35 Wash. 402 | Wash. | 1904
Respondents, being husband and wife, brought this suit as plaintiffs against appellant as defendant. They allege, that the defendant is an attorney at law and a member of the bar of Washington; that the wife plaintiff employed defendant, as such attorney, to collect for her a sum of $165, due to her upon a note and mortgage from one Meyer; that he collected thereon $175 principal and interest, and $15 as attorney’s fees, but has refused to pay the same to said plaintiff, and has converted it to his own use. It is further alleged that, while defendant was (employed by the wife plaintiff as the latter’s attorney in an
The answer first denies the material allegations of the complaint, and then affirmatively avers, that said wife employed defendant to institute for her an action for divorce from her said husband, and for the recovery of alimony, which suit was brought by him; that said wife agreed to pay defendant, as a fee for his services, one-third of the amount of money and property which should be allowed by the court as alimony, or, in the event of a settlement in any manner, such sum was to be paid as attorney’s fees; that, pending the action, the settlement of the claim for alimony was effected through defendant’s efforts, the settlement being in the sum of $2,000, to be paid by the husband to the wife; that, under the agreement as to attorney’s fees, defendant was entitled to $665 of said sum; that in part payment thereof said wife transferred to him the $165 note and mortgage mentioned in the complaint, and that in further payment she also transferred to him the other note and mortgage, named in the complaint, in the sum of $400, which note had been given by the husband to the wife as a part of the $2,000 settlement; that the said notes and mortgages thereby became the absolute property of defendant; that thereafter said wife delivered back to the husband a $1,600 note received by her in said settlement, and that she — claiming that the husband had perpetrated a fraud upon her by procuring the surrender of said not© — again employed defendant to take the necessary steps to protect her rights,, and to effect a settlement with the husband;
The reply denies that defendant was entitled to receive $665 as fees under the first settlement, but avers that he agreed to accept, and did accept, said $400 note and mortgage in full for all services rendered. It is denied that the Meyer note of $165 was transferred to the defendant as a part payment on attorney’s fees. It is further averred, in reply, that the agreement as to fees the second time was not for one-fourth of what should be thereafter recovered, in addition to wha.t had been theretofore paid, but that said $750 note should be in full for all services rendered from the beginning of the entire employment, and that defendant then agreed to surrender and return the said $400 note. Upon issues in effect as above stated, the cause was tided before the court and a jury, and a verdict was returned for the plaintiffs in the action in the sum of $375 and interest. Motion for new trial having been denied, judgment was, entered for the amount of the verdict, and the defendant has appealed.
Respondents’ counsel, however, argues that an order of court was absolutely necessary to effect an extension of time, and cites the following decisions of this court: Zindorf Construction Co. v. Western Amer. Co., 27 Wash. 31, 67 Pac. 374 ; Wollin v. Smith, 27 Wash. 349, 67 Pac. 561; Crowley v. McDonough, 30 Wash. 57, 70 Pac. 261; Lamona v. Cowley, 31 Wash. 297, 71 Pac. 1040. It is true expressions are used in those opinions to the effect that an order of court is necessary, but there was no stipulation involved in any of those cases, and the remarks of the court were intended to apply to such conditions as were then under consideration. The extension by the stipulation is authorized by § 5062, Bal. Code, wherein it is provided that the time may be enlarged either before or after the expiration of thirty days “by stipulation of the parties, or for good cause shown and on such terms as may be just, by an order of the court or judge,” etc. Thus the extension may
The second ground urged for striking the statement is that it was not presented and settled by the court within the time required by law. It is counsel’s position that it must, in any event, be settled within ninety days, the period within which it may be filed under extension. Counsel cites Loos v. Rondema, 10 Wash. 164, 38 Pac. 1012, and McQuesten v. Morrill, 12 Wash. 335, 41 Pac. 56. Again, expressions are used in those opinions which, at first glance, seem to treat both the filing and settlement of a statement of facts as being governed by the fixed time. It is manifest, however, that the real subject under discussion was the time for filing. That time is fixed by statute, but no such limit is fixed for the settlement under the terms of § 5058, Bal. Code.
