only applies when a student turns nineteen and is agnostic to a student‘s disability. Id. at 1033. This reasoning led the court to conclude that the students’ exclusion was not “by reason of” or “on the basis of” the plaintiffs’ respective disabilities.13 Id.
John principally relies on two cases. First, he relies on Dennin, which involved a nineteen-year-old student with Down Syndrome who received special education and completed middle school in four years rather than three. 913 F. Supp. at 666. The
Second, John relies on Washington v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass‘n, a Seventh Circuit case that involved a learning-disabled student who dropped out after his tenth-grade year because of his academic struggles. 181 F.3d at 842. After dropping out, the plaintiff took a test that revealed he was learning disabled. Id. When he returned to the school, the plaintiff wanted to play on the school‘s basketball team. Id. Like the RIIL, the Indiana High School Athletic Association (“IHSAA“) had an eight-semester rule and denied the plaintiff‘s request for a waiver. Id. at 842-43. Like in Dennin, the Seventh Circuit rejected Sandison‘s “passage of time” reasoning and affirmed the preliminary injunction enjoining the IHSAA, articulating that it was the plaintiff‘s disability that caused him to violate the rule. See id. at 848-49, 854. Had the plaintiff not dropped out because of difficulties associated with his learning disabilities, he would have complied with the rule. Id. at 848-49.
If the Court were to consider only the facts related to the initial transfer, John‘s Motion would fail on the merits because the record does not demonstrate that it was his disability that caused John to transfer and repeat his freshman year.
The analysis changes, however, when looking at the fulcrum of events leading up to John‘s second transfer, from the boarding school to his current private school. The League‘s counsel conceded at the hearing that, had the plaintiff not left the boarding school, he would have been eligible to play sports for the remainder of his time there. See Hr‘g Tr. at 11-12, 44-45; see also James Dep. at 46 (describing how it was James‘s understanding that John could have played four years of sports at the boarding school). Said differently, the boarding school would have allowed him to play competitively through his senior year. It was only when John returned to Rhode Island to enroll in the private school that he fell under the jurisdiction of the League
The record demonstrates that John transferred from the boarding school to the private school because of his disability. After enrolling at the boarding school, John experienced a decline in his academic performance and a deterioration of his physical and psychological health. For example, John became isolated and anti-social, lost about sixty pounds, acted out, and failed to maintain routines for academic success. James Dep. at 46-49, 51-54; Evaluation Report at 94-95. This led to a decline in John‘s grades. See James Dep. at 51-52. At the same time, the boarding school did not provide the personalized attention or services to address John‘s needs. Id. at 47-48; Attorney Ltr. at 83; Parents Ltr. at 87-88. This required John to return to Rhode Island and enroll in a school that could adequately address his needs, for example, with an individualized support plan and counseling. See James Dep. at 55-58; Attorney Ltr. at 82-83; John Doe Ltr. at 85; Parents’ Ltr. at 88.
As in Washington and Dennin, he cannot comply with the Rule because of his transfer, which is directly a result of his disability. But for his learning disability and related conditions, John would not have transferred from the out-of-state
3. Whether John Requested a Reasonable Modification
The guiding framework for determining whether a modification is reasonable is outlined in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, requiring courts to employ an “individualized inquiry.” 532 U.S. at 688; see Gelabert-Ladenheim v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 252 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2001). Martin examined the PGA Tour‘s walking rule, which requires golfers, during tournament play, to walk the entire golf course. Martin, 532 U.S. at 666-67. The purpose of the rule is to subject players to fatigue during competition. Id. at 686. The plaintiff in Martin was a professional golfer who had a degenerative circulatory disorder that limited his ability to walk without suffering serious complications. Id. at 668. Despite his documented medical issues with walking, the PGA denied his request to waive the walking rule and to utilize a golf cart. Id. at 669. In response, the plaintiff in Martin brought an action under Title
The Supreme Court concluded that allowing the use of a golf cart during tournament play was a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 682. To comply with the ADA, an entity‘s policies, practices, or procedures must be (1) reasonably modified for individuals with disabilities as necessary to afford access, (2) unless doing so would fundamentally alter what is offered. Id.; see also
Waiving the Rule is a reasonable accommodation because doing so is necessary to afford John access to competitive sports. See
The League has not shown that a waiver would fundamentally alter high school athletics in Rhode Island. The Supreme Court in Martin outlined two modifications that may “constitute a fundamental alteration.” 532 U.S. at 682. Either the change modifies an “essential aspect of the game” that affects all competitors — e.g., changing the diameter of a golf hole — or it alters a “peripheral” rule that may “nevertheless give a disabled player . . . an advantage over others.” Id. at 682-83. Neither are present here.
First, the Eight-Semester Rule is not an “essential aspect” of competition. Id. at 682. What is essential are the rules for the respective sports to ensure both fairness and safety among
To be sure, the Rule is not meaningless as it aims to prevent redshirting,16 ensure no student or team has an unfair advantage, and maintain competitor safety. Even still, the Rule is “at best peripheral.” See Martin, 532 U.S. at 689. This is because the League, when pressed, did not articulate a justification for why the Rule is essential to Rhode Island high school athletics. The League‘s explanation for why the Rule must be enforced here boils down to the idiom, “rules are rules.” See Hr‘g Tr. at 31-32, 39. This explanation, however, cannot satisfy the League‘s burden on its own. Cf. Martin, 532 U.S. at 689 (“[P]etitioner‘s claim that all the substantive rules . . . are sacrosanct and cannot be
More significant, however, was the League‘s concession that a student who, before enrolling in high school, spent two years in athletic training but only used a tutor without obtaining credit, would be allowed to play high school sports in Rhode Island if he were to enroll in ninth grade at fifteen or sixteen. See id. at 44-46. If that student could avoid the application of the Rule, which undermines the League‘s goal of preventing redshirting and protecting the health and safety of competitors, it is difficult to conclude that waiving the Rule with respect to John would fundamentally alter the nature of athletic programming. This workaround demonstrates that the Rule is not essential.
