DOE v. NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITYDOE v. NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants—a university, two affiliated residential property companies, and twelve employees of the university and businesses—breached contracts, committed multiple torts against her, discriminated and retaliated against her based on a disability, and conspired to deprive her of her civil rights. (Complaint, ECF No. 1). With her complaint, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed without prepayment of fees, (Application, ECF No. 8), which application the Court granted. (Order, ECF No. 10.)
In accordance with the statute governing actions filed without the prepayment of fees,
Following a review of Plaintiff‘s complaint, for the reasons explained below, I recommend the Court dismiss the matter.
LEGAL STANDARD
When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be granted, courts must assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff the
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS3
Plaintiff, a foreign national with a student visa, was admitted to an education program at Defendant Northeastern‘s (Northeastern) Roux Institute in Portland, Maine. (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 28.) According to Plaintiff, in connection with her application and enrollment, Northeastern represented that certain funds and support services would be operative when she arrived in the United States, but the funds were not available as Plaintiff expected. (Id. ¶ 28–29.) On January 8, 2024, a university official certified Plaintiff‘s immigration-related I-20 form, which form contained a financial section listing expected costs and certain funding. (Id.) The loan funds referenced on the I-20 form were not disbursed until much later—in October 4, 2024—nine months after
In March 2024, when two employee defendants (the Assistant Director of Financial Aid and the Director of Enrollment) met with Plaintiff, one of the employees pressured Plaintiff to secure additional external loan funding, and the same employee accused her of entering the United States illegally. (Id. ¶ 31.) The employee demanded that Plaintiff sign inaccurate financial attestations to be used for a credit application, but Plaintiff refused. (Id.)
Plaintiff asserts that one of the employee defendants (a lecturer at the Roux Institute) lacked the proper credentials to teach one of Plaintiff‘s courses in the spring 2024 semester, that in March 2024 the instructor told Plaintiff in front of another employee defendant (an academic advisor) that Plaintiff should “prepare to fail,” that in April 2024 the instructor refused Plaintiff‘s request for an incomplete grade to submit assignments late and resubmit work for a higher grade, that the instructor refused to grade Plaintiff‘s work, and that the instructor assessed Plaintiff a failing grade. (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff attempted to appeal the grading decisions, but the academic advisor did not intervene. (Id. ¶ 33.) In May 2024, the advisor encouraged Plaintiff to apply for repeat funding but refused to provide Plaintiff with an extension of time to complete the application, which refusal evidently caused Plaintiff to submit the application before she was fully ready. (Id.)
In July 2024, Defendant Annie Chuprevich (the Senior Director of Student Life and Housing) authorized a credit to Plaintiff‘s billing account corresponding to the cost of
In September 2024, the university assigned Plaintiff to one bedroom of a two-bedroom apartment in a building located at 144 State Street, Portland, Maine, which was owned or operated by Defendant Redfern, LLC. (Id. ¶ 40.) A roommate was assigned to the other bedroom in the unit. (Id.) Plaintiff requested immediate transfer because she alleged that the single small non-operable window was below the natural light requirements under the city‘s code, the closet was too narrow to accommodate standard clothes hangers, and there was an insect infestation; the transfer request was denied. (Id.) In late September 2024, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Chuprevich that she was experiencing significant stress from commuting to Boston, but no action was taken to support Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 39.)
On December 2, 2024, Plaintiff collapsed in the staircase of the apartment building, sustaining what a neurologist later described as a moderately severe traumatic brain injury. (Id. ¶ 42.) Subsequent medical evaluations revealed measurable post-concussive cognitive deficits in processing speed, memory, executive function, sustained attention, and oculomotor impairment. (Id. ¶ 118.)
On December 8, 2024, Plaintiff wrote to university officials and the property management company about the fall and sought information about filing an insurance claim. (Id. ¶ 43.) Later that month, Plaintiff requested surveillance footage; one of the
On December 20, 2024, Plaintiff wrote to the university‘s Disability Access Services for permission to take an exam remotely or in a location closer to her Portland residence. (Id. ¶ 47.) When the disability office denied the request a few days later, Plaintiff traveled from Portland to Boston to sit for the examination despite mobility limitations. (Id.)
On January 21, 2025, Plaintiff emailed Defendant Chuprevich seeking to extend the duration of her student housing assignment for the spring 2025 semester because the proximity to the MaineHealth hospital (a 12-minute walk) would help her study, manage treatment, and minimize disruptions during the critical phase of recovery. (Id. at 49.)4 Defendant Chuprevich responded ten days later advising that the request was under consideration. (Id.)
