*1 OPINION DOE, and Behalf her own Jane RABINOWITZ, Justice. son, John minor Behalf of her appeal presents This wheth- Petitioner, Doe, person may er an damages against the estate of a deceased superior concluded tortfeasor. The court representa- COLLIGAN, personal Doris could not recover victim of Dennis the Estate tive of damages. We affirm. Respondent. Colligan, AND I. FACTS PROCEEDINGS. kindergarten Doe when his John was of Alaska. Supreme Court him father died. His mother enrolled with Brothers/Big Anchorage, Big Sisters of 1978, Big In Brothers then Inc. matched May Rehearing Denied nine-year-old Colligan. Dennis In Doe with Colligan sexually Doe revealed that during relationship. him their Col- abused shortly ligan committed suicide thereafter. complaint his mother filed a Doe and Colligan’s personal representative seeking Big Brothers/Big com- and Sisters pensatory and partial superior court entered each. pleadings dismissed judgment on the and Doe’s claim for granted Colligan’s estate. Thereafter we petition for review. Doe’s PERSON RE- II. MAY AN INJURED DAMAGES COVER PUNITIVE A DE- THE OF ESTATE FROM TORTFEASOR? CEASED stat- argues that Alaska’s survival Doe construed, ute, liberally preserves his damages from Colli- to recover imposi- that the gan’s estate. He reasons justified by tion of potential their deterrent effect on contends Colligan’s estate tortfeasors. intend- primarily wrongdoer and to deter ed to Wagstaff, Anchorage, peti- H. Robert for future; in the him similar conduct tioner. any pun- Colligan’s precludes since demise Gillett, Louis R. Veerman and Eric P. deterrence, re- Doe should not ishment or Rudd, Anchorage, respondent. Guess & for cover explicitly pro- statute Alaska’s survival MATTHEWS, C.J., and of action sur- plaintiff’s Before cause vides that RABINOWITZ, BURKE, repre- COMPTON defendant’s vives However, the MOORE, 09.55.570.1 sentative. AS JJ. character, involving survive to provides: defamation of 09.55.570 Alaska Statute personal representatives of the former survive. All causes of causes action All another, representatives of person one whether action arising otherwise, latter, as construed so except but this shall not be those on contract *2 E.g., Evans v. example of him. to make an the measure of dam as to statute is silent Gibson, 476, 389, 31 P.2d 395 220 Cal. Although yet have
ages available.2 (1934). of the tortfeasor renders Death of the whether death the address punitive aspect of meaningless the punitive award of prohibits an tortfeasor position Id. Several ages. courts take the the of have said damages, we exemplary purpose punitive of the the damages is “not by imposing damages is not well served deter him and oth also to damages anyone other than the actual wrongdoing in the like him ers Id.; Thompson v. Estate wrongdoer. Sturm, Day, 594 of Ruger & Co. v. 400, (Minn.1982); Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 408 1979), 38, 47 P.2d modified Hein, 389, v. Marcante Wyo. 51 67 P.2d denied, 454 (1980), cert. reh’g, 615 P.2d 621 196, (1937). Therefore, reason, they 202-03 391, 209 894, 70 L.Ed.2d 102 S.Ct. U.S. damages are not recoverable authority split of (1981).3 There is a against the estate of the deceased tort- jurisdictions as among the courts of (Second) feasor. Accord Restatement of damages are recovera to whether (1979).5 comment a Torts 908 § estate. deceased tortfeasor’s a ble minority jurisdictions permit deny punitive A of recov- majority The damages ery after the tort- of reason that These courts These courts focus on the wrongdoer and feasor’s death.6 are intended to Kavorkian, any Tommy’s Elbow Room v. 727 P.2d where action for a to abate an 1038, (Alaska 1986); 09.55.580(a). or AS party the verdict or to defeat 1048-49 has died after given by right prejudice of action 09.- the representative may 15.010. following courts refuse to award 4. The party thereon the maintain an action against tortfeasor’s estate: a deceased or, accrued, the cause of action whom Smith, 226, (10th F.2d 231 Cir. Barnes v. 305 death, against party’s after the representatives Moreno, 1962) (New law); Braun v. 11 Mexico party. of the 509, 60, (1970); Ariz.App. P.2d 62-63 Evans 466 476, 389, (1934); Gibson, 220 31 P.2d 395 v. Cal. damages a cause of Punitive do not constitute 400, Petroff, Thompson Estate 319 N.W.2d v. "Damages the relief which action. constitute Anderson, (Minn.1982); Nev. Allen v. 93 408 204, affords for the invasion of ... [a] the law 487, (1977); McAdams v. P.2d 489-90 562 being by of the the relief limited the measure 490, 169, (1968); Blue, N.C.App. 494 164 S.E.2d 3 damage prescribed.” v. which the law Hartzell 451, Barton, 4, 190 P.2d v. 