Second, there is no evidence that the waiver of this “peripheral” rule would give John or his team an unfair advantage over non-disabled students or other teams. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 682-85. The record is clear that John is not redshirting. In fact, John‘s father testified that John does not plan on playing sports in college. James Dep. at 110. Moreover, John would not be taking another student‘s place if he were to play, given that
Taken together, there is no evidence to suggest that waiving the Rule here would alter an “essential aspect” of competition or give John or his team an unfair advantage. See Pottegen, 40 F.3d at 932-33 (Arnold, J., dissenting) (“But if a rule can be modified without doing violence to its essential purposes, . . . I do not
* * * * *
In sum, John has demonstrated actual success on the merits. The record demonstrates that Titles II and III of the ADA apply to the League, John‘s disability caused his exclusion under the Rule, and a waiver of the Rule would be a reasonable accommodation that would not fundamentally alter the nature of high school athletic competition in Rhode Island. The Court will now turn to the other equitable considerations.
B. Irreparable Harm
John would be irreparably harmed if barred from playing sports during his senior year. As part of John‘s diagnosis for depression, anxiety, and ADHD, among his other diagnoses, doctors recommended that John get involved in interscholastic sports. That, along with medication and academic support, improved John‘s academic, social, physical, and psychological well-being. This assertion is supported by John‘s psychiatrist, James Dep. at 55-58, and is recognized by the League‘s very own mission statement.17
Preventing John from being part of a team — competition and all — risks reversing the progress he has made in addressing his psychological challenges. See Cruz, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 491-92, 500 (similarly finding that preventing the plaintiff student from participating in competitive sports would cause irreparable harm considering his IEP); Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at 667 (describing how preventing the student from playing interscholastic sports would irreparably harm the student‘s self-esteem and social skills); cf. Washington, 181 F.3d at 853 (positively considering the academic and social benefits that competitive sports have on the plaintiff‘s high school experience).
At an intangible level, if John were barred from playing competitively, he would miss out on creating unique memories as a senior in high school. Simply put, John is only a senior once in his life. As Coach Dan Devine said in Rudy, “And for you seniors, it‘s your last one, so make it count because you‘ll remember it for the rest of your lives.”18 Such memories are priceless and constitute irreparable harm in their absence. See Lyon v. Ill. High Sch. Ass‘n, No. 13 C 173, 2013 WL 309205, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2013) (finding the student‘s argument that he may miss “a once in lifetime opportunity” by not playing sports persuasive if
The League avers that John would not be irreparably harmed because he could still practice and scrimmage with the team and assist in charitable work. Def. Mem. 19; Hr‘g Tr. at 38-39. Anyone who has played high school sports or engaged in other competitive activities know that just practicing with a team is no substitute to being part of a team in competition, especially during one‘s senior year. Relegating John to just practice would fundamentally alter his athletic experience. It is not difficult to imagine that being excluded from competition would also change the way he and his teammates would practice, seeing as there is no incentive for the team to actively integrate him in practice. And the League‘s argument does not tackle the very real possibility that preventing John from competing with his team would negatively affect his progress in addressing his disabilities. Accordingly, the Court finds that John would be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief.
C. Balance of Equities
In balancing the equities, the Court concludes that the harm imposed on John is greater than that imposed on RIIL. As discussed above, by not competing, John could lose out on athletic programs that have had a substantial benefit on his overall well-being and
The League complains of the floodgate of requests that it could receive if the Court were to grant the injunction. Def. Mem. 20-21. RIIL‘s assertion, however, is neither backed by adequate evidence, nor compelling even if true. Over the past ten years, it has received 64 waiver requests, an average of a little under 7 per year. Id. at 20. Of those requests, the League does not identify those like John‘s situation that would likely be approved if the League complied with the ADA. And the League does not endeavor to predict how many students would seek a waiver if the Court finds in John‘s favor. Given that the exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic are behind us and the unusual nature of John‘s predicament, a scenario in which the League will be inundated with waiver requests like John‘s seems unlikely. But more importantly, the League‘s point amounts to saying that accommodating people with disabilities is hard and they should not have to do it. Treating people with disabilities with sensitivity and compassion may take some effort and require previously unimagined flexibility, it is true. But that is what living in a civilized society is all about and what the law demands of us.
In summary, the balance of equities weighs in John‘s favor. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 853 (finding no abuse of discretion where the lower court valued the benefits of competitive sports to
D. Public Interest
A permanent injunction would not negatively affect the public interest. In fact, it would serve the public interest. Achieving the goal of full inclusion of disabled individuals in economic and social life is in the public‘s interest. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 674-75; Dudley, 333 F.3d at 303. Allowing disabled students to play in competitive sports contributes to that goal. Steines ex rel. Steines v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass‘n, 68 F. Supp. 3d 768, 783 (S.D. Ohio 2014). Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that John‘s involvement in competitive sports would significantly affect the level of competition within the league, pose any harm to other students, or displace other students. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 853-54. Thus, the public interest would not be adversely affected in issuing a permanent injunction here.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rudy had no business playing on the Norte Dame football team. As a defensive end, he simply did not have the skills like his compatriots. Nevertheless, with the support of his cheering teammates and fans packed in Notre Dame Stadium, he got his chance to play. Why? Because everyone recognized the importance of Rudy having his one moment, one memory, playing as a senior with the
This Court says, let the kid play. Accordingly, for the reasons above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Permanent Injunction, ECF No. 6, is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
District Judge
Date: May 28, 2024