| Ala. | Dec 16, 1909
Lead Opinion
This is a common-law action of ejectment by the appellant against the appellee.
Various questions in regard to the validity of certain tax proceedings and sales are discussed, but the appellant confesses that: “If the former statute (section 2794, Code 1896) was operative, of course, it bars all right, in this case, for the appellee went into possession under his deed of 29th September, 1881, and has
The Supreme Court of California, has held that where a statute exempting certain classes from liability to an inheritance tax mentioned “nieces or nephews when a resident of this state,” the effect of it was not to subject nieces and nephews residing in the state to the tax, hut only to confer on nonresident nieces and nephews the same privileges. The court cites a number of authorities, and well expresses the principle as follows (speaking of section 2, art. 4, of the Constitution of the United States), to wit: “In this case there is no striking down of or limitation upon the right of
' It results that section 2794 of the Code of 1896 was operative, and that judgment was properly rendered for the defendant.
The judgment of the court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Rehearing
ON REHEARING.
It is insisted that the reasoning of the opinion in this case does not relieve the statute of unconstitutionality, because it still leaves corporations, whether foreign or domestic, who are not “citizens” without the privilege accorded to citizens to plead the
In addition to what has already been said, the statute in question was in existence before the adoption of the Constitution of 1875, which is the first Constitution in which the section, now included in section 240 of' the Constitution of 1901, appears.—Const. 1875, art. 14, § 12, Rev. Code 1867, § 2899, and section 2375 of the. previous Code of 1852. Said section merely conferred upon corporations like privileges as were then enjoyed by individuals, and both from the wording of the constitutional provision and the principles announced in the opinion, if said constitutional provision affected the previous statute at all, it did not render it unconstitutional, hut merely extended its provisions to corporations.
The case of Smith v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 75 Ala. 449" court="Ala." date_filed="1883-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/smith-v-louisville--nashville-railroad-6511899?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6511899">75 Ala. 449, does not contravene this principle. In that case the statute specially placed a burden on corporations and associations which was not placed on individuals. The statute created “an entirely new cause of action,” and,, as the court said, was “highly penal in its terms.” The act which was condemned in S. & N. R. R. Co. v. Morris, 65 Ala. 193" court="Ala." date_filed="1880-11-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/south--north-alabama-railroad-v-morris-6510608?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6510608">65 Ala. 193, fixed a penalty, in the shape of an attorney’s fee, on a corporation or person owning a railroad in certain suits, which it was held could not be done under this clause of the Constitution. So a similar statute was held by the Supreme Court of the United States as “simply a statute imposing a penalty upon, railroad corporations for a failure to pay certain debts. No individuals are thus punished, and no other corpo
It will be readily seen that the principle in these cases is entirely dissimilar to that by which the Constitution throws its arms around others entitled to equal privileges, and extends the privilege accorded to others to them.