Doe v. BonnellDoe v. Bonnell
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Edwin G. Torres, Jacqueline Becerra
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF‘S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Jane Doe‘s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. [D.E. 21]. Defendant timely responded [D.E. 42], to which Plaintiff timely replied [D.E. 49]. An evidentiary hearing was held on the motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff‘s motion is ripe for disposition.1 After careful review of the Motion, Response, Reply, relevant authority, and for the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff‘s motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
This case stems from what Plaintiff alleges is Defendant‘s wrongful dissemination of a video of a sexual nature (the “Video”) involving both Ms. Doe and
Accordingly, Plaintiff and Defendant met online on or before “late-2019.” [D.E. 42 at 8] (citing “late-2019” and “October 23, 2019” as key points); [D.E. 120 at 3] (“[a]pproximately two years” before September 12, 2020). Their online friendship eventually yielded discussions of a more intimate and, ultimately, sexual nature. [D.E. 42 at 8]; [D.E. 120 at 3]. These discussions included each sending the other videos of them engaging in sexual acts with others. [D.E. 42 at 8-9]; [D.E. 49-1 ¶ 6]; [D.E. 120 at 3]. The Parties then met in person on September 12, 2020, and had a sexual encounter, which was consensually recorded. [D.E. 42 at 8–9]; [D.E. 120 at 3]. It is here that the Parties’ allegations as to what became of the Video steeply diverge.
In either April or October of 20222, Defendant transmitted the Video to a friend of his on Discord, “Rose.” [D.E. 42 at 9]; [D.E. 120 at 3]. Defendant alleges that “since that date, [he] has not shared, or otherwise transmitted the video to any other third party and will not do so.” [D.E. 42 at 9] (emphasis in original). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has shared the Video with at least one other individual beyond Rose, Abbymc. [D.E. 120 at 4]. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant‘s practice of hosting sexually explicit material on a Google Drive and sharing a link or links to that Google Drive constitutes “ongoing dissemination.” Id.
On January 22, 2025, Plaintiff‘s counsel sent Defendant a letter entitled “Demand for Preservation of Evidence In the Matter of [Jane Doe] v. Steven Bonnell.” [D.E. 21-3 at 1]. The letter advised3 Defendant in writing of the pendency of the present action and included the following: “You are hereby advised of your legal obligation to preserve, maintain, prevent spoliation of, and not destroy evidence which in any way relates to this matter.” Id. Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit on February 18, 2025. [D.E. 1]. And on April 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed the motion presently before us, which requests a TRO and preliminary injunction for the following:
i) enjoin Defendant Steven Bonnell II (“Bonnell”) from further sharing, distributing or publishing the intimate images/videos and/or the intimate information of Plaintiff; ii) compel[] Bonnell to remove all publications of the Videos and all messages between him and Plaintiff from all forms of public media he controls either directly or indirectly; iii) order[] Defendant to direct third parties in writing to remove all published intimate images/videos of Plaintiff and any intimate information regarding Plaintiff under their control; and iv) order[] Defendant to retrieve the messages he has deleted, to cease and desist from destroying evidence and to preserve all discoverable information relevant to this action from his phones, computers, tablets, online accounts and platforms, or any other devices, and preserve all internet routers or other hardware in their current form or image so they may be searched for information relevant to this action.
[D.E. 21 at 6].
At a subsequent hearing on April 4, 2025, Judge Becerra denied Plaintiff‘s request for a TRO and subsequently referred the remainder of Plaintiff‘s motion for preliminary injunction to the undersigned for disposition. [D.E. 31]; [D.E. 32]; [D.E. 38]. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to address the disputed issues of fact presented by the briefing on the motion.
II. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES AND LAW
“The basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.” Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974). To obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must demonstrate the following: A(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying case; (2) the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction; (3) the harm suffered by the movant in the absence of an injunction would exceed the harm suffered by the opposing party if the injunction issued, and (4) an injunction would not disserve the public interest. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1246-47 (11th Cir. 2002); Baker v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 856 F.2d 167, 169 (11th Cir. 1988).
In the Eleventh Circuit, “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the ‘burden of persuasion’ as to the four requisites.” McDonald‘s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998); Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Because a preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy,’ its grant is the exception rather than the rule, and plaintiff must clearly carry the burden of persuasion”). However, “[i]f the movant is unable to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, a court need not consider the remaining conditions prerequisite to injunctive relief.” 1-800 Contacts, 299 F.3d at 1247 (citing Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001)).
