Doddridge v. FitzpatrickDoddridge v. Fitzpatrick
The central issue raised by the instant cause is whether the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County abused its discretion when it granted appellee’s motion to vacate the default judgment.
“(B) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the сourt may relieve a party or his legal represenative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect * * *. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.”
It is generally accepted that Rule 60(B)(1), which allows a party to obtain relief from а judgment or order, “attempts to strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that justice should be done.” 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure 140, Section 2851. Therefore, a motion to vaсate a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(B) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Terwoord v. Harrison (1967),
However, that discretion is not unbridled. A court considering a motion to vacate a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(B)(1) must determine that the motion was made
Undеr the facts of the instant cause, we find that the trial court had sufficient evidence of grounds for
“Whеre timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits.”
Appellee made his motion to vаcate well within a year of the default judgment. Moreover, the record reveals that Mrs. Doddridge may have beеn required to yield the right of way to cars entering the intersection from appellee’s direction. Thereforе, appellee has a “meritorious defense” within the meaning of
Appellants also argue that the trial court abused its discretion because it granted appellee’s motion to vacate without first holding the hearing which the Court of Appeals had ordered when it remanded the cause from a prior appeal.
We disagree. Failure to hold such a hearing before granting a Rule 60(B) motion does not automatically constitute an abuse of discretion. To require a hearing even though there is sufficient evidence of a valid Rule 60(B) (1) claim оn the record would not further the interests of justice, implement speedy litigation or encourage the decisiоn of cases on the merits.
Finally, the court’s failure to hold a hearing did not constitute reversible error. We have аlready determined that the trial court had sufficient evidence of excusable neglect on the record tо grant appellee’s Rule 60(B) motion. Therefore, even if the Court of Appeals’ judgment entry ordered a heаring, the trial court’s failure to hold one did not, under the facts of the instant cause, affect a substantial right.
For the.forеgoing reasons we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted appellee’s
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
In their briеf before this court appellants also contend that the proper section of Rule 60(B) to be apрlied to the instant cause is (B) (1) and not the catch-all provision of (B) (5); and that constructive service, per se, does not constitute reason for relief pursuant either to Rule 60 (B)(5) or 60(B)(1).
We agree that the excusable neglect standard оf Rule 60(B) (1) rather 'than the catch-all provision of 60(B)(5) is applicable to the facts of the instant cause (seе staff note to Rule 60[B]), and note that 60(B)(1) was applied by the Court of Appeals on this appeal.
Since the record in the instant cause indicates that there was evidence that appellee had no aсtual knowledge, as well as no actual notice, of the suit pending against him, it is not necessary for this court to determine whether constructive service, per se, would cоnstitute grounds for granting a Kule 60(B)(1) “excusable neglect” motion to vacate.
See Stradler v. Hall (1975),