JANE DOE 1, A MINOR, et al. v. GREENVILLE CITY SCHOOLS, et al.
Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-4
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DARKE COUNTY
June 25, 2021
2021-Ohio-2127
Trial Court Case No. 2020-CV-239 (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
OPINION
Rendered on the 25th day of June, 2021.
MICHAEL L. WRIGHT, Atty. Reg. No. 0067698, ROBERT L. GRESHAM, Atty. Reg. No. 0082151 and KESHA Q. BROOKS, Atty. Reg. No. 0095424, 130 West Second Street, Suite 1600, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees
BRIAN L. WILDERMUTH, Atty. Reg. No. 0066303 and TABITHA JUSTICE, Atty. Reg. No. 0075440, 50 Chestnut Street, Suite 230, Dayton, Ohio 45440 Attorneys
TUCKER, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendants-appellants Greenville City School District Board of Education (the “Board of Education“), Stan Hughes and Roy Defrain appeal, pursuant to
{¶ 2} We hold that the trial court erred by overruling Appellants’ motion to dismiss Appellees’ claims against 10 unnamed employees of the Board of Education, and
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 3} Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 were minor students at Greenville High School in December 2019. See Amended Complaint ¶ 5, Aug. 21, 2020. During an experiment in their science class on December 9, 2019, the two students suffered injuries when a bottle of isopropyl alcohol caught fire and exploded. Id. at ¶ 6-7 and 9.
{¶ 4} On May 28, 2020, Appellees filed a complaint against Appellants, five identified members of the Board of Education, ten unnamed employees of the Board of Education, HCC Life Insurance Company, and the Ohio Department of Medicaid. See Complaint ¶ 1-6, 24 and 27, May 28, 2020. Appellants moved to dismiss the complaint on July 22, 2020.
{¶ 5} Prompted by Appellants’ motion, Appellees voluntarily dismissed the five identified members of the Board of Education on August 3, 2020, and with leave of court, Appellees filed an amended complaint on August 21, 2020. In the amended complaint, Appellees allege that while Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 were participating in “a class-sanctioned [sic] science experiment,” they were injured as a result of Appellants’ “fail[ures] to provide proper safety equipment, [such as] a fire extinguisher,” and “to enact * * * appropriate protocols [for the adequate] supervis[ion] and protect[ion]” of “students during classroom activities.”1 See Amended Complaint ¶ 7 and 12.
{¶ 6} Appellants moved to dismiss Appellees’ amended complaint on August 28, 2020, arguing that the Board of Education and Roy Defrain were immune from liability under
{¶ 7} Under
II. Analysis
{¶ 8} Appellants’ assignments of error all implicate
{¶ 9} On appeal, a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to dismiss under
{¶ 10} For their first assignment of error, Appellants contend that:
IN DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS OF ALL DEFENDANTS, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT APPLYING THE SPECIFIC IMMUNITY ANALYSIS REQUIRED BY [
R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) ] FOR CLAIMS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.
{¶ 11} Appellants argue that the trial court‘s judgment should be reversed because the court “did not consider or even address [the question of] whether [Stan Hughes and Roy Defrain] were entitled to immunity under
{¶ 12}
{¶ 13} In the first part of their argument, Appellants charge the trial court with error for omitting an express determination of whether Hughes and Defrain were entitled to immunity under
{¶ 14} In the second part of their argument, Appellants maintain that the trial court erred by overruling their motion to dismiss Appellees’ claims against Hughes and Defrain because Appellees “have not alleged any particular facts to explain how [Hughes and Defrain] purported[ly] * * * acted in bad faith, recklessly, wantonly, or maliciously.” Appellants’ Brief 7. Appellants fault Appellees for indiscriminately alleging that “all [of the] defendants [were] responsible for all [of the reckless, wanton or malicious] acts” on which Appellees’ claims for relief are predicated; for “not alleg[ing] any facts in [the amended] complaint that would have placed any district employee on notice that not having a fire extinguisher or [other,] unspecified protective equipment would, in all probability, result in the specific harm” for which Appellees seek redress; and for “not alleg[ing] any facts that constituted a perverse disregard of a known risk * * * that a bottle of isopropyl alcohol would explode.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 7 and 10.
{¶ 15} Appellees allege, in relevant part, that Roy Defrain taught “a science class [at Greenville High School, which Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2] attended” at the time they were injured; that Stan Hughes “was the principal of Greenville High School“; that Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 suffered injury “in the process of conducting a[n] [in-class] science experiment, [when] a bottle of isopropyl alcohol caught fire and exploded“; that [Hughes and Defrain] breached [the] duty [of care they] owed to [Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2] by failing to provide proper safety equipment * * *, especially, but not limited to, a fire extinguisher inside the classroom,” and by “fail[ing] to enact * * * appropriate protocols [for the] supervis[ion] and protect[ion] [of] Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 * * * during classroom activities.” Amended Complaint ¶ 3-4, 7 and 12. Appellees characterize these alleged breaches of duty as “negligent, reckless and wanton.” Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶ 16} Notwithstanding that Appellants’ criticisms of the amended complaint have some merit—given, for example, that Appellees do not allege that Hughes individually acted recklessly or wantonly, or that Defrain individually acted recklessly or wantonly—we hold that the amended complaint suffices, even if minimally, to put Appellants on notice of the nature of the claims against them. Appellees claim a right to recovery against Hughes and Defrain under
{¶ 17} The term “reckless” means “conduct characterized by ‘the conscious disregard of[,] or indifference to[,] a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct,’ ” and the term “wanton” refers to ” ‘the failure to exercise any care toward those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is a great probability that harm will result.’ ” Para v. Jackson, 2021-Ohio-1188, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), quoting Anderson v. City of Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d 266, paragraphs three and four of the syllabus. Appellees, as noted, allege that Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 were injured during an experiment in their science class when a bottle of isopropyl alcohol caught fire and exploded. Amended Complaint ¶ 7.
