82 Iowa 10 | Iowa | 1891
This contention may be regarded as being between the two districts, as, in the view we take of the case, there is nothing in the relation of the individual plaintiffs to the issue that can affect its determination. The sole question is as to which of these districts, if either, is entitled to jurisdiction over the territory in question, or, rather, whether the plaintiff district is entitled to such jurisdiction; for the relief asked can only be granted if the plaintiff is entitled to the jurisdiction. It is admitted that many years prior to 187S, section 1, and the north half of the northwest quarter of section 12, were attached to the independent district of Village Creek, LaFayette township, and so remained until that year. Our first inquiry is whether that territory has ever been legally separated from that district, for, if not, then clearly neither of these parties is entitled to jurisdiction over it.
The proceedings by which it is claimed to have been separated are these : On March 29, 1873, the petition of residents of Lansing, LaFayette and Center townships was presented to the board of the independent district of Village Creek, requesting that said section 1 and north half of the northwest quarter of section 12, and certain lands in LaFayette township, be set off to the petitioners for the purpose of establishing a new school district. This petition was granted by the board, and at a meeting of the electors of Village Creek district, March 9, 1874, it was “Eesolved, that all parties interested in property or land in section 6, township 98, range 3, and section 1, and north half of the northwest quarter, section 12, township 98, range 4, desiring to form a new school district for school purposes, be detached from Village Creek independent district, in conformity with law in such cases provided.” September 22, 1874, the secretary was-authorized to notify the county auditor to change the plat of the district. A similar petition was presented tO' the board of the plaintiff district at a meeting held December 12,1874, and the following resolution adopted: “Eesolved, that if district of Lansing and LaFayette
That this territory was legally attached to the independent district of Village Creek is not questioned, and, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, we must presume that it was legally attached. Being so attached it could not be severed, except as authorized by law; and, until so separated, remains a part thereof. The policy of our law is that territory once organized for ■school purposes must always remain within some jurisr diction ; that it may not be detached from the jurisdiction to which it belongs without at the same time becoming all or a part of another jurisdiction for school purposes. It is open to question whether there is any
It is evident that the proceedings had. were not in pursuance of any statutory provision, hence we need not determine Whether there is any statute by which such separation could be made, but simply inquire whether these proceedings had the effect of legally detaching the territory from the independent district of Tillage Creek. The effect of the action taken by the independent district of Tillage Creek was to turn this territory out of its jurisdiction, into the care of the petitioners, leaving them to hunt an alliance for it that would bring it into some jurisdiction for school purposes, and afford school1 facilities to the residents therein. Such action, though no doubt well meant, was wholly unauthorized, and contrary to the spirit and policy 6f the law. There was certainly no authority in the independent district of Tillage Creek to separate this territory, and turn it out of its jurisdiction, to be the unsuccessful suppliant for admission as a subdistrict to other school organizations. It could only be severed, if at all, by becoming at the
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the territory in question was not legally separated from the independent district of Village Creek, and, therefore, did not become restored to the plaintiff district. It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff is not entitled to any of the relief demanded, and that the decree of the district court should be affirmed.