27 Ga. 187 | Ga. | 1859
By the Court.
delivering the opinion.
The record in this case contains two assignments of error, one is on the judgment of the Court sustaining a demurrer to evidence, and the other on the refusal of the Court to give in charge to the jury a request submitted in writing by the counsel for plaintiffl The plaintiff offered in evidence proceedings had many years ago in Twiggs Superior Court, for the establishment of the copy of a lost deed to the premises in dispute, including the rule absolute or judgment of the Court establishing the copy, and also the copy deed as established. This evidence was demurred to, and the Court overruled the demurrer as to the proceedings in the Superior Court and judgment, hut sustained it as to the copy deed, because of the deficiency of proof of its execution, neither of
It is again objected, that as the original deed could not be admitted as evidence, without proof of execution, the copy deed must also be proven to be the copy of a genuine original. We think, that'the judgment of the Court established the copy offered in evidence as the copy of a genuine original conveyance. The case of Beverly vs. Burke in 9th Ga. is referred to as an authority to sustain this objection. It does not appear in that case, as it does in this, that the subscribing witnesses were dead. In the case of Keeling vs. Ball, it being a suit oh a lost bond, which had been attested by witnesses, the names of whom had been forgotten, Lord Kenyon who tried the case, held that if it appeared who the subscribing witnesses were, they must be produced; but that it was the business of Courts of justice to apply the general principles of the law to the new cases as they arise. He said that was a new case, for it did not appear that the plaintiff could by any possibility know who the subscribing witnesses were. The subscribing witnesses, if they had been known, were the best evidence, but not being known, the rule had to be relaxed, and inferior evidence admitted. Appendix to Peake’s evidence XXIV, 1st Am. from 5th London Edition. See also, 7 Waddell, 125. Here I think the
We think that for the rejection of the deed, judgment of the Court below must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.