Doe v. College of Eastern IdahoDoe v. College of Eastern Idaho
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 33. Defendants College of Eastern Idaho, College of Eastern Idaho Board of Trustees, Kathleen Nelson, Clint Reading, Lori Barber, Vicki Nielson, Hailey Holland, Michael Walker, Chris Smout, and Rick Aman allege there are no material facts in dispute, and, as a result, the Court should grant judgment on all of Plaintiff Doe‘s claims. Doe opposes the Motion. Dkt. 39. Defendants filed a Reply Brief. Dkt. 41.
The Court held oral argument on May 26, 2026, and took the matters under advisement. Dkt. 46. Upon review, and for the reasons outlined below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff John Doe was formerly a student enrolled in Defendant College of Eastern Idaho‘s (“CEI‘s“) Nursing Program.
Doe suffers from depression, PTSD, and anxiety as a result of witnessing trauma while serving a mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Mexico, and from a fire that killed fellow firefighters when he worked as a firefighter in Arizona.
After starting his program at CEI in September 2020, Doe visited the Disability Resource Center to learn about his options for assistance but ultimately did not complete any рaperwork or request any specific accommodation.1
In October of 2020, Doe was unable to take a test for one of his classes because the computer system failed. He did not contact the instructor in time to retake the test and received a zero. That decision was upheld by his teacher‘s supervisor, Jodene Trimble, and the Director of the Nursing program, Kathleen Nelson.
On December 9, 2020, Doe had a counseling session with Hailey Holland who was serving as director of the Counseling Center at CEI. Holland was a licensed master‘s social worker at that time of her meeting with Doe.
Doe and Holland discussed Doe‘s frustrations with the Nursing Program in general and specifically his concerns about Trimble and receiving a zero on the test. At one point, Doe told Holland he had thought about shooting and killing Trimble. Doe stated he very strongly wanted to kill Trimble and thought about it often and in a detailed manner,
Concerned, Holland informed her then-supervisor, Dawn Cureton, about Doe‘s threat аgainst Trimble. Cureton informed Holland that she had an obligation under Idaho‘s Tarasoff law to report the threat to the police, campus security, and CEI administration.
Accordingly, Holland called the police and reported Doe‘s threat. Holland also informed Trimble, Defendant Lori Barber (current president of CEI; vice president at the time of Holland‘s report), Defendant Michael Walker (formerly the Dean of Student Affairs at CEI), and campus security.
Holland also informed Doe she had reported his threat to the police and various individuals at CEI, including Trimble. Doe was angry with Holland, alleged she had violated his trust, and vowed not to speak with her again even if he was in distress.
Doe was subsequently removed from the Nursing Program on December 14, 2020, for “unprofessional conduct and violation of the code of conduct.” Dkt. 33-7, at 6. Doe appealed the determination of removal. Following a hearing—which Doe received notice of and where he was represented by counsel and allowed to present evidence—his appeal was granted. Ultimatеly, the Appeals Committee found that “the imminent nature of the alleged threat was inconclusive.” Dkt. 33-8, at 90.
Doe was readmitted to the Nursing Program subject to certain restrictions and stipulations. For example, one requirement of his returning to the program was that his conduct “maintain the standards set forth in the College of Eastern Idaho Student Handbook and in the Nursing Student Policy and Procedure Handbook” (the “Handbooks“). Id. Doe was also reminded that a “material violation of any one of these
As part of the Nursing Program, Doe was required to complete part of his training through clinical rotations at hospitals in the area. Doe was assigned to do one of his rotations at Bingham Memorial Hospital (“Bingham Memorial“) in Blackfoot, Idaho.
On the day set for his orientation, Doe failed to appear. Between work and school, he was simply “overload[ed],” slept in, and missed his training. Dkt. 33-3, at 40.2
On February 19, 2021, Defendant Clint Reading (former Dean of Healthcare and Human Services at CEI) sent Doe a letter dismissing him from the Nursing Program beсause he violated the provisions of the Nursing Student Policy and Procedure Handbook by missing orientation at Bingham Memorial. Reading reminded Doe of the stipulations he‘d agreed to after his recent reinstatement and, consistent with those warnings, stated he was being terminated for failure to comply.
