ORDER
Jennifer A. Zygowicz, a non-party, puts before the court the question of whether service of a subpоena, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 45(b)(1), can be accomplished by certified mail. Zygowicz attests that she received, by certified mail, a subpoena to appear to be deposed on May 27, 1994. She rеceived the subpoena on May 13, 1994, but waited until today to properly move this court to quash on the grounds that she was not served by personal delivery. The court now holds that personal service is nоt required by Rule 45(b)(1). Accordingly, Zy-gowicz’ motion is DENIED.
In construing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court is required to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Rule 45(b)(1) states, in relevant part:
A subpoena may be served by any person who is not a party and is not less than 18 years of age. Service of a subpoena upon a person named therein shall be made by delivering a copy thereof to such per-son____
(Emphasis added). Nothing in this language suggests that in-hand, personal service is required to effectuate “dеlivery,” or that service by certified mail is verboten. The plain language of the rule requires only that the subpoеna be delivered to the person served by a qualified person. “Delivery” connotes simply “the act by which the res or substance thereof is placed within the actual ... possession or control of another.” Black’s Law Dictionary 428 (6th ed. 1990). Where a mail carrier is a non-party more than 18 years old, certified mail may well assure the delivery foreseen by Rule 45. By way of both contrast and example, abode service, where a document is left at the served individual’s dwelling, would not assure delivery to the person. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(1) (describing abode service for service of summons and complaint).
Zygowicz does not contend that the service here failed to effect delivery to her of the subpoena. See 5A Jeremy C. Moоre et al„ Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 45.09[1] (1994) (party moving to quash subpoena bears burden of proof) [“Moore’s”]. In such a case, it would serve only to torture the rules and to drive up the expense of litigation to construe Rule 45 as forbidding service by certified mail.
The court’s conclusion is bolstered by the Federal Rule’s description of personal ser
The court has not found, and Zygowicz does not direct it to, any authoritative precedent on this question. Zygowicz relies wholly upon a 1958 Alaska case, in which the court stated that a subpoena failed where “it was not personally served and was not issued оut of the federal court having jurisdiction over [the deponent’s] person.” Gillam v. A. Shyman, Inc.,
This court has found district court opinions from other jurisdictions that do suggest a personal service requirement in situations involving compulsory process. See, e.g., Khachikian v. BASF Corp.,
Likewise, the primary civil procedure treatises assert without explanation thаt personal service of a subpoena is required by Rule 45. See 5A Moore’s, supra, at ¶45.-05[1] (citing no authority); 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Proсedure § 2461 (1971 & Supp.1994) (citing Gillam). Like the district court opinions cited above, the failure of these otherwise persuasive texts to explain their conclusions severely undermines their usefulness here.
One fеderal appellate court — not the Seventh Circuit — has stated, again in dicta, that personal serviсe is required upon service of a subpoena. F.T.C. v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson,
Rule 45(b)(1) is more narrow than Rule 4(e) as to how notification by service can take place, but it is not so narrow as Zygowicz would have it. For these reasons, Zygowicz’ motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.