Doe v. GeorgeDoe v. George
Lawrence A. Wilkins and Thomas M. Kollin, 2661 Commons Boulevard, Beavercreek, Ohio 45431, for defendant-appellant
OPINION
HENDRICKSON, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Gary George, appeals a judgment of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas awarding $3,575,000 in damages to plaintiffs-appellees, Jane and John Doe and their daughter Jenny Doe (the victim).
{¶2} On August 8, 2009, appellant pled guilty to charges stemming from allegations he sexually abused the victim for several years when she was a child. Following his plea,
{¶3} On January 6, 2011, three business days before the trial, appellant moved to continue the trial or, in the alternative, to convey him from prison to attend the trial.1 The trial court denied the motion. On January 10, 2011, a jury awarded $500,000 in compensatory damages to the victim, $75,000 in compensatory damages to John Doe, and $3,000,000 in punitive damages. This appeal follows.
{¶4} In a single assignment of error, appellant challenges the trial court‘s refusal to have him conveyed from prison to attend the trial. Specifically, appellant asserts that since he is a “material witness and the only individual who could refute any facts offered by appellees,” his presence at trial was crucial and the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing him to attend the trial. We disagree.
{¶5} “There is no support in the Constitution or in judicial precedent for the proposition that a prisoner has an absolute due process right to attend the trial of a civil action to which he is a party.” In re S.F.T., Butler App. Nos. CA2010-02-043, CA2010-02-044, CA2010-02-045, and CA2010-02-046, 2010-Ohio-3706, ¶8; Abuhilwa v. Board, Pickaway App. No. 08CA3, 2008-Ohio-5326. In addition, the United States Supreme Court has declined to extend to prisoners the
{¶6} Appellant asserts his presence at trial was crucial as he was a “material witness and the only individual who could refute any facts offered by appellees.” Further, because “only appellant had personal knowledge of the facts, * * * his direct testimony could have been utilized to defend against appellees’ allegations.” Such declarations overlook the fact that appellant pled guilty to the sexual abuse. It is well-established that a guilty plea “is a complete admission of the defendant‘s guilt.”
{¶7} Further, although his motion to be present at trial was denied, appellant took no steps to present his testimony by an alternate method. Even though appellant‘s deposition was taken six months before the trial, appellant never moved to present his testimony by deposition. In fact, his deposition was never mentioned at trial. Appellant asserts his deposition testimony would not have been effective as the jury could not have evaluated his demeanor. However, nothing prevented appellant from requesting that his deposition be videotaped. Appellant also took no steps to present his testimony by other alternate methods such as by an affidavit.
{¶8} In light of the foregoing, and given the exceedingly late filing of appellant‘s written motion, and the fact he was represented at trial, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to convey him from prison to attend the civil trial.
{¶9} Judgment affirmed.
RINGLAND and PIPER, JJ., concur.