178 N.C. 205 | N.C. | 1919
after stating tbe case as above: Tbe only question before us is tbe sufficiency of tbe answer to raise tbe issues tendered by tbe defendant regarding fraud and undue influence. We are required by tbe statute (Bev., sec. 495) to construe a pleading liberally, and in enforcing tbis provision we bave adopted tbis rule: tbat if in any portion of it or to any extent it presents facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or if facts sufficient for tbat purpose can be fairly gathered from it, tbe pleading will stand, however inartificially it may bave been drawn or however uncertain, defective and redundant may be its statements for, contrary to tbe common-law rule, every reasonable in-tendment and presumption must be made in favor of tbe pleader. Tbis is what we held in Blackmore v. Winders, 144 N. C., 212, and more recently in Brewer v. Wynne, 154 N. C., 467; Renn v. R. R., 170 N. C., 128, 136; Lee v. Thornton, 171 N. C., 209.
There is no magic in using tbe word “fraud,” as a term, in order properly to plead fraud, nor is it necessary to state “undue influence” in those words in order to rely upon such a plea. It is sufficient to state tbe facts from which fraud and undue influence arise. While tbis has been held in numerous cases there is a good statement of tbe doctrine in 12 E. C. L., at p. 417, see. 164, to tbis effect. While fraud must be clearly charged, it is not necessary to allege it in terms if tbe facts alleged are such as in themselves constitute fraud, or if so alleged tbat fraud may be inferred or presumed, for tbe acts charged are not less fraudulent because tbe word “fraud” or “fraudulent” is not employed by tbe pleader in characterizing them. In other words, an allegation of facts from which tbe conclusion of fraud may result is sufficient.
Now as to what is sufficient to constitute fraud or undue influence. Although tbe plaintiff be not a lunatic or insane, yet if her mind was so weak tbat she was unable to guard herself against imposition, or to resist importunity or tbe use of undue influence, equity will grant her tbe relief she seeks, provided it be shown tbat she has been imposed upon by tbe use of either of tbe means enumerated. Mere weakness or inadequate consideration, however, will not be sufficient. A court of equity cannot measure tbe understandings or capacities of individuals. Where there is a legal capacity there cannot be an equitable incapacity apart from fraud. 1 Fonbl. Eq., B. 1, M. 2, S. 3. If she be of sane mind she has a right to dispose of her property, and her will stands in place of a reason, provided tbe contract or act justifies tbe conclusion tbat she has exercised a deliberate judgment such as it is, and has not been circumvented or imposed on by cunning, artifice, or undue influence, means abhorrent to equity, and constituting fraud. Rippy v. Gant, 39 N. C., 445. “Tbe mere fact tbat a man is of weak understanding, or is below tbe average of mankind in intellectual capacity,, is not of
"With these authorities before us let us briefly review the facts as alleged in the answer, for the action of the judge in disregarding them as not pertinent and his refusal to submit issues upon them were the same as if the plaintiff had demurred to the defense so set up. We must assume these allegations to be true upon this appeal, although it may hereafter so happen that the proof will not substantiate the charge. The defendant was, at the time of this transaction, very old (now 80 years of age) and decrepit, in wretched physical health, unable most of the time to leave her bed, and without such mental capacity as would
In this ease we have allegations sufficient to show fraud and undue influence, viz.: mental and physical weakness and imbecility, extreme old age, grossly inadequate consideration, greater superiority of the one over the other, the relation of friend and advisor, and consequent full
The defendant could plead double, and set up inconsistent or contradictory defenses. McLamb v. McPhail, 126 N. C., 218; Williams v. Sutton, 164 N. C., 216; Clark’s Code (3d Ed.), sec. 245; 1 Pell’s Revisal, p. 226, sec. 482, and note with cases.
It may be that in the development of the case the defendant’s proof may not sustain her allegations of fraud and undue influence, but what she has charged is sufficient in law and entitles her to be heard before the jury.
As the issues will be somewhat interdependent and injustice may be done by allowing them as now answered to stand, we direct that they be set aside and that the whole case be tried again upon all of the issues which are raised by the pleadings, and it will be so certified.
New trial.