Doe appealed Reading‘s dismissal. An appellate hearing was conducted—where, again, Doe had notice, counsel was present, and he was given an opportunity to be heard—and Doe was, once again, readmitted into the Nursing Program.
Doe was later assigned to complete a clinical rotation at Mountain View Hospital (“Mountain View“) in Idaho Falls, Idaho. On April 5, 2022, CEI received notice from staff at Mountain View that Doe had been entering patient rooms without authorization and engaging in the practice of nursing without his supervisor—all violations of CEI‘s Nursing Student Policy and Procedure Handbook. Doe also allegedly made unprofessional
Defendant Walker sent Doe a letter outlining the alleged violations from his clinical rotation. After a noticed hearing—in which Doe had counsel present and was permitted to present argument and evidence—Walker issued a written order detailing his finding that Doe would be removed from the Nursing Program effective immediately and indefinitely. Doe would not be allowed to re-apply to the program.
Doe appealed Walker‘s decision.
The appeals board upheld Walker‘s decision but reduced the period of dismissal to six months, allowing Doe to reapply and finish his final semester at a later point in time. Dkt. 33-10, at 14.
Doe appealed that decision to Rick Amam (former president of CEI). The professor who had initiated the proceedings against Doe also appealed based on the appeal board‘s decision to allow re-admission after six months.
President Amam reviewed the competing appeals, as well as information from Doe‘s legal counsel, and issued a final decision finding Doe had engaged in unprofessional and unsafe conduct and would be dismissed frоm the Nursing Program without the option to re-apply. Dkt. 33-10, at 6–12.
Doe filed the instant suit on November 22, 2022. Dkt. 1. In his original Complaint, Doe alleged eleven causes of action against the Defendants. Doe subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on March 16, 2023, alleging six additional causes of action. Dkt. 6.
Defendants then moved to dismiss the entire case based on Doe‘s piecemeal service and to dismiss certain claims under the statute of limitations. Dkt. 9, 17. The Court denied
Accordingly, there were sixteen viable causes of action coming into summary judgment: Count I – ADA Discrimination under Section 504; Count II – ADA Retaliation under Section 504; Counts III, VI, VII, and VIII – Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process; Count IV – Freedom of Movement under
In briefing prior to oral argument, Doe waived Cоunt IV. Dkt. 39, at 3 n.1. Thus, Defendants move for summary judgment on all fifteen remaining claims.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the respondent need only present evidence upon which “a reasonable juror drawing all inferences in favor of the respondent
IV. ANALYSIS
For organizational purposes, the Parties grouped some claims together. The Court will follow suit. The Court begins with the federal disability claims.
A. Discrimination and Retaliation under the ADA
Defendants first argue there is no evidence that any of them discriminated against Doe or in any way violated Doe‘s rights under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act states, in relevant part, that:
No qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
To establish a prima facie case under the ADA with regard to a public school, a plaintiff must show:
(1) []he is disabled under the Act; (2) []he is ‘otherwise qualified’ to remain a student at the [school], i.e., []he can meet the essential eligibility
requirements of the school, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) []he was dismissed solely because of [his] disability; and (4) the [school] receives federal financial assistance (fоr the Rehabilitation Act claim), or is a public entity (for the ADA claim).
Zukle, 166 F.3d at 1045. Defendants do not dispute CEI receives federal financial assistance and is a public entity. They do, however, dispute the first three elements. The Court addresses each in turn.
1. Disability
Defendants claim there is no evidence establishing any of them were even aware Doe was disabled, let alone that they discriminated against him on that basis. Dkt. 33-1, at 3. Doe takes great umbrage with this, asserting Defendants knew he had visited the Disability Resource Center and that it was Defendants who placed requirements on him regarding his mental health as part of his readmission so they clearly knew he suffered from certain disabilities. Doe specifically highlights the requirement that he “develop an ADA plan should you meet the requirements” as evidence of Defendants’ knowledge of his disabilities. Dkt. 33-8, at 90.3
The Court understands Defendants’ argument that Doe never officially filled out paperwork at the Disability Resource Center. It also understands their argument that he never formally developed an ADA plan. But Defendants do not dispute they knew Doe suffered from PTSD, dеpression, and anxiety.