Plaintiff began coordinated neurological care at the nearest medical center on January 31, 2025. (Id. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff argues that she would have received better care earlier if the university provided resources and education on the local medical system. (Id.)
On February 13, 2025, Plaintiff‘s roommate sent photographs of plastic cutlery to Defendant Barry (the Associate Director of Housing). (Id. ¶ 50.) Defendant Barry confirmed a housing transfer for the roommate on February 21, 2025. (Id.) On February 22 and 23, 2025, the roommate reported an incident involving plastic cutlery being used to unlock a bathroom door. (Id.) The roommate withdrew the complaint on February 28, 2025. (Id.) Despite the withdrawal, Defendant Barry filed a university disciplinary complaint against Plaintiff involving allegations of dangerous weapons, endangering behavior, and disorderly conduct. (Id.) The employee also forwarded the allegations to the property management company and other authorities. (Id.)
On February 28, 2025, Plaintiff emailed Defendant Chuprevich asking to switch to her former roommate‘s now-vacant room “to escape the habitability violations reported months earlier and transfer from her non-compliant, window-deficient room to an available light-filled room.” (Id. ¶ 52.) On March 3, 2025, Plaintiff requested reduced housing fees under a university policy for unexpected medical expenses. (Id.)
On March 10, Defendants Barry and Chuprevich issued a move-out notice stating that the housing license expired on December 31, 2024, and that the April 30, 2025, move-out date was firm and would not be extended. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 54.) Defendant Chuprevich denied housing fee relief and asserted that Plaintiff was no longer a student at the Portland campus. (Id. ¶ 53.) On March 11, 2025, the Office of Student Conduct and Conflict Resolution advanced disciplinary charges against Plaintiff, evidently related to the incident with the former roommate. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that the timing of the negative actions is
On April 28, 2025, citing the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Chuprevich requesting a medical accommodation to extend her current housing accommodation beyond the April 30, 2025, vacate date. (Id. ¶ 54.) Defendant Chuprevich replied that this was the first time Plaintiff sought an extension beyond the earlier “courtesy extension” through April 30, 2025, that an extension would incur additional housing charges, and that she should make the request through the university‘s Disability Access Services office. (Id.)
On April 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed a housing discrimination complaint with Maine‘s civil rights agency. (Id. ¶ 55.) According to Plaintiff, university employees lifted prior obstacles and granted extensions and other requests after previously resisting or ignoring them. (Id.)
On August 7, 2025, another employee defendant issued findings in the student disciplinary case that Plaintiff was not responsible for violating the dangerous weapons policy, that Plaintiff was not responsible for violating the endangering behavior policy, and that there was insufficient information that Plaintiff had threatened the former roommate. (Id. ¶ 56.) Although Plaintiff asserts that she was cleared of “the serious charges,” the employee required Plaintiff to complete a “living with a roommate” training module and placed a registration block to enforce the requirement. (Id.) On August 17, 2025, Plaintiff objected in writing to another employee defendant, but the employee refused to remove the requirement. (Id.)
On August 25, 2025, Plaintiff made the following accommodation requests for medical reasons and citing her treating neurologist at MaineHealth: (1) a 50% reduction in coursework, (2) academic pacing flexibility, (3) a stable university residence environment, and (4) deferral of procedural demands. (Id. ¶ 57.) The neurologist expected the accommodations to remain necessary for up to one year. (Id.) On September 12, 2025, another employee defendant (the Director of Disability Access Services) approved the accommodation request for a reduced course load but denied the request to remain in university-assigned housing. (Id. ¶ 58.) The employee determined that the asserted housing medical need was for housing in proximity to Plaintiff‘s medical providers, which the employee maintained could be achieved through off campus living arrangements. (Id.) On September 15, 2025, Plaintiff wrote to the employee objecting to the decisions, asserting that they caused her harm because she had continued commuting eighteen hours per week during the intervening period, and stating that she expected the university to approve the accommodation requests “exactly as [her] neurologist prescribed.” (Id. ¶ 59.)