{¶ 18} Although a “plaintiff must plead the operative facts with particularity in some cases, the plaintiff in a sovereign immunity case does not.” Para at ¶ 28, citing David v. Matter, 2017-Ohio-7351, 96 N.E.3d 1012, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.). Isopropyl alcohol is a flammable liquid, and despite the lack of allegations detailing the precise nature of the experiment at issue in this case, a reasonable inference is that the experiment involved the use of a Bunsen burner or other source of intense heat, which ignited the alcohol. In the context of a science-class experiment, the risk that a flammable liquid might catch fire in the presence of an open flame or other source of intense heat should be obvious. Whether Hughes and Defrain, individually or collectively, consciously disregarded or were indifferent to the risk, and whether such disregard or indifference was a substantially greater deviation from the standard of care than ordinary negligence, are questions of fact. Pendry, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28531, 2020-Ohio-3129, at ¶ 13. Whether Hughes and Defrain, individually or collectively, failed to exercise any care at all, and whether the circumstances of the experiment gave rise to a great probability that the alcohol would be ignited, are likewise questions of fact. Id.
{¶ 19} In the third part of their argument, Appellants assert that the trial court erred by overruling their motion to dismiss as it related to Appellees’ claims against 10 unnamed employees of the Board of Education. Appellants’ Brief 11. Under
{¶ 20} For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellants’ first assignment of error is overruled with respect to the trial court‘s omission of an express determination of whether Stan Hughes and Roy Defrain are immune from liability under
{¶ 21} For their second assignment of error, Appellants contend that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED ABSENCE OF A FIRE EXTINGUISHER OR [OTHER] UNSPECIFIED PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT MAY CONSTITUTE A “PHYSICAL DEFECT” WITHIN OR ON THE GROUNDS OF GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS.
{¶ 22} Appellees claim a right to recover against the Board of Education under
{¶ 23} The analysis of whether a political subdivision is immune from liability under
{¶ 24} Appellants do not dispute that the Board of Education is a political subdivision performing a governmental function or that Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 were injured within a building used for a governmental function. See Appellants’ Brief 12-16. Instead, Appellants argue that the absence of safety equipment cannot constitute a physical defect as a matter of law. Id. at 13-15.
{¶ 25} As the trial court noted in its judgment, “[t]here [is] a split [among] the
{¶ 26} Appellants suggest that the trial court misplaced its reliance inasmuch as the Ohio Supreme Court “gave no hint as to how it might [have] ruled” had the issue been squarely raised in Moore, but Appellants thus understate the significance of the Court‘s rationale for remanding the case. Appellants’ Brief 13. Regardless of how the Court might have ruled, remand would not have been appropriate had the absence of “required” safety equipment been insufficient, as a matter of law, to qualify as a “physical defect” for purposes of the exception to a political subdivision‘s immunity under
{¶ 27} The record in the instant case, being limited to the allegations in the amended complaint, is inadequate to support a determination of what, if any, safety equipment was required in the classroom in which Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 were injured, and arguably, the Court‘s opinion in Moore indicates that the absence of fire safety equipment could constitute a physical defect if the equipment were a legal or regulatory requirement. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err by overruling Appellants’ motion to dismiss as it related to Appellees’ claims against the Board of Education.5 Appellants’ second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 28} For their third assignment of error, Appellants contend that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT EVALUATING WHETHER ANY STATUTORY DEFENSES WERE AVAILABLE TO REESTABLISH IMMUNITY FOR THE BOARD OF EDUCATION.
{¶ 29} Specifically, Appellants argue that the trial court‘s judgment should be reversed because the court did not determine whether the Board of Education‘s immunity would “be restored [under]
{¶ 30} Citing opinions issued by the Ohio Supreme Court and the Tenth District Court of Appeals, Appellants argue that because the employees of a “[p]olitical subdivision have wide discretion in determining what level of supervision is appropriate to promote the safety of * * * children in their care,” the “Board of Education‘s * * * immunity would be reinstated as a matter of law,” even if the alleged absence of a fire extinguisher and other safety equipment constituted a physical defect for purposes of
{¶ 31} Furthermore, to demonstrate that its immunity from liability should be restored under
{¶ 32} Similarly, to demonstrate that its immunity from liability should be restored under
{¶ 33} Because the record is insufficient to determine the extent of Hughes and Defrain‘s discretion with respect to policy-making, planning or enforcement, and because the determination of whether Hughes and Defrain acted in a reckless or wanton manner with respect to the exercise of their discretion, if any, to acquire and use safety equipment, we hold that the trial court did not err by omitting an express analysis of whether the Board of Education‘s immunity would be restored under
III. Conclusion
{¶ 34} Under
{¶ 35} Therefore, the trial court‘s decision is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, specifically, with an instruction to enter an order dismissing the 10 unnamed defendants.
HALL, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Michael L. Wright
Robert L. Gresham
Kesha Q. Brooks
Brian L. Wildermuth
Tabitha Justice
Daran Kiefer
Joseph McCandlish
Hon. Jonathan P. Hein