The Court finds it unnecessary to further dissect whether and to what degree
2. Otherwise Qualified
Defendants next argue Doe cannot show he was otherwise qualified to remain at CEI or that he could meet the essential eligibility requirements of the program. This is so, they argue, because Doe was repeatedly dismissed for violations of the Handbooks, not because he was disabled.
The competing interpretations for why Doe was dismissed from the Nursing Program (and ultimately CEI) will be discussed further below, but for purposes of this element, the Court agrees with Defendants that Doe‘s argument is difficult to swallow. Doe postures that, while he was dismissed for various reasons, he was always allowed back in the program (except for the last time) which undercuts Defendants’ argument he was not qualified. Doe avers all indications are that he was qualified for the program and could do the work when given the chance. The Court understands Dоe‘s point, but this must be tied back to the ADA.
First, assuming Doe was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, he never requested any accommodation. Thus, he was required to meet the academic standards as outlined by CEI. Period. But he failed—on multiple occasions and by his own admissions—to comply with provisions in the applicable Handbooks and was, therefore, dismissed. Although he was readmitted each time (except the last time), Doe was nevertheless found to have violated CEI‘s terms. Thus, it is not clear Doe was otherwise
This aside, all anyone can do is speculate. Defendants have not shown Doe would not have received his degree but for his final dismissal. While Defendants cite his repeated failures, they do not discount the fact that Doe was re-admitted each time. Thus, like its finding above, the Court concludes it can afford Doe the benefit of the doubt on this element and holds he was otherwise qualified for the program.
3. Reason for Dismissal
This third element is the lynchpin of Doe‘s ADA-related claims. Setting aside the fact that Doe never invoked any disability status and never requested any accommodation, he was dismissed multiple times from the Nursing Program for reasons that had nothing to do with his purported disabilities. This dooms his federal disability claims.
Doe was initially removed from the Nursing Program because he threatened to shoot one of CEI‘s nursing faculty. This was a violation of the code of conduct.
Does was given a second chance and was put back into the program, but then missed his clinical rotation at Bingham Memorial Hospital because he slept in. This constituted a violation of the policies contained in the Nursing Student Policy and Procedure Handbook, which Doe signed and agreed to abide by, and his readmission restrictions.
After being readmitted into the Nursing Program a second time, Doe was finally dismissed for not successfully completing his clinical rotation at Mountain View because his conduct was deemed unprofessional and unsafe—a violation of the Nursing Student
Each of these dismissals shows Doe was removed because of his own violations of the code of conduct and the policies of the Nursing Program; not because of his disabilities or because of any action by Defendants related to his disabilities.
Doe counters his dismissal need not be based “solely” on his disability to qualify for relief but that he can establish this element by showing his exclusion was “by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). He claims the evidence is sufficient at this stage to show his disability played at least some role in his dismissal and that a jury will have to decide what Defendants’ motivations really were when they dismissed him from the program each time.
This argument about causation is also what Doe relies upon to suggest his retaliation claim survives summary judgment as well. The Court steps back momentarily to bring in more context for the retaliation claim and then will discuss these in tandem.
Although discrimination and retaliation claims are closely related, when analyzing a retaliation claim under the ADA, the Court applies the burden-shifting framework from Title VII, as outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S 792 (9173). To make a prima facie retaliаtion claim, a plaintiff must show: “(a) that he or she was engaged in protected activity, (b) that he or she suffered an adverse action, and (c) that there was a causal link between the two.” T.B. ex rel. Brenneise v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 806 F.3d 451, 472-3 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). The standard for the “causal link” is “but-for” causation, which is a more “stringent test.” Id.