On September 16, 2025, Plaintiff withdrew from the state civil rights agency proceeding. (Id. ¶ 61.) Plaintiff maintains that the choice was not a concession on the merits but instead reflected a need to minimize non-essential cognitive and emotional demands. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, pressure and obstacles from university employees resumed after she abandoned the proceeding. (Id.) On October 27, 2025, Plaintiff received notice that Defendant Barry and a property management employee would conduct an inspection of the housing unit related to damage, maintenance and/or cleanliness. (Id. ¶ 62.) Plaintiff consented to inspection by a staff member from Defendant Redfern
On December 4, 2025, Plaintiff wrote to another employee defendant (the Senior Vice Chancellor for Student Life) demanding removal of the registration hold that was preventing her from enrolling in courses for the Spring 2026 semester. (Id. ¶ 64.) The employee directed Plaintiff to work with the Office of Conduct and Conflict Resolution. (Id.) On December 12, 2025, Plaintiff completed the required training module but stated that her participation in the training was “coerced under threat of academic exclusion, made under protest, with full reservation of rights.” (Id.)
On December 15, 2025, Plaintiff submitted updated medical documentation from the same treating neurologist in support of a request for the same accommodations for the next academic term. (Id. ¶ 66.) Plaintiff also wrote to the university wellness coordinator and health services office requesting emergency housing stability as a medically necessary accommodation. (Id. ¶ 67.) The employee from the disability services office again approved the reduced course load but denied the request for an extension of her student housing assignment and deferral of procedural demands. (Id. ¶ 66.)
During extreme cold weather on December 19, 2025, Plaintiff reported to Portland Housing Safety that she was requesting an inspection for compliance with requirements related to light, ventilation, heat, and electricity because her unit had no heat for three days
Defendant Chuprevich wrote to Plaintiff that notice to vacate the housing unit was extended to January 2, 2026. (Id.) The property manager sent a tenancy termination notice enclosing a Maine Judicial Branch mediation package. (Id.) On January 2, 2026, Plaintiff sent to the property manager and several university employees a notice that they were parties to actions filed concerning her tenancy and the eviction notice. (Id. ¶ 69.)
On January 12, 2026, the property manager and Defendant Chuprevich arrived at Plaintiff‘s door and entered her apartment using a master key without her consent and without a court order. (Id. ¶ 70.) The property manager put her foot in the door to prevent Plaintiff from closing the door and asserted that this was not an eviction. (Id.) Less than an hour later, Plaintiff emailed Defendant Chuprevich and several other university offices a cease-and-desist letter, and Plaintiff reported the entry and a new heat shutoff complaint to Portland Code Enforcement. (Id. ¶¶ 70–71.) In the hours that followed, Portland Code Enforcement contacted Defendant Redfern and heat was restored. (Id. ¶ 70.)
On January 13, 2026, Plaintiff attended the first day of classes of the spring 2026 semester, and, upon returning to Portland that night, could not access the building using her key fob. (Id. ¶¶ 66, 73.) Plaintiff concluded that her key fob was deliberately deactivated to prevent her from accessing her unit. (Id. ¶ 73.) On January 14, 2026,
Plaintiff initiated this federal lawsuit in March 2026. (Complaint, ECF No. 1.) Later in the same month, Defendant Northeastern imposed a financial registration bar. (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 78.) In April 2026, Plaintiff‘s private student loan lender declined to disburse further funds to Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff was also diagnosed with hypopituitarism, which she asserts is causally linked to the traumatic brain injury. (Id. ¶ 79.) In May 2026, Defendant Northeastern transferred Plaintiff‘s unpaid account balance to a third-party collections servicer. (Id. ¶ 80.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts two federal claims against the three entity defendants. (Id. at 50–58.) Plaintiff argues the university and housing entities failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability after the December 2024 injury and retaliated against her for requesting accommodations in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.5 As
A. Reasonable Accommodation Claim
To state a reasonable modification/accommodation claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) the plaintiff is a person with a disability, (2) the defendant is covered by one of three statutes; (3) the defendant has a discriminatory policy or practice in effect; (4) the plaintiff requested a reasonable modification in that policy or practice which would have afforded the plaintiff access to the goods, services, or program; (5) that the modification was necessary to afford that access; and (6) that the defendant refused to modify the policy or practice. Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 333 F.3d 299, 307–08 (1st Cir. 2003).
Regarding the first element, as alleged, the disability discrimination statutes apply to the organizational defendants. Similarly, the alleged facts would support a finding that the entities refused to modify certain policies or practices after Plaintiff made the requests. Plaintiff thus satisfied the sixth element, at least for some of the policies and practices during some portions of the times at issue in this case.
