Aрpellant Clinton Dixon (“Claimant”), formerly employed by Respondent Stoam Industries, L.L.C. (“Employer”), appealed a deputy’s determination that he was disqualified for waiting-week credit and benefits, pursuant to § 288.050.2, 1 for the reason that he “was discharged because he was not performing the assigned duties[.]” Following review, the Appeals Tribunal concluded that Claimant’s refusal to follow a supervisor’s direсtive constituted misconduct connected with his work, and the deputy’s determination was affirmed. Claimant appealed to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (“Commission”), which adopted and affirmеd the decision of the Appeals Tribunal. Claimant now appeals the Commission’s decision claiming “there is insufficient evidence of ‘misconduct’ in the record to support the commission’s deсision.” We affirm.
1) Timeliness of Claimant’s Notice of Appeal
Claimant filed a
pro se
notice of appeal to this Court. Respondent Division of Employment Security (“Division”) moved to dismiss the appeal, alleging that Claimant’s notice of appeal was not timely filеd. Because Claimant’s notice of appeal was received by the Commission without any United States Postal Service postmark, this Court remanded the case to the Commission, directing the Commissiоn to hold a hearing and determine the date on which Claimant’s notice of appeal was “deemed” filed.
Dixon v. Stoam Industries, Inc.,
No. 27407,
Following a hearing, the Commission certified to this Court that Claimant’s notice of appeal was filed December 6, 2005. As the Commission’s decision was mailed November 9, 2005, we determine that Claimant’s notice of appeal was timely filed. §§ 288.210 and 288.200.2, RSMo 2000;
Johnson v. Climate Express, Inc.,
2) Factual and Procedural Background
Employer manufactures preassembled wall panels for residential and commercial construction. Claimant was employed in the manufacturing sector of the business. On the morning of July 15, 2005, while Claimant was assisting a co-worker, he was approached by Steve Edwards, who handed Claimant blueprints and asked Claimant to “move over and do a different process.” Claimant told Edwards he was working on something else and he “wasn’t going to stop what [he] was doing and go over there and do that the rest of the night.” Edwards told Claimant “to get [his] stuff and leave.” Claimant was immediately discharged.
Claimant filed a claim for unemployment benefits. Employer protested his *692 claim, contending that Claimant “was terminated for refusing to follow orders from his supervisor and insubordination.” The Division determined that Claimant was disqualifiеd for waiting-week credit and benefits, for the reason that Claimant “was discharged because he was not performing the assigned duties. The claimant had been directed to return to work by his supervisor.”
Clаimant appealed the deputy’s determination, which was subsequently affirmed by the Appeals Tribunal. It concluded that Claimant was discharged for misconduct connected with his work, in that he “refused to fоllow a directive of a supervisor” whom Claimant “knew or should have known ... had the authority to direct his activities.” Following review by the Commission, the decision of the Appeals Tribunal was adopted аnd affirmed. This appeal followed.
3) Standard of Review
Section 288.210 governs our review of the Commission’s decision.
Hoover v. Community Blood Center,
(1) That the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers;
(2) That the decision was procured by fraud;
(3) That the facts found by the commission do not support the award; or
(4) That there was no sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.
Section 288.210, RSMo 2000.
An appellate court examines the evidence in the record as a whole to determine whether competent and substantial evidence supports the Commission’s decision.
Scrivener Oil Co., Inc. v. Div. of Employment Sec.,
4) Discussion
Pursuant to § 288.050.2, an individual discharged for misconduct in connection with work may be denied waiting-week credit from four to sixteen weeks of unemployment benefits.
Dameron v. Drury Inns, Inc.,
Section 288.030.1(24) defines “misconduct” as:
[ (1) ] an act of wanton or willful disregard of the employer’s interest, [ (2) ] a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules, [ (3) ] a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his or her employee, or [ (4) ] negligence in such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interest or of the em *693 ployee’s duties and obligations to the employer[.]
See also Dixon v. Div. of Employment Sec.,
Each definition set out above requires “a showing of culpability on the part of the employee!.]”
Id.
Each definition also requires “that the employeе willfully violate the rules or standards of the employer.”
Hoover v. Community Blood Center,
“ ‘Willful misconduct is established when action or inaction by the claimant amounts to conscious disregard of the interests of the employer or сonstitutes behavior contrary to that which an employer has a right to expect from an employee.’”
Dixon,
Our research of Missouri cases has revealed no reported opinions in which the facts are on point with those in this appeal — where an employee refused to comply with a reasonable work directive from a supervisor — and we find no citation to any applicable precedent in the partiеs’ briefs. Absent such guidance in determining whether Claimant’s behavior constitutes misconduct, we have turned to labor and employment cases involving allegations of “insubordination.” Missouri case law defines “insubоrdination” as “a willful disregard of express or implied direction or a defiant attitude.”
McClellon v. Gage,
We also consider a related rule of law, that “ ‘[i]n every contract of employment[,] it is implied that the employee will obey the lawful and reasonable rules, orders and instructions of the employer[.]’ ”
Superior Gearbox Co. v. Edwards,
Conduct which “disregards the standard of behavior that an employer has a right to expect” constitutes misconduсt.
Simpson Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n,
When an employer claims that a claimant was discharged for misconduct connected with work, the burden is on the employer to prove by substantial and competent evidenсe that claimant was discharged for “misconduct.”
Dameron,
*694 By his own admissions, Claimant did not follow Edwards’ directive. 2 However, Claimant maintained that Edwards was not his supervisor. When asked by the referee whether Edwards was his supervisor, Claimant responded: “Well I never considered him a supervisor. Maybe in his own mind. I just thought that he was the boss’s son-in-law.” Claimant later testified: “I guess he was a supervisor!,] but everybody but me realized it or considered him ... a supervisor.”
Employer’s representative, Bill Nys-trom, testified that Claimant’s “immediate supervisor” was Edwards and that Claimant was terminated “[f]or refusing to obey the instructions of the supervisor.” When Nystrom was questioned about Claimant’s asserted lack of knowledge regarding Edward’s position as his supervisor, Nystrom stated that Edwards had been “running that cull manufacturing operation for a рeriod of probably close to two months!,]” and that Claimant had been previously instructed, specifically by Steve Barton, who was “head of manufacturing,” to follow the directions given by Edwards.
Steve Barton, Employer’s vice-president of operations, testified that Edwards was Claimant’s supervisor, and he had informed the employees, including Claimant, that Edwards was their supervisor.
The Appeals Tribunal concluded,
inter alia:
“The evidence further shоws that the claimant knew or should have known that this person had the authority to direct his activities.” Deference is accorded to the Commission’s determinations of weight of the evidence and witness credibility.
Scrivener Oil Co., Inc.,
5) Decision
The Commission’s decision is affirmed.
Notes
. References to statutes are to RSMo Cum. Supp.2005, unless othеrwise indicated.
. When asked at the administrative hearing what occurred when Edwards approached him with blueprints and wanted Claimant to work on something other than what he was already doing, Claimant testified: "I wasn’t going to stop what I was doing and go over there and do that the rest of the night[,]” and “I didn’t want to[J”