Sec. 70.27 (1), Stats., in part provides :
“Thе actual and necessary costs and expenses of making assessors’ plats shall be paid out of the treasury of the city, village, town or county whose governing body *711 ordered the plat, and all or any part oí such cost may be charged to the land, without inclusion of improvements, so plаtted in the proportion that the last assessed valuation of each parcel bears to the last assessed total valuation of all lands included in the assessor’s plat, and collected as a special assessment on such land, as provided by s. 66.60.”
The parties differ in their interpretаtion of this statute. The property owners contend that the clause, “as provided by s. 66.60,” must be interpreted to mean that the entire procedure in the determination of the assessment and the levying of the lien must be as set forth in the municipal law, special-assessment statutes. The town contends thаt the only procedures of sec. 66.60 that are applicable are those relating to the “collection” of special assessments. The circuit court agreed with the town.
Property owners rely upon
Service Investment Co. v. Dorst
(1989),
The interpretation urged by the property owners would lead to a result at odds with thе expressed legislative intent of sec. 70.27, Stats. The conflicts are numerous and are apparent to the careful reader. We need but *712 point out that sec. 70.27, without equivocation, provides that the cost of making an assessor’s plat shall be paid out of the treasury of the town. There is no limitation, as there is in sec. 66.60, providing that the determination to assess specific property owners for improvements to their propеrty must be made prior to the time that the expenses are incurred if such assessments are to be levied. Under sec. 70.27 the board may properly dеcide to charge the costs back to the property owners after the services are performed and paid out of the town treаsury. Under sec. 66.60 a variety of costs can be charged as special assessments in connection with the work undertaken. Under sec. 70.27 only “actuаl” costs of preparing a plat can be charged. Moreover, sec. 70.27 prescribes a definite formula for the apportionment оf costs, while sec. 66.60 permits special assessments for improvements imposed pursuant to the police power to be apportioned “upon a reasonable basis.”
In view of these conflicts, and others which we find it unnecessary to mention, the legislature could not have intendеd that the whole of the procedures outlined in sec. 66.60, Stats., is mandatory, when under sec. 70.27 a determination is made to charge back the cost of an assessor’s plat. The only reasonable interpretation is that adopted by the trial court — that only those portions of sec. 66.60 relating tо the “collection” of special assessments need be followed. Although the entire panoply of procedures detailed in sec. 66.60 is nоt required, it should be pointed out that the procedure employed by the town gave the property owner due notice and the right to be heаrd prior to the determination of the assessment and the imposition of the assessment lien. The procedures employed afforded due prоcess. The assessment was validly imposed.
The annexation to the city of Marshfield took place too late to supersede the town’s jurisdiсtion to make the *713 assessment and impose the lien. Sec. 66.60 (15), Stats., relates to the “collection” of special assessments and, thereforе, applies to the procedures of sec. 70.27. Sec. 66.60 (15) creates a lien on the property “from the date of the determination of suсh assessment by the governing body.” Under this statute, the lien was effective from the time of the “determination” of the town board on June 4, 1970. The property ownеrs argue, however, that the procedural steps taken by the town were ineffective until the final resolution was published on July 16, 1970. They rely on sec. 66.60(8) (e), whiсh provides:
“When the final resolution is published, all work or improvements therein described and all awards, compensations and assessments arising therefrom are deemed legally authorized and made, subject to the right of appeal under sub. (12).”
We do not deem this statute controlling over the spеcific statute that dictates the effective date of the assessment lien. Sec. 66.60 (8) (e), Stats., merely provides that all procedural steps theretofore taken in the course of the assessment procedure are presumptively correct, subject only to the bringing of an apрeal. That statute’s scope does not encompass a procedure brought under sec. 70.27.
The town’s lien was effective on June 4, 1970 — prior tо the effective date of the annexation of the property to Marshfield on June 11, 1970. Although the validity of the annexation of the property to the city of Marshfield is not questioned in these proceedings, the lien of the town is nevertheless effective and the assessments are payable under the provisions of sec. 66.03 (13) (b).
The original judgment entered by the trial court on March 31, 1971, awarded the town $1,601.31 as costs and disbursements. Apparently, costs wеre determined on the assumption that each of the property owners was objecting to the gross assessment of $4,500 and not just *714 to that portion assessed against his own property. Upon objection made by the property owners, the portion of the judgment assessing costs was reopеned and the costs were reduced to $501.31. For such sum, the owners of each of the parcels of property were made jointly and severаlly liable to the town of Spencer.
There was error in the awarding of costs. The costs should have been assessed separately against each of the appellants and computed on the basis of the individual assessment in question.
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wisconsin Auto Sales, Inc.
(1949),
By the Court. — That part of the judgment sustaining the assessment of the town of Spencer is affirmed; that part of the judgment awarding costs to the town is vacated; and the cause is remanded for the assessment of costs not inconsistent with this opinion.