The goal of a preliminary injunction is to prevent irreparable harm and to “preserve the district court‘s power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits.” Canal Auth. of the State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974). “[T]he most compelling reason in favor of [granting a preliminary injunction] is the need to prevent the judicial process from being rendered futile by defendant‘s action or refusal to act.” Id. at 573; see also All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem‘l Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Preliminary injunctions are issued when drastic relief is necessary to preserve the status quo.”).
When an injunction does more than preserve the status quo, however, an even stronger showing is required. See, e.g., Callander” cite=“256 F.2d 410” pinpoint=“415” court=“5th Cir.” date=“1958“>Miami Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n v. Callander, 256 F.2d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1958) (“A mandatory injunction . . . especially at the preliminary stage of proceedings, should not be granted except in rare instances in which the facts and law are clearly in favor of the moving party.”); United States v. Board of Educ. of Green County, Miss., 332 F.2d 40, 46 (5th Cir. 1965) (“[M]andatory injunctions are rarely issued and interlocutory mandatory injunctions are even more rarely issued, and neither except upon the clearest equitable grounds”).
III. ANALYSIS
“First, a party requesting a preliminary injunction must generally show reasonable diligence.” Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 159 (2018). Thus, “[a] delay in seeking a preliminary injunction of even only a few months—though not necessarily fatal—militates against the finding of irreparable harm.” Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244, 1248 (11th Cir. 2016). “Indeed, the very idea of a preliminary injunction is premised on the need for speedy and urgent action to protect a plaintiff‘s rights before a case can be resolved on its merits.” Id. (emphasis in original).
To that end, while the movant must meet all four elements required to merit the issuance of a preliminary injunction, “[a] showing of irreparable injury is ‘the sine qua non of injunctive relief.’” Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176 (citing Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass‘n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990)). “[E]ven if Plaintiff[] establish[es] a likelihood of success on the merits, the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper.” Id. (citing of Savannah, N.A.” cite=“909 F.2d 480” pinpoint=“486” court=“11th Cir.” date=“1990“>Snook v. Trust Co. of Georgia Bank of Savannah, N.A., 909 F.2d 480, 486 (11th Cir. 1990)); see Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass‘n of Gen. Contractors of Am., 896 F.2d at 1285 (“The plaintiff‘s ‘success in establishing a likelihood it will prevail on the merits does not obviate the necessity to show irreparable harm.’”) (citing United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 540 (11th Cir. 1983)). Such alleged irreparable injury “must be neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.” Id. (citing Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass‘n of Gen. Contractors of Am., 896 F.2d at 1285). Accordingly, we will begin by analyzing Plaintiff‘s showing of irreparable harm.
As described above, Plaintiff commenced this action on February 18, 2025, and subsequently filed her motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction on April 2, 2025 [D.E. 21]. This matter, however, ultimately stems from Defendant‘s alleged sharing of the Video several years prior to the commencement of this action—whether only with Rose or to additional persons. See, e.g., [D.E. 1 at 3]; [D.E. 120 at 3-4]. Defendant theorizes that it was a hack of Rose‘s Discord that led to the leak of the Video, and, thus, it subsequently being uploaded to Kiwi Farms on November 29, 2024. [D.E. 42 at 8–9]; [D.E. 120 at 4].
So, from the allegations in Plaintiff‘s timeline, even if we look at only the closest incident to the present—the Video being uploaded to Kiwi Farms on November 29, 2024—Plaintiff waited roughly five months to file her motion for preliminary injunction and provided no convincing justification4 for the delay. That fact alone
Importantly, Plaintiff‘s request for a TRO was denied for similar reasons at the April 4, 2025, hearing. [D.E. 38 at 5:19–23]. In fact, Plaintiff‘s counsel even agreed that “most of the damage has already been done,” id. at 6:3, which accords with the fact that three of the four elements of Plaintiff‘s requested preliminary injunction are targeted at Defendant‘s alleged publication and/or distribution of “intimate
As to the fourth item of Plaintiff‘s requested preliminary injunction, addressing alleged spoliation of relevant evidence, Plaintiff‘s counsel then proceeded to explain at the April 4, 2025, hearing that, “the [ongoing] issue is that we keep receiving evidence of destruction of evidence. We are trying to compile enough evidence to file a motion for spoliation[.]” Id. at 6:4–6. It is now October of 2025 and there is no such motion on the docket—despite that being the then-existing “ongoing harm” Plaintiff was ostensibly seeking to stop.5 But even putting aside for a moment Plaintiff‘s counsel‘s statements at the TRO hearing, the allegations in Plaintiff‘s motion as to “an imminent risk of further nonconsensual disclosures of intimate images of herself by Bonnell and further humiliation from the same,” also do not convince us of ongoing harm. [D.E. 21 at 19, 21].