As above, the Court can give Doe the benefit of the doubt on the first two elements
Doe claims the discrimination and retaliation all started with counselor Holland and her “inflammatory breach” of his privacy. As discussed in greater detail below, the Court does not accept this argument. But even assuming arguendo Doe had established a prima facie case of disability discrimination or retaliation (based on Holland‘s conduct or otherwise), that does not automatically mean his ADA claims must go to a jury.
The burden then shifts to Defendants to demonstrate a “non-retaliatory explanation” for their actions. Brown v. Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendants have provided an explanation for each instance Doe was dismissed from the Nursing Program—failure to comply with the Handbooks.
The burden then shifts back to Doe to demonstrate Defendants’ proffered reasons are pretextual. Doe has not provided any explanation or evidence whatsoever illustrating Defendants’ “non-retaliatory explanations” are a pretext; only his supposition that Holland “tainted” everyone against him when she disclosed his threat against Trimble. But this inference is insufficient to survive summary judgment. Doe must put forth more than mere conclusions that discrimination or retaliation existed to defeat Defendants’ evidence that they dismissed him from the program for non-disability related reasons.
In short, Doe cannot establish Defendants discriminated against him or retaliated against him based upon his disability—under any causation framework—and, therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Doe‘s ADA discrimination and ADA retaliation claims.
The Court turns next to Doe‘s Due Process claims. It will first review the procedures
B. Procedural Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deрrive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
Defendants claim they provided Doe with sufficient due process each time they took disciplinary action because of his behavior. Plaintiff disagrees. The Court finds Defendants actions and procedures were objectively reasonable.
The United States Supreme Court has held that “[t]he essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). Loudermill did not establish a formal, one-size-fits-all set of requirements for due process. Instead, it established that “all the process that is due is provided by a pretermination
Each time Doe was alleged to have done something wrong, he was provided with a letter or notice of the allegations against him. Each time Defendants held a hearing where Doe heard the evidence against him, was allowed to present evidence, and had counsel present.5 And each time, Doe was told how he could appeal any adverse decision against him. Critically, Doe appealed each of the three decisions terminating him from the program and was successful on two of his appeals. It can, therefore, hardly be said he was not afforded due process.6 Doe clearly did not agree with many of the proceedings and the outcomes, but that does not mean he was not afforded constitutionally adequate due process. The Court finds Defendants’ actions consistent with Loudermill.
Doe also specifically argues he was not provided with impartial and unbiased
To prevail on such an argument, Doe must overcome a “presumption of honesty and integrity” in the decisionmakers, and he has failed to do so here. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). Doe has not cited any caselaw holding a decisionmaker must have no prior knowledge of the person subject to disciplinary proceedings or the events in question. Likewise, Doe has not shown the decisionmakers in his hearings could not have fairly evaluated the allegations against him. That Defendants determined dismissal was appropriate each time does not in and of itself constitute evidence of bias.
Importantly, the record shows CEI attempted to give Doe unbiased decisionmakers at every step. CEI moved different faculty into positions of supervision over Doe, changed his clinical rotation placements so that he could have a clean slate, and tried tо give him a fair opportunity to succeed. The same goes for the disciplinary proceedings. While there were some repeat players involved, many people were new each time. Even Doe acknowledges that the reason Aman heard his final appeal—and not Barber who normally would have—was because CEI determined Barber had been involved in the prior dismissal related to Doe‘s threat against Trimble.
Ultimately, the Court finds Defendants provided Doe with constitutional due process and that he was not subjected to any biased decisionmakers. Summary judgment is, therefore, appropriate on Doe‘s claims regarding procedural due process and biased decisionmakers.
In addition to his claim that Defendants’ processes were unconstitutional, Doe claims he had a constitutional right to work in his chosen profession of nursing and that Defendants’ actions resulted in him losing that right.
Although the “contours” of a “generalized due process right to choose one‘s field of private employment” have “not been cleаrly set forth,” the Ninth Circuit has held that “a plaintiff can make out a substantive due process claim if []he is unable to pursue an occupation and this inability is caused by government actions that were arbitrary and lacking a rational basis.” Dudley, 152 F.4th at 1000. This claim, however, is only available in “extreme cases, such as a government blacklist, which when circulated or otherwise publicized to prospective employers effectively excludes the blacklisted individual from his occupation, much as if the government had yanked the license of an individual in an occupation that requires licensure.” Id. (citation modified).
