51 Tenn. 601 | Tenn. | 1871
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The complainant, who is a married woman, brings her bill to recover the possession of a tract of land of seventy-two acres, lying in Gibson county, and to have an account of rents and profits. She inherited the land from her father, and alleges that in the year 1847, being then a minor, and the wife of the defendant J. M. Dodd, as she now is, she joined her said husband in the sale of the said land to the defendants Elder, to whom a deed in fee simple was executed by her said husband and herself; and that her said
Tbe grounds of demurrer are: 1. That tbe complainant is not entitled to tbe possession of tbe land or tbe rents and profits thereof during tbe lifetime of tbe defendant ber husband, he having sold and conveyed tbe same after bis marriage with complainant. 2. That it appears from tbe face of the bill that defendants bave been in adverse possession of tbe land for more than twenty years, and bave thereby acquired a title to tbe land. 3. That it appears upon tbe face of tbe bill that defendants bave bad adverse possession of tbe land for more than seven years prior to tbe bringing of this suit, and, therefore, bave acquired a right to possession during tbe lifetime of complainant and ber said husband by the statute of limitations.
Tbe deed executed by tbe complainant and tbe defendant ber husband, is not exhibited in tbe
At the time of the execution of the deed in question, and prior to the act of 1850, c. 86, the husband having acquired by the marriage an interest in the lands of his wife during their joint lives, which might, perhaps, ripen into an estate for life in himself, might sell and convey his said interest, with or without the consent of the wife. The act of 1850, c. 36, however, abrogated this ancient common law right in the husband; and for the purpose of protecting the wife in the
But the question recurs, to what relief is the complainant entitled under this bill ? She was an infant at the time of the execution of this conveyance, and the deed of an infant, though not void, is, nevertheless, voidable within a reasonable time after the disability of infancy is removed. What is a reasonable time is undefined and indefinable. How long a reasonable time ought to be, said Littleton, is not defined in the law, but depends upon the sound discretion of the court: Co. Litt., 50. It is left to be fixed by circumstances, by the condition and relation of the parties, or by the usages of the trade or business in reference to which the question arises. The complainant was a feme covert also at the time of the conveyance, but the two disabilities cannot be connected so as to give strength to each other in rendering void or voidable the mere fac-tum of the deed of the complainant. Let it be conceded that the disability of coverture, so far as it could invalidate the deed of the complainant,
But it is said the bill is inartificial, and' cannot be maintained as a bill to remove a cloud, because no such relief is asked. While the rules of pleading in a court of equity are more flexible and liberal than in a court of law, yet it is generally true that a court of equity can grant no relief unless such relief be within the purview and spirit of the equities set forth in the bill. Bút a court of equity regards not mere forms, but looks to the substance of things; and if the
With these principles applied to the facts set forth in the complainant’s bill, there can be no question that, though not entitled to the present possession of the land, or an account for the rents and profits, she is, nevertheless, entitled to have a decree stating and declaring her rights in the reversion after the falling in of the particular estate that now stands in her way, and removing the cloud which has been thrown upon her title by the facts stated in the bill, if said averments of the bill be true.
The decree of the chancellor is, therefore, reversed, and the cause will be remanded for further proceedings.