82 Ky. 441 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1884
delivered.the opinion on tiie court.
In 1858, Edward Crossiand was tlie owner oí a tract of five hundred and thirty acres of land, devised to him by his lather, and to secure the payment of a debt for-the nominal amount of about 88,400, he executed a mortgage upon it to one L. M. Lee, who instituted an
On the day the land was sold by the commissioner of court, and, as we think is -shown by the preponderance of the evidence, before the sale took place, a written contract was entered into between Crossland of the one part, and Walker, Bullock and Dodge, of the other, by which it was agreed that he (Crossland) should procure his wife’s relinquishment of dower in the land, and convey it to Walker, if he (Walker) would pay off the
We think the evidence satisfactorily shows that both Dodge and Bullock were parties to this contract, and were, under it, entitled each to an undivided third of the land, and bound, as between them and Walker, to pay one-third of the debts of Crossland, which amounted to about $6,000.
Tire written contract is not filed, and appears to have been lost or mislaid by Crossland. But he proves the contents of it, and his statement is not controverted'by Bullock, nor the personal representatives of Dodge and Walker, who are parties to the action.
This action was instituted January, 1867, by Moss and others, the clients of Bullock, and creditors mentioned in the judgment rendered in the action of Lee v. Crossland, &c., to recover personal judgment for the sum of $2,000, with interest at the rate of ten per cent., against Bullock and the personal representatives of Walker and Dodge, and to enforce their alleged lien upon the land purchased by Walker and conveyed to him by Crossland and wife.
It will be perceived that all the creditors whose debts were provided for in the contract between Crossland .and Walker, Bullock and Dodge, do not unite as plaint
But the failure of the other creditors to sue, need not prejudice the rights of Moss and others, for whom the equity of redemption was purchased by Bullock, nor prevent them from recovering, if they have any right of action founded upon the written agreement made by Walker, Bullock and Bodge with Crossland, in 1859, And whether they have such right of action is the-main question in this case.
That a party, for whose benefit a promise is made to-another person, may maintain an action upon such promise against the party who has made it, though not. made to the plaintiff, is a proposition too well settled by this court to require a citation of cases to support .it,
But it appears that, in 1864, Crossland, for the consideration of about $200, in writing signed and delivered to Walker, agreed to cancel and annul the contract: entered into between himself and Walker, Bullock and Bodge in 1859.
From Crossland’s deposition it appears that at the time the release was executed, he was a soldier in the-Confederate army, not in a position to know whether the representations made to him by Walker, and which he states induced him to execute the release, were true or not. These representations to him were that all the-debts provided for in the contract, except one due to Herriford, had been paid,by him, Walker, Bullock and Bodge.
As the representations were not true, -clearly, even Crossland would not be bound by the release, if they should be pleaded in avoidance, But the plaintiffs in
It seems to be conceded that if they had. accepted the ■contract of 1859, Crossland would not have thereafter had the power to annul it. But it is contended that they had never, in any way, accepted or assented to it, and, therefore, the release executed by Crossland, in 1864, operated to deprive them of any right under it. This position is in accordance with the doctrine announced by this court in the case of Jones v. Higgins, MS. opinion, October, 1882, and we see no reason to ■now depart, or dissent from its correctness ; but can it be assumed that the creditors of Crossland, or those who were the clients of Bullock, had not accepted the contract of 1859 %
We are of the opinion it can not, but, on the contrary, they did accept it.
It is admitted by Bullock that his object, in becoming a party to that contract was to save the amount, §2,000, bid by him for Crossland’s equity of redemption, and that amount he expected to be considered by Walker and Dodge as a payment of his one-third of the §6,000, the consideration-expressed in the deed from Crossland to Walker as the purchase price of the land. Bullock did not own the debt of §2,000, but it belonged to his clients. He was not attempting by the arrangement to ¡save a debt of his .own, but theirs. He did not sustain
The circumstances of this case make it too plain to doubt that what Bullock did was in the interest of, and for his clients, and that Crossland, Walker and Bodge were well aware of the attitude Bullock occupied, and ..of the object he had in uniting in the contract here . sought to be enforced.
The plaintiff, in this action, having thus practically . and to every legal intent accepted that contract, Cross-land had no right, in 1864, to - release the parties to it, and consequently appellees were entitled to the judgment rendered, which appears to be the sum of $2,000, and interest counted thereon from 2859.
It follows necessarily that if appellees, under that contract, have the right of recovery, they also have a lien on the land to secure the payment of their debt.
It was suggested before the judgment was rendered that there was a defect in the title to a portion of the land, arising from a mistake made in the will Of Samuel Crossland, and also in the deed of Edward Cross-land in describing it. But this action had been pending from 1867, and the plaintiffs in the action should not have been required to longer continue the case, and we are not disposed to reverse the judgment for the alleged error of the lower court in refusing to longer continue it.
Appellant, Bodge, administrator of J. R. Bodge,
The judgment is affirmed.