Dobbs was convicted of two counts of armed robbery, and appeals the judgment entered on the conviction.
1. In his first enumeration of error, Dobbs claims the trial court erred by refusing to sever the two armed robbery counts. Severance is required if offenses are joined solely because they are similar in nature.
Cooper v. State,
In the instant case, the armed robberies involved two convenience stores and took place less than one month apart. In each robbery the perpetrator, wearing sunglasses and a hat, approached the cashier, who was alone in the store, and initiated a cash transaction before pulling his gun and reaching across the counter to grab the money. Both cashiers expressed surprise at the well-mannered demeanor and speech of the perpetrator, and both described the handgun used as a type of long-barrelled machine gun. Both cashiers also identified the defendant as the armed robber. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Dobbs’ motion to sever the offenses.
2. In enumeration number two, Dobbs argues the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict on both counts because of a fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence *794 adduced at trial.
Under OCGA § 16-8-41 (a), “A person commits the offense of armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) With respect to both counts, the present indictment charges in part that Dobbs did, “with intent to commit theft, take property of another [the convenience stores] from the person and the immediate presence [of the store cashiers] . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Since the indictment uses the conjunction “and” rather than “or,” Dobbs contends the State must prove he took property from the person and the immediate presence of another. He argues that while the evidence at trial may show money was taken from the store cash register in the immediate presence of the cashier, there was no evidence he took any property from the person of anyone at either robbery. Therefore, he claims the State failed to prove the offense occurred in the manner stated in the indictment.
Even if we accept the defendant’s contention that a variance occurred, it was not fatal. A variance between the allegations and the proof is so material as to be fatal only when it deprives the accused of “ ‘obvious requirements (1) that [he] shall be definitely informed as to the charges against him, so that he may be enabled to present his defense and not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial; and (2) that he may be protected against another prosecution for the same offense.’ ” (Citations omitted.)
De Palma v. State, 225
Ga. 465, 469-470 (
3. In his third enumeration, Dobbs claims the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude evidence of other robberies attributed to him. Generally, evidence of other criminal acts by the defendant is inadmissible because it tends to place the defendant’s character into evidence.
State v. Johnson,
Dobbs was charged in the instant case with two armed robberies occurring in Carroll County on December 31, 1989, and January 23, 1990. The extrinsic criminal acts introduced by the state were armed robberies occurring in Polk County on January 12, 1990, and in Haralson County on January 5, 1990. Dobbs was identified by witnesses to both extrinsic robberies as the perpetrator, and although the strength of these eyewitness identifications varied from definite to probable, there is no requirement that such proof be made beyond a reasonable doubt.
Williams v. State,
Although the two extrinsic armed robberies were not identical to the offenses at issue, they were sufficiently similar to authorize the trial court to admit the evidence to show identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, or course of conduct. All four armed robberies occurred at convenience stores within less than a month. In all instances, the robber wore a hat; wore sunglasses (in three of the four robberies); used a handgun similarly identified, not as a typical handgun, but as a long-barrelled weapon; pulled the gun on the cashier after initiating a cash transaction requiring the cashier to use the cash register; reached across the counter for the cash; and fled on foot. On these facts, we find no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence and denying the defendant’s motion in limine.
Durham v. State,
4. Fourthly, Dobbs asserts the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. He argues that the testimony of eyewitnesses that he committed the armed robberies at issue was not reliable and should not have been believed. Determining the credibility of witnesses and resolving conflicts goes to the weight of the evidence and is for the jury’s consideration.
Holcomb v. State,
I 5. In enumeration of error five, Dobbs contends that he was de[nied effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel failed to [object to improper remarks and misstatements of fact by the prosecutor during closing argument. The claim of ineffective assistance was ot raised in the trial court, and is pursued for the first time on ap
*796
peal. Where appropriate, claims for ineffective assistance on counsel raised for the first time on appeal are remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. See
Smith v. State,
Judgment affirmed. Sognier,