OPINION
Aрpellant, Roger Lavoy Dodd, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Institutional Division, appeals from a judgment declaring void his purported marriage to appellee, Fannie Eu~ *716 gene Atkins Dodd, and awarding title to property.
I.
Introduction
On Dеcember 28, 1996, appellant and appellee were ceremonially married. Subsequently, appellee discovered that appellant was already married to, and apparently not divorced from, Bernice Walters Dodd. Appellant had filed a divorce suit against Bernice in a Harris County district court before his marriage to appellee, but his suit was dismissed for want of prosecutiоn on June 23, 1997. Appellee filed a petition to have her marriage to appellant declared void because of his existing marriage, and to have the trial court award each party title to the property then in his or her possession. Although appellant was incarcerated and did not attend the proceedings, he repeatedly requested in his pleadings and correspondеnce to the court to be bench warranted to attend the trial. The record indicates -that the court never addressed appellant’s request for a bench warrant, but simply noted in its judgment that apрellant did not attend trial.
Following appellee’s appearance and testimony at trial on April 30, 1998, the county court entered judgment finding that appellee’s allegations (including the allegation that appellant was still married to someone else and that a trailer home in which appellant alleged an interest was paid for primarily by her funds) were materially correct, declaring hеr marriage to appellant void, and awarding each party the property then in his or her possession. The trailer home was in appellee’s possession.
II.
Discussion
Many of appellant’s 13 pоints of error assert arguments that are either irrelevant to the appeal or unsupported by relevant authorities or citations to the record. They are therefore waived.
See
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h);
Sisters of Charity of Incarnate Word v. Gobert,
Appellаnt urges several matters that are cognizable points of error on appeal. First, he challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment declaring his marriage to appellee void, contending that the evidence does not show he was already married to someone else. We. reject this contention. Appellant’s own pleadings acknowledge his earlier marriage and recite, as a mitigating factor, that he had initiated a divorce action against Bernice in October 1996 and that he had been under the presumption that his “divorce was final” when he married appellee. Appellant does not argue, however, that he actually received a divorce in the prior action, and he acknowledges the order dismissing his divorce action. The evidence introduced included a certified copy of a judgment of dismissal for want of prosecution in appellant’s divorce action against Bernice—issued months after appellаnt’s marriage to ap-pellee. The trial court did not err in declaring appellant’s marriage to appellee was void. We overrule this point.
Among his other points of error are comрlaints that he should have been bench warranted to attend the trial and permitted to present evidence concerning title to a trailer home he claims as his separate property.
Wе first address appellant’s assertion that the trial court erred and denied his right to due process by ignoring his requests for a bench warrant to attend his trial.
A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a prisoner’s bench warrant request is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Pedraza v. Crossroads Sec. Systems,
A prisoner in Texas has a constitutional right of access to the courts, but only a qualified right to appear personally at a civil procеeding.
In re M.M.,
The right of a prisoner to have access to the court entails not so much his personal presence as the opрortunity to present evidence or contradict the evidence of the opposing party.
Clearly all litigants who are forced to settle disputes through the judicial process have a fundamental right under the federal constitution to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner. Boddie v. Connecticut,401 U.S. 371 , 377-378,91 S.Ct. 780 , 785-86,28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). The right to be heard includes the opportunity to introduce evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, to be heard on questions of law and tо have judgment rendered only after trial.
Nichols,
Should the court find that the pro se plaintiff inmate in a civil action is not entitled to leave prison to appear personally in court, then the prisoner should be allowed to proceed by affidavit, deposition, telephone, or other effective means.
Byrd v. Attorney General,
The Byrd court also noted that, from the appellate transcript, it could not determine that the trial court “ever ruled on appellant’s request to appear at the ... hearing by way of a court ordered bench warrant,” and found the trial court’s failure to act on appellant’s motiоn requesting a bench warrant constituted an abuse of discretion and required a reversal. Id. at 569. 1
*718 In our case, the record does not reflect that the trial court addressed appellant’s repeated requests for a bench warrant. The prisoner in Byrd was a civil plaintiff, not a defendant. Id. at 567. The facts are stronger in the instant case because appellant did not initiate the suit. Had the .trial court addressed his request, it might have found that appellant was not entitled to appear; however, it might also have provided some safeguard such as a phone conference to provide appellant, who had no attorney, access to the court for the trial of a suit he did not initiate to assign disputed property claims.
Because appellant had a qualified right to appear in person at trial, and requested to do so, the trial court should have considered and ruled upon his request, making appropriate findings weighing his right to attend against factors including, among others, (1) the state’s interest in preserving the integrity of the сorrections system, (2) the appellant’s status as a pro se civil defendant rather than a plaintiff, (3) alternate means for him to present and respond to evidence, and' (4) the nature and-circumstances оf the claim. In failing to do so, the trial court abused its discretion.
In response to appellant’s request to appear personally, the trial court should have (1) made findings as to the need for his prеsence in light of the issues raised by appellant’s pro se defendant status, and (2) determined alternate means for him to present and respond to evidence.
Under these facts, we conclude the trial cоurt abused its discretion. Because we sustain this point of error, we do not address appellant’s other arguments.
We affirm the trial court’s declaration that appellant’s marriage to appellee is void. We reverse and remand that portion of the judgment dividing property.
Notes
. At least two other Texas appellate courts have held that the failure to issue a bench warrant constituted abuse of discretion in the circumstances represented there. In
Pruske,
an appellant who requested to appear personally had not initiated the suit, but merely sought to defend a claim for a
money
judgment.
Pruske,
While we are not prepared to hold that Mr. Pruske has an absolute right to appear in person, we do hold that the trial court should, in these situations, directly address the issue by weighing the protection of the integrity of the correctional system against the prisoner’s right of access to the courts and strike a balance that is fundamentally fair.
Id.
In
Nichols,
the appellate court addressed a situаtion in which the family court judge refused to appoint counsel for the appellant in a child custody dispute and also denied his request to appear personally and represent himself.
Nichols,