| NY | Dec 15, 1854
A judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be impeached collaterally for error or irregularity, but is conclusive until set aside or reversed by the same court or some other court having appellate jurisdiction. (Smith v. Lewis, 3 J. R., 157; Homer v. Field, 1 Pick., 435.) The jurisdiction of the court in which a judgment has been recovered is, however, always open to inquiry; and if it has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not acquired jurisdiction of the parties by the due service of process or by a voluntary appearance, the proceedings
So, fraud and imposition invalidate a judgment as they do all acts; and it is not without semblance of authority that it has been suggested that at law the fraud, may be alleged, whenever the party seeks to avail himself of the results of his own fraudulent conduct by setting up the judgment, the fruits of his fraud. (See per Thompson, C. J., in Borden v. Fitch, 15 J. R., 121, and cases cited.) But whether this be so or not, it is unquestionable that a court of chancery has power to grant relief against judgments when obtained by fraud. Any fact which clearly proves it -to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party could not avail himself at law, but was prevented by fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or .his agents, will justify an interference by a court of equity. (Reigal v. Wood, 1 J. C. R., 402; McDonald v. Neilson, 2 Cow. Rep., 139; Duncan v. Lyon, 3 J. C. R., 351; Marine Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Hodgson, 6 Cranch, 206; Shottenkirk v. Wheeler, 3 J. C. R., 275.)
Under our present judiciary system, the functions of the courts of common law and of chancery are united in the' same court, and the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits, are abolished, and the defendant may set forth by answer as many defences as he may have, whether they be such as have been heretofore denominated legal or equitable, or both. (Code, §§ 69, 150.) The Code also authorizes affirmative relief to be given to a defendant in an action by the judgment. (§ 274.) The intent of the legislature is very clear, that all controversies respecting the subject matter of the litigation should be determined in one action, and the provisions are adapted to give effect to that intent. Whether, therefore, fraud or imposition in the recovery of
The right of the plaintiff in the judgment was a personal right and followed his person; and, aside from the fact that he had resorted to the courts of Connecticut to enforce his claim under the judgment, the courts of that state, having obtained jurisdiction of his person by the due service of process within the state, had full power to pronounce upon the rights of the parties in respect to the judgment and to decree concerning it. It necessarily follows that the decree of the superior court of Connecticut, sitting as a court of chancery, directly upon the question of fraud, is conclusive upon the parties to that litigation and all persons claiming under them with notice of the adjudication. The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction .upon a point litigated between the parties, is conclusive in all subsequent controversies where the same point comes again in question
The judgment of the superior court must be affirmed, with costs.
The questions in this cause arise upon two , exceptions taken at the trial. The first was taken to the decision admitting in evidence the record of a decree m
The plaintiff is in the same position which Olney would have occupied had he been plaintiff; he is the immediate assignee of Olney, against whom, before the assignment, the decree was pronounced; and if it be material, he had actual notice of the decree when the assignment was made to him. "Giving to the plaintiff’s objection to the admission of the record the broadest effect, the first question is whether the defence set up by the answer was available. That defence is, in substance, that the judgment sued upon was fraudulently entered up after assurances on behalf of the plaintiff in that suit to the defendant, that no further proceedings should be taken in it without notice to him, whereby he was induced not to take steps to interpose a defence, which in point of fact he could successfully have maintained.
Relief against such a judgment, upon these facts, would have been within the power of a court of equity in this state, upon a bill filed for that purpose. (2 Story’s Eq. Jur., §§ 887, 896; Huggins v. King, 3 Barb., 616.) The Code, § 69, having abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions as theretofore existing, an equitable defence to a civil action is now as available as a legal defence. The question now is, ought the plaintiff to recover; and anything which shows that he ought not is available to the defendant, whether it was formerly of equitable or legal cognizance.
The question then remains to be considered upon the constitution and laws of the United States, and here the decisions permit of no doubt. Full faith and credit are given to the judgments of a state court, when in the courts of another state it receives the same faith and credit to which it was entitled in the state where it was pronounced. (Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat., 234.)
We have then a decree of the superior court of Connecticut in a cause where they had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, and it is duly authenticated and relevant to the issue on trial. Its admissibility in evidence follows of course.
By the record of that decree it appears that the very matters in issue here wqre litigated there, and were decided adversely to Olney, whom the plaintiff represents. The determination is necessarily conclusive upon him as to all the material facts there litigated and determined.
The judgment should be affirmed with costs.
Judgment accordingly.