Doe ex dem. Summerlin v. Roe
20 Ga. 689
Ga.
1856
Check Treatment

By the Court.

Benning, J.

delivering the opinion.

In this case, the judgment was a general one, that the motion for a new trial should be granted. That motion was put on several grоunds. One of these was the decision of the Court rejecting the parol evidence offered in connection with the еntry on the fi. fa. This ground, we think, was a sufficient one.

Parol evidence is, of necessity, admissible, ‍​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‍to apply a writing to its subject.

[1.] Parol evidence, therefore, was admissible in this esse to show what parcel of land it was that fitted all the parts of thе description contained in the Sheriff’s entry. And if, on the introduction of such evidence in such a case, it appears thаt there is no parcel which will fit every рart of the description, but that there is a parcel which will fit some part of the description, this parcel is to be rеgarded as the parcel intended by the description. There are many deсisions to this effect. (1 Phill. Ev. 533; and note 942 of Cow. & Hill.)

*691It was the right of the plаintiff ‍​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‍in error, therefore, to show .by parol evidence that the fractional lot on which John Smith •lived at the time of the entry, wаs the lot in suit; and that .although thp number of it was nоt 181, but was 189, yet, that there was no such lot as lot 181 that was a fractional lot, or that if thеre was such a lot that was a fractional lot, it was not a lot occupied by John Smith. And if he had shown this, he would have been entitled to insist that the lot described in the entry was the lot in suit.

In such cases, the inaccurate part of ‍​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‍the description is to •be rejected.

The Sheriff’s deed contаined a recital to the effect, that he had seized and sold the land under the rеjected fi. fa. The -defendant insisted that this recital was evidence ‍​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‍of the facts •recited, although the Ji. fa. itself was not in evidence. The •Judge thought that it was, and made it.the grоund on which •He granted the new trial.

In this we differ with him. As the fi. fa. was not in evidence, there was nothing in evidence to show that the Sheriff had authority to makе deed ‍​​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‍or recitals. And unless he had authority to make the recitals, they could nоt be of any virtue.

[8.] But still, we affirm the judgment, because the other ground to which we have аlready adverted made the judg.naent right. That was sufficient, if this was not. And a .judgment that is right must remain right, whatever be the .reason which the Court may choose to give for it.