Doe v. LeeDoe v. Lee
This action is before the Court on Defendant David Rausch‘s “Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunctions” [Doc. 55]. For the reasons below, the Court grants the Motion in part.
I. Background
In 1999, Plaintiff John Doe was convicted of two counts of rape [See Doc. 61 ¶ 18]. His convictions subjected him to Tennessee‘s then-operative Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act (SORMA) [See id. ¶ 21]. See 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 976.
SORMA required sex offenders—the only category of offender established—to send the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) a form detailing their personal information within ten (10) days of certain events and every ninety (90) days thereafter. See id. §§ 3, 4, 5. After ten (10) years, a sex offender could petition for relief from these requirements and expungement of his sex offender reports. See id. § 8. SORMA specified when such relief was appropriate. Id. SORMA also required TBI to maintain a “centralized record system of sexual offender registration and verification” and “promptly report” that information to the law enforcement agency local to an offender‘s residence or workplace. See id. § 7.
SORVTA classifies each sex offender as a (1) “sexual offender,” (2) “violent sexual offender,” (3) “offender against children,” and/or (4) “violent juvenile sexual offender” based on the offense(s) of conviction, offender‘s age, and victim‘s age. See
Because of Plaintiff‘s offense of conviction and his victim‘s age, he is classified as a “violent sexual offender” and an “offender against children,” and he must comply “with the registration, verification and tracking requirements” of SORVTA for life [See Doc. 61 ¶ 104]. See
SORVTA also restricts a sex offender‘s geographical movement. It prohibits a sex offender from residing or working within 1,000 feet of a school, childcare facility, or public park. See id.
TBI maintains a sex offender‘s personal information and DNA samples and publishes a public registry of information regarding sex offenders. See id.
TBI must provide certain information to law enforcement agencies and schools near where an offender resides. See id.
In January 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Governor Bill Lee and TBI Director David B. Rausch [Doc. 1]. The Complaint challenged: (1) the retroactive application of SORVTA under the Ex Post Facto Clause and
Plaintiff later filed an “Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Injunction,” seeking a preliminary injunction based only on his Ex Post Facto Clause claim [See Doc. 37 at 2]. He asked the Court to “enter a preliminary injunction ordering that Plaintiff be removed from the [Sex Offender] Registry and prohibiting Defendants from retroactively enforcing the SORVTA against him” [See id. at 5]. Governor Lee and Defendant Rausch “maintain[ed] that the Act [did] not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause” [See id. at 1 n.1]. But they did “not oppose Plaintiff‘s request for a preliminary injunction” while they appealed an injunction in Doe I to the United States Court
The Court granted both motions [Doc. 41]. The Court granted a preliminary injunction only as to the Ex Post Facto Clause claim [See id. at 5-7]. The Court ordered that Plaintiff “be removed from Tennessee Sex Offender Registry” and “[e]njoin[ed] Defendants from enforcing the Sex Offender and Violent Sex Offender Registration Verification and Tracking Act” against him [See id. at 9]. The Court also stayed this case pending a decision in Does II [See id.].
On May 15, 2024, the Sixth Circuit decided Does II. See 102 F.4th 330. Based on that ruling, Governor Lee and Defendant Rausch filed the instant “Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunctions” [Doc. 55].
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [Doc. 61]. The Amended Complaint challenges the retroactive application of the same provisions of SORVTA as the original Complaint [Compare Doc. 61 at 17-34, with Doc. 1 at 17-35]. It brings the same original eight (8) claims and a claim that Tennessee‘s retroactive application of SORVTA is a breach of Plaintiff‘s plea agreement and a violation of due process [See Doc. 61 at 41-45]. The Amended Complaint also adds “factual allegations” about “TBI‘s role in Maintaining and Enforcing” SORVTA [See id. at 34-41]. The Amended Complaint removes Governor Lee as a defendant but adds Knox County Sheriff Tom Spangler, Knoxville Police Department Chief Paul Noel, and Knox County District Attorney Charme Allen [See id. at 6-7].
After filing the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunctions [Doc. 71]. Defendant Rausch, now the only defendant who was subject to the preliminary injunction, replied [Doc. 85].
To start, the Court must modify its preliminary injunction based on the significant change in the law espoused in Does II. See Doe v. Lee, 137 F.4th 569, 577-78 (6th Cir. 2025) (“Doe III“). As the Sixth Circuit confirmed in Doe III, Does II “changed the law” on which the preliminary injunction rested. Id. at 578. And following that change, the Court must modify its injunction to conform to Does II. See id. at 579.
A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). Courts “consider four factors: (1) the plaintiff‘s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the risk of irreparable harm to the plaintiff in the absence of an injunction; (3) the risk that an injunction will harm others; and (4) the broader public interest.” PCC Airfoils, LLC v. Daugherty, 176 F.4th 509, 512-13, (6th Cir. 2026) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). “When a case turns on a potential constitutional violation, ‘the likelihood of success on the merits often will be the determinative factor.‘” Boddy v. Grech, 178 F.4th 264, 272 (6th Cir. 2026) (quotation omitted). A preliminary injunction “should not issue relief that extends further than necessary to remedy the plaintiff‘s injury.” L.W. by and through Williams v. Skrmetti, 83 F.4th 460, 490 (6th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). Because the Court only granted a preliminary injunction as to Plaintiff‘s Ex Post Facto Clause claim, [see Docs. 37 at 2, 41 at 5-7], and Defendant Rausch is the only remaining defendant against whom the injunction issued, the Court limits its analysis accordingly.