Doe claims Defendants actions were arbitrary and lacking a rational basis and that they have effectively precluded him from the nursing profession. The Court disagrees on the first point because, as explained above, Defendants’ actions were rational, organized, and related to Doe‘s failure to comply with the Handbooks. The Court disagrees on the second point as well, but it is a closer call.
It is true that Doe is not currently a nurse. And, ostensibly, that is because of Defendants’ actions in terminating him from school without a degree and without the option of returning later to complete his degree. However, that is not to say Doe couldn‘t ever become a nurse. He could. Just not at CEI.
The Court agrees changing to another school could be daunting or difficult. But Defendants have no authority over whether other schools will accept CEI‘s credits nor how they will run their programs. Regardless, Doe has not been “blacklisted” from his chosen field of nursing; he simply cannot pursue his chosen field at this college. Such is insufficient to mount a substantive due process claim and summary judgment is appropriate here as well.
D. First Amendment
Doe claims Defendants violated his First Amendmеnt right to free speech when they disclosed what he told Holland to others and took other “chilling” actions against him for that speech. He asserts he was simply exercising his free speech rights by criticizing CEI‘s Nursing Program and, furthermore, that he did so in a confidential counseling session.
In order to prove a First Amendment retaliation claim under
Doe tries to evade this argument by asserting he did not threaten Trimble directly. But that is immaterial. Doe threatenеd to kill one of his teachers. While it may have been exaggerated or emotionally charged, it was not without detail. Holland‘s notes indicate Doe stated he had thought about killing Trimble “often” and in “detail.” Dkt. 33-3, 25, 31. And again, that Doe did not have an exact plan to carry out his threat is irrelevant. Thunder Studios, Inc., 13 F.4th at 746. Doe‘s comments constituted a true threat and were not protected by the First Amendment.
Likewise, it cannot be said that Defendants’ actions would “prevent or chill” another student from engaging in free speech when the actions Defendants took here were in response to a student discussing his thoughts and desire to murder a teacher. The remaining elements fall in tandem and summary judgment is appropriate as to this claim.
E. Declaratory Judgment
Defendants argue summary judgment must be granted in their favor on Doe‘s claim for declaratory judgment because a declaratory judgment is “a remedy, not an independent cause of action.” Dkt. 33-1, at 24 (citing Doe v. Univ. of Idaho, 2024 WL 4308380 at *13 (D. Idaho Sep. 26, 2024)). Doe contends he cannot force CEI‘s hand to issue his degree
F. Qualified Immunity
Finally, regardless of the Court‘s substantive findings on any of Doe‘s federal causes of action, Defendants contend they are also independently entitled to qualified immunity for their actions in this case. Under the circumstances, the Court agrees.
“A state official is entitled to qualified immunity unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing ‘(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.‘” Pavel v. Univ. of Or., 774 F. App‘x 1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 2019) (cert. denied) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the law was clearly established. Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2002). Clearly established law “should not be defined at a high level of generality” but “must be particularized to the facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (citation modified).
Although “a case directly on point” is not required, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (citation modified). “Put simрly, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (citation modified). This gives government officials “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments
Here, the individual Defendants’ conduct did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. Doe did not have a constitutional right to threaten Trimble, to miss orientation, or to violate the standards of his clinical rotation. Doe was provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard each of the times that he was dismissed, satisfying the requirements of due process. Doe cannot point to any instance in which any of the Defendants violated any of his constitutional rights, and because there were no violations of constitutional rights, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Doe‘s federal claims against them.
Furthermore, at the time Doe was dismissed from the Nursing Program, there was no “clearly established right” indicating he had a property interest in his education or as applied to certain aspects of the student conduct hearings. See supra note 5. The case directly on point is Dudley, which has alreаdy been referenced and which the undersigned is intimately familiar with having presided over the case.
