Dobson v. PearceDobson v. Pearce
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It is a good defence to an action upon a judgment,—whether brought by the original judgment creditor or his assignee,—that the judgment was fraudulently obtained.
A court of equity has jurisdiction to make a decree restraining a judgment creditor from bringing suits upon his judgment, upon the ground that it was fraudulently obtained.
A duly authenticated record of such a decree, rendered in a court of equity of another State having jurisdiction of the parties, is a conclusive defence against the prosecution in a court of this State, of a suit upon the judgment referred to in the decree.
Such decree is conclusive upon the parties everywhere and in every forum, where the same matters are drawn in issue; not indeed as an injunction, but as a judgment of a court of another State.
This was an action in the nature of an action of debt on a judgment rendered in the New York Superior Court, April 17, 1847, for $612.93, in favor of one James N. Olney, against Abner T. Pearce, the defendant, and afterwards assigned to Thomas Dobson, the present plaintiff.
From the answer, it appeared that the judgment sued upon was fraudulently entered up by Olney. The defendant was a resident of Connecticut; but being casually in the city of New York in 1846, Olney procured a capias to be served upon him; and by assurances that no further proceedings should be taken in the suit so commenced, induced him not to appear; and in consequence of his non-appearance, judgment was, without his knowledge, entered up against him by default. About two years afterwards, Olney commenced an action of debt on this judgment, in the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut. While this action was pending, the defendant commenced a suit upon the Chancery side of the Superior Court of Connecticut, complaining that the judgment upon which he was
The reply denied the allegations of the answer.
The cause was three times tried.
Upon the first trial, before Mr. Justice Paine, June 19, 1851, after the plaintiff had proved the judgment, and the assignment of it by Olney to himself, the defendant offered in evidence a record duly authenticated of the proceedings in the chancery suit in Connecticut, including the decree, and moved for a dismissal of the complaint, on the ground that the plaintiff was estopped and barred from prosecuting his suit, by the adjudication of the Superior Court of Connecticut. The court decided that the decree of the Superior Court of Connecticut did not constitute any such bar or estoppel, and denied the motion; and defendant‘s counsel excepted.
The defendant‘s counsel then offered the same record in evidence, as matter of defence to the suit. The plaintiff‘s counsel objected, and the evidence was excluded; the defendant‘s counsel excepting. A verdict was, by direction of the court, found for the plaintiff. The defendant moved to set this verdict aside, which motion was directed to be heard at general term. The court at general term granted the motion and ordered a new trial.*
The plaintiff appealed from this judgment to the general term; where it was reversed for error in the exclusion of the evidence offered by plaintiff, and a new trial ordered.
This third trial was had before Mr. Justice Duer, April 5, 1853, and the evidence offered on the part of both plaintiff and defendant, at the previous trial before Justice Campbell, was put in, subject to like exceptions. The court instructed the jury that the Connecticut decree was conclusive upon the plaintiff, if the jury found that Olney appeared in the chancery suit by his authorized attorney; otherwise he was not bound by it.
The jury found for defendant; and judgment having been afterwards rendered in his favor at special term, the plaintiff appealed to the general term, where it was affirmed.
From this judgment the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The plaintiff is in the same position which Olney would have occupied had he been plaintiff; he is the immediate assignee of Olney, against whom, before the assignment, the decree was pronounced; and if it be material, he had actual notice of the decree when the assignment was made to him. Giving to the plaintiff‘s objections to the admission of the record the broadest effect, the first question is, whether the defence set up by the answer was available. That defence is, in substance, that the judgment sued upon was fraudulently entered up, after assurances on behalf of the plaintiff in that suit, to the defendant, that no further proceedings should be taken in the suit without notice to him, whereby he was induced not to take steps to interpose a defence, which in point of fact he could successfully have maintained.
Relief against such a judgment upon these facts would have been within the power of a court of equity in this State, upon a bill filed for that purpose. (2 Story, Eq. Jur., §§ 887, 896. Huggins v. King, 3 Barb., S. C. R., 616). The Code (§ 69) having abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions as heretofore existing, an equitable defence to a civil action is now as available as a legal defence.
The question now is, ought the plaintiff to recover? and anything which shows that he ought not is available to the defendant, whether it was formerly of equitable or legal cognizance.
The next question is, whether the record of the decree of the Superior Court of Connecticut was competent evidence upon
The objection, so far as it is founded upon an assumed violation of the comity which exists between the several States of the United States, does not reach to the jurisdiction of the court.
The rules of comity may be a restraint upon a court in the exercise of an authority which it actually possesses, but it is self-imposed. (Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet., 519). The courts of each State must judge for themselves exclusively how far they will be restrained, and in what cases they will exercise their power, except where the constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance of it prescribe a rule; where that is the case, the question ceases to be one of comity, and becomes one of right.
The question then remains to be considered upon the constitution and laws of the United States, and here the decisions permit of no doubt.
