106 A.2d 695 | D.C. | 1954
Lead Opinion
Appellee corporation has been engaged in the laundry and dry cleaning business in the District of Columbia since 1941. In 1943, 1944, 1945, and 1946 appellee filed its personal property tax return as required by law.
Appellee then filed suit in the Municipal Court to recover these seized funds. The complaint alleged that the additional assessments were “arbitrary and capricious”' and “illegal,” and that the funds were “unlawfully seized” in what “amounts to an exaction of plaintiff’s property without due-process of law.” At the trial appellee relied mainly on the testimony of its president and general manager to show that the valuation of its personal property as reported in its tax returns was the full and true value required by the statute.
The Government’s first contention is that the burden of proof on a taxpayer
The Code requires that the taxpayer list his personal property “at not less than the full and true value thereof in lawful money”, and the property shall be assessed at its “fair cash value”.
Moreover, appellee’s witnesses at trial admitted that many of its heavier pieces of equipment had a usable life of more than ten years, while some of its lighter equipment had a life of only two or three years. All of these articles were lumped together for accounting purposes and given an average life of ten years and depreciated accordingly. Obviously, such a system could not be the basis for determining the fair cash value of áll the individual pieces of appellee’s personal property on a given tax date.
We hold, therefore, .that the appel-lee failed to show that the assessment of its personal property was arbitrary or capricious, or that it was even erroneous. By proving only its accounting method for computing its taxes, it showed nothing incorrect on the Government’s part in assessing on the basis of higher valuations. As the burden of proof was on the taxpayer,
Reversed, with instructions to enter judgment for the defendant.
. Code 1951, § 47-1206.
. “All personal property in the District of Columbia subject to taxation, shall be listed and assessed at not less than the full and true value thereof in lawful money.” Code 1951, 47-1202.
. Maish v. Territory of Arizona, 164 U.S. 599, 17 S.Ct. 193, 41 L.Ed. 567; Watrous v. District of Columbia, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 295, 135 F.2d 654.
. Great Northern R. Co. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 56 S.Ct. 426, 80 L.Ed. 532; Harjim v. Owens, 5 Cir., 64 F.2d 306, certiorari denied 290 U.S. 655, 54 S.Ct. 71, 78 L.Ed. 568.
. Code 1951, § 47-1203.
. 51 Am.Jur., Taxation, § 696.
. District of Columbia v. Morris, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 356, 159 F.2d 13.
. Compania General De Tabacos v. Collector of Int. Rev., 279 U.S. 306, 49 S.Ct. 304, 73 L.Ed. 704; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 38 S.Ct. 495, 62 L.Ed. 1154.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring).
I cannot agree with the proposition that appellee proved only its accounting method and thereby failed to carry even the usual