Thе trial court entered for the defendant, Alabama Power Company, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), after a jury had returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $175,000. The basis for the case was a sailboat accident on Lake Logan Martin. Joseph G. Dobbs was injured whеn the mast of the sailboat that he and his wife were operating came into contact with high voltage power lines. Dobbs was badly shocked and has since undergone extensive surgery to his hands and eyes.
In entering the JNOV, the trial judge stated:
"1. The defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is granted becаuse the Court should have granted a directed verdict in favor of defendant, Alabama Power Company, at the close of all the evidence. Accordingly, judgment [is] rendered in favor of said defendant and against plaintiff and all court costs are taxed against Plаintiff.
"2. Under Rule 50(c)(1) this Court also rules on defendant's Motion for a New Trial and determines that it should not be granted, if the judgment against plaintiff notwithstanding thе verdict is hereafter vacated or reversed. . . ."
A motion for JNOV is properly granted only when the movant would have been entitled tо a directed verdict. Luker v. City of Brantley,
, 520 So.2d 517 521 (Ala. 1987), quoting Wright v. Fountain,(Ala. 1984). 454 So.2d 520
This Court has held:
Osborn v. Johns,"There are only two situations in which a directed verdict is proper: (1) where there is no scintilla of evidenсe to support an element essential to the claim or (2) where there is no disputed issue of fact upon which reasonablе men could differ. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford,
, 406 So.2d 854 856 (Ala. 1981). A directed verdict is appropriate in the second situation only if the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in one party's favor that reasonable persons could only arrive at one verdict. Bickford v. International Speedway Corp.,, 654 F.2d 1028 1031 (5th Cir. 1981)."
The present case is a tort action. Under Alabama law, every action in tort consists of three elements: The existence of a legal duty by defendant to plaintiff; a breach of that duty; and damage as the proximate result. Alabama Power Co. v. Guy,
Alabama law has specific statutes delineating the duties placed upon a landowner whose property is used by the general public for recreational purposes. Codе 1975, §
We have considered two similar cases under the Alabama recreational use statutes. In Driskill v. Alabama Power Co.,
Id. at 267."The Company was under no duty to warn the plaintiff, an ordinary licensee, of a possible danger concerning a condition brought about by its ordinary use of its land — raising and lowering the level of the lake."
In a case where the plaintiff, riding on an inner tube pulled by a ski boat, collided with a partially submerged fence on Lake Neely Henry near Gadsden, Alаbama, we stated: *37
"The licensee's entrance on the land carries with it no right to expect the land to be made safe for his reception, but he must assume the risk of whatever may be encountered. . . . Once he is there, the law only requires the landowner to refrаin from wantonly, maliciously or intentionally injuring him; in other words, the landowner is not liable unless he does some act which goes beyond mere nеgligence."Wright v. Alabama Power Co.,
Under Alabama law, even in cases where the recreational use statute is not applied, the duty owed by a landowner is determined by the status of the person entering the land. In this case, Dobbs has the status of licensee. A landowner generally owes no duty to warn a licensee of a potentially dangerous condition unless the landowner does some positive act that creates a new and hidden danger. Edwards v. City ofBirmingham,
Dobbs contends that the Alabama recreational use statutes do not apply in the present case. Dobbs claims that this case was filed pursuant to
We note that the first question usually addressed in any personal injury case rеasonably related to the maritime field is whether admiralty jurisdiction exists. Waldrop, "Maritime Personal Injury Actions," 35 Ala.L.Rev. 63 (1984). We do not make a determination in this case that admiralty jurisdiction exists. We assume, for the sake of argument, that it does.
Dobbs cites Kennedy Engine Co. v. Dog River Marina Boatworks, Inc.,
However, Dobbs fails to cite a principle under admiralty law that differs from Alabama law, except to argue that general negligence principles should apply rather than the recreatiоnal use statutes in the present case. In support of his position, Dobbs cites Brown v. United States,
The evidence at trial clearly established the following facts: (1) Alabama Power Company is the licensee of the Logan Martin hydroelectric dam project. (2) the power lines struck by the mast of Dobbs's sailboat were staked, surveyed, and designed by Patterson and Dewars Engineers. (3) The pоwer lines are owned, operated, and maintained by the Coosa Valley Electric Cooperative. (4) Alabama Power did nоt create the allegedly defective condition and had no actual knowledge of it.
Even reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Dobbs, as we are required to do, Ritch v. Waldrop,
The judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED. *38
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.