The third point alleged on the motion to strike the statement is that the settlement was made without notice, the respondents having* filed proposed amendments. The record shows that notice was once regularly given, and several continuances were thereafter noted on the journal for definite times, and it was then continued indefinitely. Later, counsel for both parties were in court when appellant’s counsel asked the court to set a time for settlement. Bespondents’ counsel simply objected, but stated no reason to the court other than that he wished to raise the point that the settlement could not be made after ninety days. The court set the hearing for two- days thereafter. The point was not made that the objection was for want of sufficient notice, and the record shows that, at the time of the settlement, respondents’ counsel appeared, and that many of the proposed amendments were allowed. Under such circumstances the court was authorized to settle the statement, and the motion to strike it is denied.
Appellant assigns that the court erred in not granting his motion for judgment on the pleadings, for the reason, as alleged, that the reply admits the correctness of the affirmative defense, and that the complaint and reply, taken together, show that respondents had no cause .of action. Objection was also made to the introduction of any evidence- for the same reason. It will be remembered that the complaint avers that the $400 note and mortgage came into appellant’s possession by and through his employment as attorney for this wife respondent. The answer avers that it was turned over to him in payment of attorney’s fees. The reply admits that it was first so turned over to him, but alleges that, by subsequent agree
Errors are assigned upon the court’s instructions. One instruction with reference to the burden of proof is criticised, but no exception to it is disclosed by the record, and we shall therefore not discxxss it. We think the other ixistxnxctions discussed by coxxxxsel wex'e not erroneous under the issues and testimony, and we believe it is unnecessary to extend this opinion as would be reqxxired for their discussion.
There was conflict in the testimony, and it is argued that neither the general nor special verdict returned was sxxpported by the evidence. We have read all the evidence. It is much in conflict, but it was for the jury to pass upon the conflicting testimony, and upon that ground we find no reason to disturb the verdict. There is, however, another assignment of error which we regard as serious. The record discloses the following in the cross-examination of appellant:
“Q. How long have you been a member of the bar? Mr. Battle: Don’t make any difference. They have alleged he is* and it is admitted. The Couxh: Objection overiaxled. A. I have been a member of the bar for foxxr years, this and the Oregon bar. Q. You were admitted*410 to the bar of this state upon examination, or upon certificate from some other state? A. I was admitted to the bar of this state on a certificate from the supreme court of Oregon. Q. Did you bring in those certificates? A. I have got them. Q. Will you produce them? A. Certainly. Q. What is the date of the original certificate? A. 25th of September, in the yeardjrf our Lord, 1899. Q. What is the date of the Washingpln certificate ? A. 27th day of March, A. D. 1901. *Q. Were you admitted to the supreme court of the state of Oregon on examination? A. Yes. Q. In open court? A. In open court., by the full bench. Q. By the full bench ? A. Yes, sir; as my certificate states. Q. Were you there? A. Oh, yes. Q. Are you acquainted with the firm of Joseph, Slager & Watson of Portland? A. I am. Q. Did you make them a note of $750 payable on condition that you get admitted to the supreme court of the state of Oregon ? A. Ho. Q. Hasn’t one been in Seattle for collection in the last year for collection? A. Ho'. Do you mean to tell me that I could bribe the supreme court of Oregon ? You have no more respect for American courts ? Q. I am talking about Joseph, Slager & Company. Did you give Joseph, Slager & Company a note? A. Ho', sir. Q. Endorsed on the back in your own handwriting that it should be payable when you got admission to the supreme court of Oregon ? A. I never gave a note for any such purpose, nor yet have I ever had a note presented to me. Q. There was no such a note as that presented to you for payment in the last year? A. At no time. Q. Did Joseph, Slager & Watson procure your admission to the bar ? A. Ho sir. Q. You didn’t give any note in connection with your admission? A. Oh, no sir; not at all.”
It- is urged that appellant was highly prejudiced by the foregoing examination. We think it must be so held. That he was a member df the bar of this state was a fact alleged by respondents in their complaint, and admitted by the answer. It was therefore wholly immaterial
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to the lower court to grant a new trial.
Fullerton, C. J., and Mount, Anders, and Dunbar, JJ., concur.