The opinion of the court was delivered by
Plaintiff claims $5,000.00 as damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained through the negligence of the defendant, by whom he was employed. Defendant denies the negligence imputed to it, and alleges that if plaintiff’s injuries are the results of negligence, it was that of himself and a fellow servant. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,500.00 and defendant has appealed.
The ease as we find it, from the evidence in the record, is as follows:
W. K Henderson, W. N. Morrison, and probably some other persons, not named, organized the defendant company, the two gentlemen named being the principal, if not the only stockholders and occupying the positions of president and superintendent, respectively. In
“Q. — He was not what you would call a regular old sot, all the time drunk ?
“A. — I think he was, every time he' got a chance at it.
“Q. — If he got a chance at it ?
“A. — Yes, sir.
“Q. — Was he drunk all the time?
“A. — He did not get a chance all the time, (unless?) he got out of money.
“Q. — Did he have money all the time ? ' •
“A. — I never saw him with a cent in my life.”
Re-Examined.
“Q. — You never saw him with a cent, because he spent it all for liquor ?
“A. — I suppose he did; I never saw him with a cent.
“Q. — Was he drunk a great deal of the time?
“A. — It was like this; ‘he was drunk when he could get whiskey, I expect.’ ”
And this testimony is rather corroborated by that of some other witnesses; Jatlin, for instance, who testifies that Loveless was discharged for drinking and allowing the boilers to go dry. Morrison, upon the other hand, says that he was discharged for putting saw dust into the injector, and condemning the injector as worthless, and that he, Morrison, never saw him drunk, or smelled whiskey about him. Be that as it may, Loveless was not retained more than ten days or a fortnight after the accident to the plaintiff, and the defendant was unable to find him in order to obtain his testimony.
On the morning of October 17, 1898, about nine o’clock, the plaintiff was at his post at work, when the engine ran away. He stepped to the rope, in order to check it, but was unable to do so, and a very high rate of speed was attained. At that moment the wooden pulley, called the “idler,” to which the motion of the main belt had been eommuni
The evidence as to the cause of the engine’s running away develops the fact that the “governor” was out of order, and that the fireman and engineer was, as has been stated, eighteen feet away, on the top of the boiler, looking after an arrangement supposed to be automatic, whereby the saw-dust, which was used as fuel, was supplied to the furnace. A subsequent examination by Mr. Morrison of the “governor,” which was intended, automatically, to regulate the speed of ■the engine, showed some scale, or scales, in it which prevented it from working properly. How long it had been in that condition, no one could say. The plaintiff, however, testifies that the engine had run away a few weeks before that, and, to quote his language, “Mr. Morrison claimed that he had fixed the engine, he said he had found out what was the matter with it, that the governor didn’t control the engine, but he said everything was all right, then.”
“Q. — Did he say it would run away again, or would not ?
“A. — He said he had found out what was the matter with the governor, and had had it fixed, that there was not any more danger.”
It is true that Morrison denies this statement; but then Morrison denies that the engine ran away after the accident, whereas there are several witnesses, who have no interest at stake, who testify that it did run away, several times, after the accident, and was stopped by the engineer or fireman, and not by the governor. Upon the subject of the
We have, therefore, a patched boiler, an engine, with a governor known to be defective; and both engine and boiler, acquired at secondhand, and of an age beyond the knowledge of any of the witnesses. To which, add a man in charge of the engine, acting in the double capacity of engineer and fireman, who was never sober when he could get drunk, who was, at the moment of the accident, engaged in the work of a fireman, at a distance from the engine, and who, when the engine ran away, was not enough of an engineer, to know what to do without the assistance of a mill hand who makes no pretence that he is an engineer at all. Further than this, we have a pulley assigned to work which it was incapable of performing safely, to the knowledge, not only of the superintendent of the mill, but of persons less well informed. And finally^ as a result of it all, there is an accident, and a working man, who must live by his labor, is badly crippled, in an effort to save himself and the property of his employers from the consequences of their own recklessness.
We think that, upon principle and authority, the plaintiff: is entitled to recover:
> 1. Because the running away of the engine was a result of a defect in. the governor, which the defendant knew, or ought to have known.
2. Because, if the engineer had been competent, or the defendant had employed, a fireman to assist him, one or the other of them might have checked the runaway.
■ 4. Because the plaintiff was subjected to dangers, by reason of defective and insufficient appliances, and an incompetent engineer, which were not incidental to the business in which he was engaged, and from which he was entitled to protection through the presumed knowledge and intelligence of his employer.
Poirer vs. Carroll, 35 Ann., 699; Towns & Wife vs. R. R. Co., 37 Ann., 630; McFee vs. R. R. Co., 42 Ann., 791; Bomar vs. R. R. Co., 42 Ann., 983; Mattise vs. Ice Co., 46 Ann., 1535; Meyers vs. R. R. Co., 49 Ann., 27; Stucke vs. R. R. Co., 50 Ann., 173; Hough vs. T. & P. R. R. Co., 100 U. S., 212.
As to the amount to which he is entitled, the evidence shows that he is forty-two years of age, that he earns his living by manual labor, that he was receiving fifty-two dollars a month when injured, and that up to the date of the trial, he had lost eight months time, or over $400.00, and was still not in a condition to do the work which he had done before.
It also shows that he had paid his surgeon $183.50. Under these circumstances, we repeat what was said in the case of Mullins vs. Blaise, 37 Ann., 92, to-wit: “Where the verdict of the jury is not manifestly excessive, and when we can feel no certainty that any modification thereof would come nearer exact retribution, we are not justified in disturbing it.”
The judgment appealed from is therefore aflirmed.