200 Okl. Morriss 670, 676, Myall, Cal.App.2d 252 P.2d 681 115 39, Gill, (1947); Hayes 216 Tenn. 390 v. 459-60 (1953). City Hopcus, v. 174 See also Oklahoma 213, Johnson, (1965); v. 204 217 Dalton S.W.2d 186, 216, (1935) ("injury" de Okl. 50 P.2d 218 647, (1963); 102, Mar 650-51 Va. legal wrong to be redressed while notes the 389, 196, Hein, Wyo. 202-03 67 P.2d cante v. 51 recovery "damages” is the scale or measure of (1937). wrong). as amends for the distinguished “A action must be ... cause of Supreme Aat a sur Court ruled remedy simply 5. The Nevada is the means which from puni corresponding duty an award of obligation statute which authorized or vival which just” sought." damages may did not “as be fair and and also effectuated relief Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 22 a tort- permit award Venuto 116, 350, 204, (1971). Anderson, Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 99 355 93 Nev. Allen v. feasor’s estate. Co., Mfg. 487, (1977). Merlino v. WestCoast Macaroni Accord The court essen 489-90 562 P.2d 748, 106, (1949); Cal.App.2d 202 P.2d 754 90 tially law that it is neither as a matter of ruled 799, Smelser, (5th 87 F.2d 800 United States v. just nor to award fair Co., Cir.1937); Moreno, v. Inner Shoe Tire 260 S.W. Tonn 11 Ariz. Braun v. an estate. See also 1078, (Tex.Civ.App.1924). Punitive 60, 1080-81 (1970); Thompson, App. 62-63 relief, not a cause of are a form of N.W.2d at 408. action. jurisdictions permit following the recov 6. The malice, Outrageous product of conduct—the of a ery Ae estate motives, in- or reckless indifference to Ae bad Zuck, F.2d Ellis v. deceased tortfeasor: pu- may justify an award of terests of another — law); Cir.1977) (Alabama (5th Atlas 644-45 living damages against a tortfeasor. nitive Sturm, (Fla. Didich, Properties 687-88 Co., Ruger & P.2d at 46. Punitive 1969) (dicta); Byrd So.2d 138- wrongful also recoverable in a following (reluctantly Di (Fla.App.1986) 39 dich); when Aere is clear evidence that deaA action Stephens v. 478 So.2d Didich); maliciously; wrongdoer acted death (following injured party rule. does not affect the Hofer added). Indeed, probably is the deterrent, sis exemplary, nature primary purpose of such an award. See E.g., Hofer Hanson, 101 Idaho (Tex.1984). of Gavica v. Some 472-75 S.W.2d (1980) (while punish- form of punitive dam- note that these courts also ment, primary purpose an compensation to behind ages provide additional inconvenience, losses, punitive damages is one of deter- award of for remote victims rence). Id.; attorney’s Perry v. fees. *3 (W.Va.1982). They as- legislature If intended not to allow a be de- potential tortfeasors will sume that punitive damages victim’s claim for to sur- knowledge their estates that terred tortfeasor, vive the death of the when it may be liable for 09.55.570, such intent is not enacted Accordingly, I apparent to me. would re- reasoned decisions follow the better We party may not verse. I would hold that and hold that an damages from the estate are recoverable the estate of the tortfeasor, and until the under AS 09.55.- deceased unless a deceased tortfeasor date, legislature says otherwise. To it has The central 570. wrongdoer and to not done so. ages punish is to him from future misconduct. deter goal deterrence de-
concomitant upon punishment
pends significantly punitive damages. of an award of
function cannot the deceased tortfeasor be
Since general deterrent effect be-
punished, the thus, in our speculative
comes at best view, furnishing justifiable falls short of DEGNAN, Appellant, Charles O. ground for an award tortfeasor’s estate.8
AFFIRMED. BERING STRAIT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee. BURKE, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. Supreme Court of Alaska. I think it is for us to assume that punish only serve wrongdoer. For more than a deter the decade, recognized puni- court has assessed, partly, as an are warning
“example and to others.” Alaska Lee,
Placer Co.
1976). Thus, have said that “designed not also to deter him and but him, wrongdoing
others like Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. (Alaska 1979)(empha-
Day, (Tex.1984); argument Perry reject Doe’s ethical-cultural 679 S.W.2d We (W.Va.1982). S.E.2d should be the "sins" of the deceased tortfeasor family. upon In our visited his children and Stephens See 478 So.2d benefit to be derived view there is no social Byrd (Fla.App.1985); see punishment permit the from a rule which would (unrealistic to think that deceased tort- of the estate and the heirs of the punitive damage possible award will deter feasor. prospect prosecu- of criminal others when the not). does tion