In Dudley, the Court determined it could not find any Idaho law granting a student a property interest in his or her education and held no such property interest existed. 732 F. Supp. 3d at 1283. The Court reached that conclusion based upon the caselaw in the District of Idaho at the time of the incident. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that a property interest does exist in a collegiate degree under Idaho law. Dudley, 152 F.4th at 991. The Ninth Circuit issued its decision on August 27, 2025.
The existing caselaw from this Court both at the time Doe was dismissed from the Nursing Program between December 2020 and April 2022 and at the time that he filed his
Doe‘s last attempt on this wise is to highlight the idea that prоcedural due process protections have been established “for years” and, therefore, Defendants cannot meaningfully invoke qualified immunity. Dkt. 39, at 27. While it is true that due process protections have been established for years, that does not mean they were established in this context. In fact, as just explained, the opposite is true. It was not clearly established that Doe had a property interest in his degree at the time of the events in question or what the full parameters of a student conduct hearing had to include.
In short, the legal landscape was not so clear “that every reasonable official would have understood that what he [wa]s doing violate[d] [Doe‘s rights]” and, therefore, qualified immunity applies to Defendants on each of Doe‘s federal
The Court moves next to Doe‘s state law claims.
G. State Claims
1. Estoppel and Reliance
Count Ten of Doe‘s Amended Complaint is for “Estoppel and Reliance.” Dkt. 6, at
As best the Court can gather, Doe claims CEI owed him a duty regarding his degree, he relied on that, and now CEI is “estoрped” from taking that away from him.
At most, Doe and CEI had a contract. See Yu v. Idaho State Univ., 444 P.3d 885, 890 (Idaho 2019) (“It is well-settled that the principal relationship between a college and its students is contractual.“) (citation modified). But Doe broke that contract. Repeatedly. He failed to comply with the applicable Handbooks and codes of conduct despite multiple opportunities and chances to do so. CEI, therefore, owed him nothing. This claim is meritless and summary judgment is appropriate.
2. Fiduciary Duty
In a certain sense, this claim is the crux of Doe‘s entire case. Doe alleges Holland owed him a fiduciary duty (and confidential duty) as his counselor and that she breached that duty when she reported his threat to kill Trimble. Doe asserts Holland‘s actions then created a domino effect which, in essence, tainted everything moving forward. Each of Doe‘s claims about Defendants and their actions are premised on Holland‘s initial violation of his rights.
A federal court applies the law of the forum state when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims such as breach of fiduciary duty. Bird v. Lewis & Clark Coll., 303 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002). Under Idaho law, “[t]о establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiff must establish that defendants owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty and that the fiduciary duty was breached.” High Valley Concrete, LLC v. Sargent, 234 P.3d 747, 752 (Idaho 2010).
Doe alleges Holland breached her duty in multiple ways. He claims she failed to inform him that she was “untrained, inexperienced, and practicing outside the scope of her credentials as a licensed master social worker.” Dkt. 39, at 4. He also claims she did not obtain his consent or a signed confidentiality notice.
Doe‘s claims here are extremely fact-specific. He spends a significant amount of his brief discussing Holland‘s credentials, whether she was qualified to counsel him, whether his threat against Trimble was legitimate, and whether Holland should have told anyone of his threat. The Court highlights only those factual areas necessary to accomplish its task of determining whether there is a fiduciary relationship in this case sufficient to support this claim.
While Doe recognizes a fiduciary relationship usually exists in the context of persons who are legally obligated to act in each other‘s interest, he emphasizes such a relationship can exist even among family and friends and is supported where this is a “special confidence” between the parties. Dkt. 39, at 3 (citing Skinner v. US Bank Home Mortg., 365 P.3d 398, 403 (Idaho 2016).
But Doe cites no case for the proposition that a counselor has a fiduciary duty to a client. At oral argument, his counsel admitted this argument is an assumption based on non-binding caselaw from other districts. To be sure, a counselor and patient may have
But substantively, this claim also has problems. Because some of these problems permeate Doe‘s other claims, the Court discusses them now.