In her motion, Plaintiff claims that it is the “imminent risk of further nonconsensual disclosures [by Defendant]” that creates ongoing harm sufficient to
We do not doubt Plaintiff‘s testimony that she is distraught because of these events [D.E. 21-1 at 4]. To the contrary; we find her testimony fully credible in this regard. But as her counsel stated at the TRO hearing, “the damage has already been done” as to the Video6 and related statements [D.E. 38 at 6:3]—and was as of the time
Additionally, “[m]ere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of [an injunction], are not enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” Sampson, 415 U.S. at 90. There is now a Confidentiality Agreement and Protective Order that governs discovery in this case, including how to handle confidential information. [D.E. 116]. Should Plaintiff discover evidence of spoliation, she is able to file a
And to the point of compensatory relief, Sampson, 415 U.S. at 90, Plaintiff herself has acknowledged on social media that a primary aim of this lawsuit is inherently financial:
I don‘t know what you‘re specifically referring to, but Steven is a multi-millionaire and I want him to lose so much money as a result of this that every time he thinks of the word “nude” he cringes at his mistake.
I truly believe if the cost isn‘t high enough he will do this again. My goal here is not public humiliation of Steven, or even all the money in the world, it‘s him receiving such a financial hit/penalty that he will permanently learn his lesson.
@pxielovee, X (Jan. 20, 2025, 9:08AM), https://x.com/pxielovee/status/1881388385312329848; [DE 42-1, Exhibit H]. Thus,
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, we do not find that Plaintiff will suffer an irreparable injury unless an injunction issues. See Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176. As “the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper,” we are empowered to deny Plaintiff‘s motion solely on this finding. Id. (citation omitted). But as to Plaintiff‘s likelihood of success on the merits, we note that there is an outstanding question of whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See [D.E. 132] (Defendant‘s
Plaintiff also adds that she has made a prima facie case as to her claim under
Nonetheless, as to the final two elements of the preliminary injunction analysis, Plaintiff has not shown that she, under the circumstances, is at risk of irreparable harm as a result of any alleged “continue[d] disseminati[on] of [her] intimate visual depictions and private information” [D.E. 21 at 22] (or, as alleged in the hearing, the spoliation of evidence [D.E. 38]), and thus any injury would not outweigh the damage of unduly imposing an injunction. See Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176. Further, as to public interest, Plaintiff argues that the Congressional intent behind
In sum, Plaintiff has not “clearly established the ‘burden of persuasion’ as to the four requisites.” McDonald‘s Corp., 147 F.3d at 1306. Her motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED. [D.E. 21]. But that denial is, of course, without prejudice to the ultimate adjudication of the case, which may or may not require permanent injunctive relief if legally sound.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff‘s motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED. [D.E. 21]. The motion is adjudicated by Order as the motion is largely denied for procedural grounds and not on the ultimate merits. But injunctive relief generally is addressed by a Magistrate Judge via Report and Recommendation because a litigant would be entitled to de novo review from the District Judge if such review is sought. The entry of this Order thus does not foreclose any party from appealing this Order, which would then be treated as a Report and Recommendation by the District Judge under Local Mag.J. R. 4. The parties retain the right to de novo review if such an appeal is filed.
It is further ORDERED that, as to any links to images or online documents (e.g., [D.E. 21 at 9–10]) and on a going forward basis, the references linked to must be included as exhibits to filings. For security reasons, the Court will not open random links to, e.g., Imgur or Google Drive. Should a Party believe any such exhibit should be sealed, they may file a motion seeking leave of court to file it under seal, as with any other filing or exhibit.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 6th day of October, 2025.
/s/ Edwin G. Torres
EDWIN G. TORRES
United States Magistrate Judge