Regarding the second element, Plaintiff described generally an injury that is likely capable of causing at least a temporary disability in some cases. See Mancini v. City of Providence by & through Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2018) (noting that “injuries can comprise impairments, even when their impact is only temporary“). Plaintiff includes in her pleading a conclusory legal allegation that she had impairments that substantially limit major life activities, but she provided few facts regarding the symptoms and impacts to render the proposed conclusion plausible. Plaintiff offers no explanation of how or the
Even assuming the complaint satisfies the second element, a similar concern exists as to the third, fourth, and fifth elements. The absence of alleged facts regarding Plaintiff‘s condition and limitations precludes the requisite assessment of whether the organizational defendants had policies that effectively restricted access and whether the requested modifications were reasonable and necessary to provide equal access to the organizational defendants’ programs. See Jones v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 696 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2012) (“An accommodation request must be sufficiently direct and specific, and it must explain how the accommodation is linked to plaintiff‘s disability“).
The following accommodation requests are alleged explicitly or otherwise discernible in the second amended complaint: (1) an April 2024 request for policy compliance regarding grading decisions, (2) a September 2024 request for a room transfer, (3) a December 2024 request for remote testing, (4) a January 2025 request for an extension of student housing, (5) a February 2025 room transfer request, (6) a March 2025, request for housing fee reduction, (6) an April 2025 request for an extension of student housing, (8) an August 2025 request for reduced coursework, (9) an August 2025 request for academic pacing flexibility, (10) an August 2025 request for an extension of student housing, (11) an August 2025 request for deferral of procedural demands, (12) an October 2025 request for an a different employee to conduct a housing inspection, (13) a December 2025 request for reduced coursework, (14) a December 2025 request for academic pacing flexibility, (15) a December 2025 request for an extension of student housing, and (16) a December 2025 request for deferral of procedural demands.6
The first and second requests cannot be construed as accommodations for a disability because the injury that caused the alleged impairments had not yet occurred when
The fourth, seventh, eighth, tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth requests were explicitly granted or essentially or implicitly granted because Plaintiff received the requested relief. Plaintiff failed to explain adequately the ninth, eleventh, fourteenth, and sixteenth requests. She mentioned the requests for “academic flexibility,” but she did not address them further or assert whether the requests were denied or granted. Similarly, Plaintiff provided no information for Defendants or a factfinder to understand precisely what was meant by “deferral of procedural demands.” To the extent that Plaintiff was asking to remove all deadlines, forms, and other measures that all large bureaucracies use to operate, there is no authority requiring such a broad accommodation. To the extent that Plaintiff was asking for something less, it is not defined adequately in the second amended complaint. See Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255–56 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of identifying an accommodation, and of demonstrating that the accommodation allows [equal access]“).
The third request—remote testing not on the Boston campus—similarly fails because the complaint lacks any facts to support an inference that the accommodation was
The second amended complaint also fails to state a claim regarding the sixth request, a housing fee reduction. Such claims are insufficient when they are based on an alleged failure to waive generally applicable fees and when the alleged need stems from a person‘s financial hardship rather than a special requirement of the person‘s impairment. See Pownall El v. S. Realty, No. 24-CV-6450 (LTS), 2024 WL 4635344, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2024). Plaintiff evidently sought to avoid ordinary housing costs based on financial insecurity from multiple causes, including medical expenses. That need, however, is shared by many people with impairments and without impairments.
Plaintiff does not raise circumstances within the narrow category of cases where a fee waiver can be reasonable, necessary, and disability-related because a generally applicable additional expense is attached to a choice for nondisabled individuals while the disabled individual has no choice but to incur the additional expense because of the individual‘s impairment. See Birdwell v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2024); CNY Fair Housing, Inc. v. Welltower Inc., 588 F. Supp. 3d 282, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 2022). The allegations suggest that the housing fees are applicable to all students in university housing and are not unlawful surcharges for services required by the ADA. See generally,
Finally, there are insufficient facts to support a finding that Plaintiff‘s fifteenth request—another extension of her university housing assignment—was reasonable and necessary. By the time of the request, Plaintiff had evidently already received approximately one year of extended residency in the student housing unit since her first request for an extension. Plaintiff provided no information regarding the nature of her impairments in December 2025 that would support a finding of a continued need for “housing stability” in the second year of extensions. Plaintiff argues that she needs to live close to her medical provider and that her neurologist recommended that she have stable housing, but she did not include any facts about her symptoms to allow a factfinder to assess the alleged need to remain in student housing in particular, and she offered no explanation why she could not continue attending the university while obtaining other
B. Disability Retaliation Claim
To proceed on a disability retaliation claim under the familiar burden shifting approach, (1) a plaintiff must show that he or she engaged in protected conduct, he or she was subjected to an adverse action by the defendant, and there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action; (2) the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for the adverse action; and (3) the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered legitimate explanation is pretextual, meaning that the defendant was motivated by a retaliatory animus. D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2012). The First Circuit instructs that the prima facie case is not “a rigid pleading standard,” Rae v. Woburn Public Schools, 113 F.4th 86, 109 (1st Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted), but the burden shifting framework and the prima facie case “may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim.” Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013).