Doe continually asserts Holland was “practicing outside the scope of her credentials” (Dkt. 39, at 4) and did not obtain his informed consent regarding the treatment he received. These assertions are contradicted by the record.
First, Holland was the Director of the Counseling Center at CEI. She was a licensed master social worker (“LMSW“) and was qualified to provide mental health counseling services. Because she was still obtaining her clinical hours, however, she was acting under Dawn Cureton‘s license (a licensed clinical social worker) to obtain that certification. However, contrary to Doe‘s insistence now in this litigation, Holland was not required to inform Doe she was an LMSW—as opposed to a clinical psychologist—because she was qualified to provide mental health counseling and her status was not a “lesser licensure.” Dkt. 33-3, at 69.8 Holland was fully qualified to be Doe‘s counselor and was not practicing outside the scope of her credentials.
Finally, Doe asserts Holland failed to review Cureton‘s notes from prior sessions she held with him and avers that, had Holland engaged in a more thorough review of his prior counseling sessions, she would have understood his situation better and been able to ascertain whether his “dark thoughts” and threats toward Trimble were really worth reporting. This idea dovetails into the next section regarding confidentiality, but as for this claim, the Court finds the idea that Holland should have more thoroughly reviewed Cureton‘s notes does not support the idea that Holland owed Doe a fiduciary duty.
In conclusion, there is no caselaw indicating a fiduciary duty claim can even exist in this context. Second, the evidence of Holland and Doe‘s relationship—even if considered “special“—would not support such a claim anyway because Holland did not do anything contrary to her credentials or job duties. Summary judgment is appropriate.
3. Confidentiality
Doe next claims Holland breached her duty of confidentiality, had no duty to warn anyone of his threat to kill Trimble, exceeded any allowable disclosure to the extent she did disclose his threat, and is not immune from liability because she misrepresented her
Defendants counter any duty of confidentiality in this situation was trumped by Holland‘s statutory duty to report his threat to kill Trimble.
Idaho has what is commonly referred to as a “Tarasoff law,” codified at
A mental health professional has a duty to warn a victim if a patient has communicated to the mental health professional an explicit threat of imminent serious physical harm or death to a clearly identified or identifiable victim or victims, and the patient has the apparent intent and ability to carry out such a threat.
No professionаl disciplinary procedure, no monetary liability and no cause of action may arise against any mental health professional, who has a reasonable basis for believing that he has a duty to warn pursuant to section 6-1902, Idaho Code, for disclosing confidential or privileged information in an effort to discharge such duty.
Holland was a licensed social worker which is a “mental health professional” for purposes of the statute.
Doe raises various issues with Defendants’ arguments in an attempt to create a dispute of material fact that could defeat summary judgment. For example, Doe “disputes” Holland‘s notes about exactly what he said regarding Trimble. Citing his own deрosition where he stated he did not remember saying he wanted to kill Trimble or that maybe he said he wanted to kill himself, but not Trimble, Doe claims Holland‘s notes are inaccurate, and she should not have felt the need to warn anyone. Dkt. 33-3, at 25, 31.10 But Doe also admitted to discussing his thoughts of suicide with Holland, how he would likely use a gun to commit suicide because he was a gun owner, and that he very strongly disliked Trimble. Id. at 23. And in briefing before the Court, Doe has stated he shared thoughts about harming Trimble, but that this admission is insufficient to find he actually said anything along those
Based on her training and experience, Holland was concerned enough to take the issue to her supervisor, Cureton, who advised her to report the threat to Trimble and law enforcement.12 This was consistent with Idaho law. The Court finds summary judgment appropriate on Doe‘s confidеntiality claim and further, that Holland is immune from suit pursuant to
4. Defamation
Defendants next move for summary judgment on Doe‘s defamation claim.
“A defamatory statement is one that tends to harm a person‘s reputation, usually by subjecting the person to public contempt, disgrace, or ridicule, or by adversely affecting
Defendants argue the Idaho Tort Claims Act bars any claim against them because they acted within the scope of their employment and did not act with malice or criminal intent.
