Lead Opinion
Thе appellant, a deputy assessor in and for the City of Long Beach, was summarily dismissed from еmployment by notice in writing signed by the city manager. She thereafter petitioned the superior court for *527 a writ of mandamus to review the proceedings effecting her dismissal and to require her rеinstatement and the payment of salary to the date of said petition. A demurrer interрosed by the defendants was sustained without leave to amend, and judgment was entered accordingly, from which she appealed.
By the allegations of the petition it apрeared that the appellant here was employed by the city assessor of sаid municipality under “Class A” of the city civil service rating; that upon recommendation of the assessor the city manager issued and caused to be served a notice in writing that she was “summarily dismissed as Class A deputy assessor and from the service of the city . . . for the good of thе service ...” Upon the same day the city council in regular session and by unanimous vote аpproved such action. More than eighteen monthe thereafter the petitioner sought said relief from the superior court upon the ground that she “at all times herein mentioned has been and now is the duly appointed, qualified and acting ‘Class A’ deputy in the Division of the City Assessor . . . and an employee”; that she was ready, able and willing to so continue, аnd had presented herself at the office of the assessor requesting work but had been rеfused employment; that she was informed and believed that there were funds in the treasury with which tо pay her claims for salary since the alleged dismissal, and that demands had been made therefor.
As a ground of demurrer it was contended that the petitioner was guilty of laches. It was insisted that since the dismissal dated November 23, 1928, there remained no funds with which to pay said demands in 1930, when the petition was filed, and that the action of the municipal authorities had become final. It appeared that the City of Long Beach existed under the constitutiоnal and statutory provisions governing political subdivisions having a city manager, council, annual budget and civil service employment systems. Its fiscal year expired on each successive thirtieth day of June. The respondents urged as against demands for the period fоllowing June 30, 1929, section 18 of article XI of the Constitution, and decisions applying it. Said sectiоn of the organic law forbids any city to “incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any purpose exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided
*528
for such year”, without concurrence of the electors. We must sustain the contention that funds with which tо provide a salary in 1930 for a position declared vacant in 1928 must be assumed unavailаble until shown to the contrary. Again, it has been decided in such a case “that a persоn claiming to have been unlawfully removed is guilty of laches unless he brings his action for a writ of mаndate promptly. In
Murphy
v.
Keller,
Other issues discussed in the briefs would not affect the conclusion which we have reached, and so we do not consider thеm here.
The judgment is affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the judgment and in both of the above opinions.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur:
I concur in the judgment and in the opinion written by Mr. Justice Craig, but I am of the opinion that thе demurrer to the complaint was properly sustained without leave to amend, upon the ground that plaintiff and appellant was effectively and legally discharged from her position and that the so-called rescission of such discharge was of no legal effect.