Regarding the protected conduct element, Plaintiff cites her accommodation requests. Courts have held that reasonable disability-related requests for policy modifications can constitute a protected activity for purposes of the disability discrimination statutes. Akerson v. Pritzker, No. CV 12-10240-PBS, 2021 WL 2295522, at *8 (D. Mass. June 4, 2021). The investigation of misconduct, the requirement to attend a training session on living with a roommate, the alleged failure to voluntarily take affirmative steps to assist Plaintiff, and the denials of her requests for fee waivers and other accommodations would not satisfy the adverse action requirement, see Shervin v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc., 804 F.3d 23, 50 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting that adverse actions occur when there is significant conduct sufficient to deter a reasonable person from reporting discrimination); Mullin v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 162 F.4th 1296, 1315 (11th Cir. 2025) (reasoning that if denial of accommodation requests were adverse action, there would be no difference between retaliation claims and reasonable modification claims), but at this stage of the proceeding, the alleged lockout from her apartment is likely sufficient to satisfy the adverse action element.
Plaintiff, however, has not alleged sufficient facts to support a finding that her accommodation requests were the but-for cause of the lockout. Plaintiff evidently relies on the temporal relationship between the requests and the lockout. In some cases, the temporal proximity between protected conduct and adverse action can support a plausible inference of causality, but it must be very close. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Department of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir. 2004). Indeed, even close proximity can be insufficient “particularly if the larger picture undercuts any claim of causation.” Cordero Ayala v. United States Postal Service, No. CV 20-1239 (MEL), 2024 WL 2199005, at *12 (D.P.R. Mar. 27, 2024) (quoting Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 478 (1st Cir. 2003) (nested quotation marks omitted).
Here, the timing alleged in the second amended complaint would not support an inference that the lockout was motivated by Plaintiff‘s requests for accommodations. Plaintiff alleges that much of Defendants’ improper conduct occurred up to a year before she experienced any disability. Furthermore, she made many requests beginning in April 2024, but the alleged lockout did not occur until January 2026. Even if the temporal relationship analysis is limited to an alleged request made in December 2025, Plaintiff‘s other allegations undermine any inference that might be drawn from the temporal relationship between that request or any other subset of the accommodation requests and the lockout. For example, Defendants explicitly or effectively granted several of her requests, including an extension of the student housing assignment for the spring 2025 semester (which was the most prominent accommodation request identified in the complaint), and her requests for a reduced course load.
Some of Plaintiff‘s other assertions regarding the causes and motives for Defendants’ actions also undermine any suggestion that a retaliatory motive may permissibly be inferred based on the temporal relationship. For instance, Plaintiff repeatedly alleges that university officials took adverse actions against her because of her premises liability/insurance claim rather than because she made disability requests. Plaintiff also alleges a closer temporal proximity between her complaints to city code enforcement and the lockout, but while complaints of violations of state laws or local
In sum, even considering all well-pled allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff‘s favor, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support a plausible inference of retaliatory motive.7 Plaintiff, therefore, has not alleged an actionable disability retaliation claim.
Plaintiff asserts fourteen state law contract, quasi-contract, and tort law claims against the three entity defendants and the twelve employee defendants. Because Plaintiff has not alleged an actionable federal claim, the Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st Cir. 1995) (“As a general principle, the unfavorable disposition of a plaintiff‘s federal claims at the early stages of a suit, well before the commencement of trial, will trigger the dismissal without prejudice of any supplemental state-law claims“).8
CONCLUSION
After a review of Plaintiff‘s complaint in accordance with
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate judge‘s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered pursuant to
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court‘s order.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 31st day of August, 2026.