Doe summarily counters “Defendants act[ed] with malice.” Dkt. 39, at 30. He contends Holland shared the information about his threat against Trimble too widely which then circulated among staff and, from that point forward, “the entire faculty was irate that Doe was [in the Nursing Program]” and “Defendants were itching to find a reason to get rid of him.” Dkt. 39, at 15. Doe further claims othеr staff members were unhappy when he was re-admitted to the program and still other staff wouldn‘t make calls on his behalf when he missed orientation. But none of that, even if assumed true, is indicative of malice.
What minimal allegations Doe has alleged here cannot rebut the presumption to which Defendants are entitled. There are numerous non-maliciоus reasons staff would be concerned about Doe‘s presence on campus (e.g., safety) and why they would not make phone calls on his behalf (such is not required). Does has not presented any factual disputes that need to go to a jury on this claim. Summary Judgment is appropriate.
5. Emotional Distress
Finally, Defendants ask for summary judgment on Doe‘s emotional distress claims.
Negligent infliction of emotional distress includes: “(1) a legal duty recognized by law; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant‘s conduct and the Doe‘s injury; and (4) actual loss or damage.” Williamson v. Ada Cnty., 509 P.3d 1133, 1145 (Idaho 2022) (citation modified). A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress includes the following elements: (1) intentional or reckless conduct by the defendant; (2) that was extreme and outrageous; (3) that was causally connected to the Doe‘s emotional distress; and (4) which was severe. See Berian, 483 P.3d at 950.
Again, in response to Defendants’ arguments, Doe summarily states a jury should analyze his emotional distress claims because Defendants’ actions caused him stress and
But absent any record evidence to supрort either claim, the Court finds summary judgment is warranted.
Defendants did not breach any duties owed to Doe. Holland did not breach confidentiality or a fiduciary duty to Doe, and she was required to disclose his threat against Trimble and law enforcement. Doe also cannot show any of the other Defendants breached a duty of confidentiality to him. Without any evidence Defendants breached any legal duty, Doe cannot meet the elements of his claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress notwithstanding any harm he claims to have suffered.
In like manner, it was not “extreme and outrageous” for Defendants to remove Doe from the Nursing Program after he threatened to kill an instructor, overslept and missed his (specially arranged) orientation, and was removed from his clinical rotation for unprofessional and unsafe conduct. Defendants gave Doe multiple chances to prove himself, but Doe continued to engage in behavior warranting dismissal. Because there were valid reasons for Defendants to dismiss Doe from the Nursing Program, Doe cannot meet the elements of his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress either.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Doe‘s claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
V. CONCLUSION
This is a tough situation. Doe lost the chance to graduate from CEI with a nursing degree. But that was the result of his own actions, not the result of any animus from
Defendants provided sufficient procedural due process throughout every step of the various disciplinary proceedings. Doe availed himself of that process and succeeded multiple times. Thus, it cannot be said there was no process. And to the extent Dudley changed anything, that decision came out after the events in question. Similarly, there was no substantive due process violation. Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity. Summary judgment is appropriate on all of Doe‘s federal claims.
As for Doe‘s state claims, many of them are, frankly, a stretch. The Court appreciates that Doe experienced stress because of what happened here. But again, such is a result of his own actions. Holland was doing her job—a job she was qualified to do—and there is no indication she breached any duty or owed Doe any more than what she already provided. What disagreements Doe has about the underlying statements he made and how they should have been interpreted are immaterial. Holland had a reasonable belief she needed to report the threat and that was sufficient. For these reasons, summary judgment is also appropriate on all Doe‘s state claims.
In sum, the Court finds there are no material facts in dispute precluding the Court from ruling on the papers and forgoing trial. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants on all Doe‘s claims.
VI. ORDER
- Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 33) is GRANTED as outlined above.
The Court will enter a separate judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 .
DATED: September 1, 2026
David C. Nye
U.S. District Court Judge
Notes
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which:
…
3. Arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.