140 Ind. 284 | Ind. | 1895
— The appellant prosecutes this appeal to reverse a judgment, declaring him guilty of contempt of -court.
He further admits that he feels that he can not justify such a reply to the court; and also states “that' he regrets that he was betrayed into making a retort that ought not to have been made in court, but that he felt that the statement made by the judge was injurious to the interest of his client.”
The trial court, after fully considering the matters involved, found appellant guilty of a direct contempt, and assessed, as a punishment therefor, a fine of fifty dollars, and rendered judgment against him for the fine and cost.
The main, and, in fact, only question properly raised by the assignment of errors, is this: Was the alleged conduct a contempt of court? Giving the language and conduct of appellant, as the same appears in the statement, a reasonable and fair interpretation, we think that this question must be answered in the affirmative.
It is well settled by the decisions of this court that disorderly conduct, insulting demeanor towards the court, and disobedience of its orders or directions, in facie curias, constitute a direct contempt. Holman v. State, 105 Ind. 513, and authorities there cited.
As a general proposition, it is held “that any willful act tending to obstruct, interrupt or embarrass the pro
A direct contempt is an open insult in the presence of the court to the person of the presiding judge, or a1 resistance or defiance in his presence to its powers or authority, and is one that the court may and' ought to, on its own motion, notice and punish accordingly. See Ex parte Wright, 65 Ind. 504, and authorities there cited.
In the case now under consideration, the court had ruled that the interrogatory put by appellant to the juror was not pertinent, and directed, or rather requested, that the same be not again propounded. But the appellant wholly disregarded this injunction and seemingly, in utter defiance of the court’s ruling, proceeded to again put the same question to the juror, and followed this act with the contemptuous language in controversy. This certainly was an insult, in the court’s presence, to the judge thereof, and tended to embarrass the proceedings then before it, and to impede the administration of its judicial duties, and rendered appellant guilty of a direct contempt.
Were such conduct and acts upon the part of attorneys permitted or tolerated by judges, the courts over which they preside would be justly covered with opprobrium and held in contempt. It is always to be regretted that a case should arise that renders it necessary for a court to inflict punishment for contempt against a member of its bar. Attorneys at the bar are properly termed the court’s ■ constituency to aid it in the due administration of justice. Each one is required to take an oath that he will honestly and faithfully discharge his duties as such attorney, and one of the cardinal duties enjoined upon
In the determination of the question as to whether a contempt has been committed, it does not depend upon the” intention of the offending party, but upon the act he has done. A disclaimer of.intentional disrespect or design to embarrass the administration of justice, is no excuse for the person charged with the offense, when the contrary appears from a fair interpretation of the language used. People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195.
The contention of appellant that the language of the judge was provoking, and also detrimental to the interest of his client, and hence he ought to be excused for his conduct, can have no weight or consideration from a legal standpoint. The wrong of the judge, if any, can not justify the misconduct of counsel. Holman v. State, supra.
It is the imperative duty of an attorney to respectfully yield to the rulings and decisions of the court, whether right or wrong, reserving the rights of his client by proper and necessary exceptions thereto. A remedy for the correction of the court’s errors, if any, is fully provided by law.
There is no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed with cost.