2005 Ohio 6966 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2005
{¶ 2} The current appeal marks the second time this case comes before us for review regarding the same discovery dispute.1 In Doe v. Mount Carmel Health Systems,
Franklin App. No. 03AP-413,
{¶ 3} Subsequent to the trial court's original judgment, which was the subject of appeal in Doe I, the legislature amended R.C.
{¶ 4} On April 4, 2005, the trial court filed a second decision and entry. The trial court declined to apply the amended statute to its examination of the disputed documents. Instead, the court conducted its analysis under former R.C.
{¶ 5} Pursuant to our instructions in Doe I, the trial court set forth its rationale for permitting discovery. The court noted that a majority of the documents it deemed discoverable were records of complaints received by Mt. Carmel employees from patients treated by Dr. Schneider.2 Upon receipt, the employee would send the complaint to the Quality Assurance Department, which would then forward the complaint and any corresponding documents for investigation. The trial court concluded that the complaints filed with Mt. Carmel were not made directly to a review committee as contemplated by R.C.
* * * These records, while they may have been forwarded to the Court by a review committee department of Defendant Mt. Carmel, are documents that are available from an original source — the department that the patient contacted to make the complaint. * * *
The trial court found that because the documents were available from an original source, they were discoverable from the review committee.
{¶ 6} The court also concluded that copies of letters from Mt. Carmel to Dr. Schneider were discoverable. The trial court observed that the letters appeared to be used to review the doctor's hospital status and various applications for continued appointments to the emergency room staff. Thus, because they did not originate in a review committee, the trial court deemed the letters discoverable.
{¶ 7} Finally, the trial court addressed two incident reports regarding Dr. Schneider filed by an employee of Mt. Carmel. The court observed that while the documents were forwarded to quality assurance, the information was collected for use by the department that made the report. Consistent with its earlier ruling, the trial court concluded that because the documents were available from an original source, they were discoverable from the review committee.
{¶ 8} After the trial court entered its April 4, 2005 judgment, Mt. Carmel filed a timely notice of appeal. Mt. Carmel raises the following assignments of error for review:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MOUNT CARMEL WHEN IT REFUSED TO APPLY R.C. §
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MOUNT CARMEL WHEN IT HELD THAT DOCUMENTS PRESENTED TO MOUNT CARMEL'S QUALITY ASSURANCE COMMITTEE AND PEER REVIEW COMMITTEE WERE DISCOVERABLE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MOUNT CARMEL WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER R.C. §
{¶ 9} As a preliminary matter, we must establish the applicable standard of review. Appellee asserts that, because this is an appeal of a discovery order, we must review the matter under an abuse of discretion standard. Generally, an appellate court will evaluate a determination of a discovery dispute under an abuse of discretion standard. However, here we are presented with a threshold question of law: which version of the statute is applicable. Accordingly, we must conduct our review of the trial court's decision to apply former R.C.
{¶ 10} The trial court determined that the amended statute should not apply to the discovery issue at bar. However, in EPIof Cleveland, Inc. v. Limbach (1989),
"Laws of a remedial nature providing rules of practice, courses of procedure, or methods of review are applicable to any proceedings conducted after the adoption of such laws."
Id. at 105, quoting with approval State ex rel. Holdridge v.Indus. Comm. (1967),
{¶ 11} Here, R.C.
{¶ 12} Appellee argues that amended R.C.
{¶ 13} We hold that the trial court should have applied the revised version — R.C.
{¶ 14} Mt. Carmel's second assignment of error contends that the trial court erred in holding that the documents presented to its quality assurance and peer review committees were discoverable. Similarly, the third assignment of error submits that the trial court erred in failing to consider R.C.
{¶ 15} R.C.
Any information, data, reports, or records made available to a quality assurance committee * * * of a hospital or * * * not-for-profit health care corporation * * * are confidential and shall be used by the committee and the committee members only in the exercise of the proper functions of the committee. * * *
Additionally, R.C.
Proceedings and records within the scope of a peer review committee of a health care entity shall be held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction in evidence in any civil action against a health care entity or * * * provider * * * arising out of matters that are the subject of evaluation and review by the peer review committee. No individual who attends a meeting of a peer review committee, serves as a member of a peer review committee, works for or an behalf of a peer review committee, or provides information to a peer review committee shall be permitted or required to testify in any civil action as to any evidence or other matters produced or presented during the proceedings of the peer review committee or as to any finding, recommendation, evaluation, opinion, or other action of the committee or a member thereof. * * *
This statutorily conferred privilege, dubbed the peer review privilege, is not absolute. R.C.
* * * Information, documents, or records otherwise available from original sources are not to be construed as being unavailable for discovery or for use in any civil action merely because they were produced or presented during proceedings of a peer review committee, but the information, documents, or records are available only from the original sources and cannot be obtained from the peer review committee's proceedings or records. * * *
Furthermore:
* * * An individual who * * * provides information to a peer review committee shall not be prevented from testifying as to matters within the individual's knowledge, but the individual cannot be asked about the individual's testimony before the peer review committee, information the individual provided to the peer review committee, or any opinion the individual formed as a result of the peer review committee's activities. * * *
{¶ 16} As amended, R.C.
{¶ 17} In addition to amending former R.C.
Notwithstanding any contrary provision of section
(Emphasis sic.) R.C.
* * * [A] report of an incident involving injury or potential injury to a patient as a result of patient care provided by health care providers, including both individuals who provide health care and entities that provide health care, that is prepared by or for the use of a peer review committee of a health care entity and is within the scope of the functions of that committee.
{¶ 18} The privilege granted by R.C.
{¶ 19} Applying amended and renumbered R.C.
{¶ 20} Given the above, we find that the trial court should have considered R.C.
{¶ 21} In regard to Mt. Carmel's second assignment of error, to the extent that the trial court ruled that documents presented to quality assurance and peer review committees were discoverable, the trial court erred. The amended statute prohibits the discovery of such documents unless they are obtained from an original source. Documents do not become accessible from quality assurance and peer review committees merely because an original source is available elsewhere. Beyond this, we are unable to meaningfully address the merits of the second assignment of error at this time due to the trial court's failure to apply the proper statutes. Accordingly, we must remand this discovery dispute for further review by the trial court. On remand, the trial court should apply amended and renumbered R.C.
{¶ 22} Based on the foregoing, Mt. Carmel's first and third assignments of error are sustained. The second assignment of error is sustained in part and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and remanded with instructions.
Judgment reversed; cause remanded with instructions.
Sadler and McGrath, JJ., concur.