Under Article 1 of the Constitution, “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law.”
As Does II summarized, SORTVA generally “does three things.” See Does II, 102 F.4th at 334. First, it establishes “reporting rules which require registrants to appear in-person quarterly at a local law enforcement agency and update information.” Id. Second, it requires TBI to “publish[] this information . . . for public use.” See id. Third, it restricts a sex offender‘s “geographical movement, particularly where they can live, work, and stay.” See id.
Does II held that the “registration, reporting, and surveillance components” of Tennessee‘s statutory regime would not have been “traditionally considered as a punishment“—hence no Ex Post Facto violation. See id. at 339 (quoting Bredesen, 507 F.3d at 1005). “So, a registry kept by the state and disclosed publicly is constitutionally sound.” Id. at 339 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 90-91). But “[a] regulatory regime that severely restricts where people can live, work, and ‘loiter,‘” or that “categorizes them [sex offenders] into tiers ostensibly corresponding to present dangerousness without any individualized assessment thereof,” see id. at 339-40 (quoting Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705 (6th Cir. 2016)), “may not be retroactively enforced upon” a sex offender, id. at 340. The Court expressly noted that “to the extent [TBI Director Rausch‘s] office categorizes registrants based on the crime of their conviction and without an individualized assessment, that function may be questionable under Snyder.” Id. at 342 (citing Snyder, 834 F.3d at 705). On remand, the Sixth Circuit instructed the district court to “look at each restriction” in
After Does II, the preliminary injunction in place against Defendant Rausch is too broad. See id. at 339-342. Plaintiff is only likely to succeed on his claim that TBI‘s categorical classification of him as an “offender against children” without an individual assessment coupled with TBI‘s publication of that classification violates the Ex Pose Facto Clause.2 And because he is likely to show that a Constitutional right has been violated, “irreparable injury is presumed.” See Am. Civil Liberties Union Fund of Mich. v. Livingston Cnty., 796 F.3d 636, 649 (6th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).
SORTVA charges TBI with classifying a sex offender as “an offender against children,” and that classification is published. See
This is not to say that TBI could not publish information about Plaintiff‘s rape convictions that is already in the public record, including information (if available) showing that his victim was twelve (12) years of age or less [See Doc. 55-1 at 16-17]. And Tennessee might be right to publicly classify Plaintiff as an “offender against children” after an individualized assessment of his crimes even if that classification causes shame. But it is the precise categorical classification of an individual corresponding to dangerousness, based on an offense of conviction without an individualized assessment that failed in Synder. See Snyder, 834 F.3d at 702, 705. And it likely exists here too.
But Plaintiff is not likely to succeed against Defendant Rausch on his Ex Post Facto challenge to other SORVTA requirements. First, Does II forecloses Plaintiff‘s challenge to the registration and reporting requirements as it applies to Director Rausch. Under Does II, Defendant Rausch‘s role in “designing and issuing the forms which registrants use to report their information, creating and maintaining the registry database, disseminating that information to prosecutors and law enforcement, facilitating other agencies’ entry of new data into the registry, and managing the repository of original registry forms” “fall[s] squarely within the legitimate regulatory scheme which Tennessee is constitutionally allowed to provide and maintain.” 102 F.4th at 341 (internal citations omitted). To the extent Defendant Rausch is otherwise involved in the “registration,
Second, to obtain injunctive relief, Plaintiff must show “actual present harm or a significant possibility of future harm.” See Binno v. Am. Bar Ass‘n, 826 F.3d 338, 344 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Friends of George‘s, Inc. v. Mulroy, 108 F.4th 431, 435 (6th Cir. 2024). TBI has the authority to promulgate regulations regarding the enforcement of SORVTA. See
Third, Defendant Rausch is not authorized to enforce the other provisions of SORVTA Plaintiff specifically challenges. Those laws “prohibiting [offenders] from living, working, and traveling within certain areas are enforced by a diffusion of state officers and prosecutors,”4 not Defendant Rausch. See Does II, 102 F.4th at 341. And he “cannot be enjoined from enforcing provisions of the Act which he does not enforce.” See id. at 342. Resisting this conclusion, Plaintiff relies on Doe v. DeWine to argue that Defendant Rausch‘s overall role in Tennessee‘s sex offender scheme supports the injunction [See Doc. 71 at 16-17 (citing 921 F.3d 842, 848 (6th Cir. 2018))].
And the other equitable factors cannot save the failure to show likelihood of success on these other portions of the preliminary injunction. A state is irreparably harmed if its duly-enacted and constitutional statutes are enjoined. See Doe III, 137 F.4th at 576. And it is in the public interest to allow duly-enacted and constitutional statutes to be enforced.
III. Conclusion
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant David B. Rausch‘s “Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunctions” [Doc. 55] in part. The Court ENJOINS Defendant Rausch from publicly publishing Plaintiff‘s classification as an “offender against children.” Otherwise, the Court DISSOLVES the preliminary injunction [See Doc. 41].
SO ORDERED.
KATHERINE A. CRYTZER
United States District Judge
KATHERINE A. CRYTZER
United States District Judge