“Full faith and credit” are given to the judgment of a State court, when in the court of another State it receives the
By the record of that decree, it appears that the very matters in issue here were litigated there, and were decided adversely to Olney, whom the plaintiff represents. The determination is necessarily conclusive upon him as to all the material facts there litigated and determined.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
Allen, J.—A judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be impeached collaterally for error or irregularity, but is conclusive until set aside or reversed by the same court, or some other court having appellate jurisdiction. (Smith v. Lewis, 3 J. R., 157; Homer v. Field, 1 Pick., 488.) The jurisdiction of the court in which a judgment has been rendered is, however, always open to inquiry, and if it has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not acquired jurisdiction of the parties by the due service of process, or by a voluntary appearance, the proceedings are coram non judice, and the judgment is void. The want of jurisdiction has always been held to be a valid defence to an action upon the judgment, and a good answer to it when set up for any purpose.
So, fraud and imposition invalidate a judgment, as they do all acts, judicial as well as extra-judicial; and it is not without semblance of authority that it has been suggested, that at law the fraud may be alleged whenever the party seeks to avail himself of the result of his own fraudulent conduct by setting up the judgment, the fruits of his fraud. (See per Thompson, C. J., in Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. R. 121, and cases cited.)
But whether this be so or not, it is unquestionable that a court of chancery has power to grant relief against judgments when obtained by fraud. Any fact which clearly proves it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party could not avail himself at law, but was prevented by fraud or accident unmixed with any fault or negli
Under our present judiciary system the functions of the courts of common law and of chancery are united in the same court, and the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits are abolished, and the defendant may set forth by answer as many defences as he may have, whether they be such as have been heretofore denominated legal or equitable, or both. (Code § 69, § 150). The Code also authorizes affirmative relief to be given to a defendant in an action, by the judgment, (§ 274). The intent of the legislature is very clear, that all controversies respecting the subject matter of the litigation should be determined in an action, and the provisions are adapted to give effect to that intent.
Whether, therefore, heretofore, fraud or imposition in the recovery of a judgment could have been alleged against it collaterally at law, or not, it may now be set up as an equitable defence to defeat a recovery upon it. Under the head of equitable defences are included all matters which would before have authorized an application to the Court of Chancery for relief against a legal liability, but which, at law, could not have been pleaded in bar. The facts alleged by way of defence in this action would have been good cause for relief against the judgment in a court of chancery, and under our present system are, therefore, proper matters of defence, and there was no necessity or propriety for a resort to a separate action to vacate the judgment.
In Connecticut, although law and equity are administered by the same judges, still the distinction between law and equity is preserved, and justice is administered under the heads of common law and chancery jurisdiction, by distinct and appropriate forms of procedure; and hence, as it was at least doubtful whether at law the fraud alleged would bar a recovery upon the judgment, a resort to the chancery powers of the court of that State was proper, if not necessary.
1. The judgment of the Superior Court in New York, notwithstanding the alleged fraud, was conclusive upon the defendant in it; and in an action upon it, no allegation of matter of fact, in pais, could be admitted to impeach its validity. It could only be relieved against on motion, or by an action in the nature of a bill in equity.
2. It was, under the constitution and laws of the United States, equally conclusive in the courts of Connecticut as in this State.
3. But it was competent for the courts in this State, or in any other State which had obtained jurisdiction of the person of the plaintiff, by a direct proceeding, to impeach the equitable obligation of the judgment on the ground of fraud, surprise, or mistake in obtaining it, or for any other matter which, according to the principles of a court of chancery, would render it inequitable and unconscientious for the plaintiff to insist upon the recovery.
The jurisdiction of courts of equity in this respect is well stated in Pearce a. Olney, (20 Conn. 544,) where the question upon this judgment was examined by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. (See also 2 Cowen, 193, and cases cited).
4. If a court in this State, in such a suit as is referred to under the last head, had given judgment to the effect that the judgment of the Superior Court had been obtained by fraud or mistake, or in such a manner in any respect that it could not be conscientiously enforced, such determination would have been a bar in an action at law on such Superior Court judgment. It would have been similar to a decree in chancery setting aside a contract or conveyance, which it cannot be doubted would have barred an action at law on such contract or conveyance.
5. The judgment or decree of the Supreme Court of Errors in Connecticut (that court having jurisdiction of the parties) is equally effectual as a judgment to the same effect in this State would have been. This results from the constitutional provision before referred to, and the act of Congress which
6. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Connecticut, determining that the facts set forth in the defendant‘s petition were true, and forever enjoining a prosecution of the judgment of the Superior Court of New York, is a determination as to the equitable validity of the judgment, and precludes the plaintiff from insisting upon it, as well in every State where the judicial proceedings of Connecticut are entitled to full credit, as in the State of Connecticut itself. This results from the principle, that a matter once litigated and determined in a court of competent jurisdiction cannot ever again be drawn in question by the same parties, or any others standing in legal privity with them. (Le Guen v. Gouverneur & Kemble, 1 Johns. Cas., 436).
7. It follows, from these positions, that the judgment in Connecticut is a perfect bar to the action brought upon the judgment of the Superior Court.
The judgment appealed from should therefore be affirmed.