*1 COLUMBIA, Appellant, OF DISTRICT HOUSE APARTMENT
BURLINGTON
COMPANY, t/a The
Hotel, Appellee.
No. 7986. Appeals.
District of Columbia Court 10, 1976.
Argued May en banc
Decided June *2 C.,D. Sanger, Washington,
Christopher appellee. for REILLY, KEL Judge,* and Chief Before GALLAGHER, KERN, FICKLING,** LY, YEAGLEY, NEBEKER, HARRIS and MACK, Judges. Associate
HARRIS, Judge: Associate 1976, 29, a division of this January On (with a minor affirmed unanimously the trial court’s adjustment) arithmetical assessment property tax of a real reduction 1973. made for fiscal which had been 2-1, by a vote opinion, same In the that as- reversed of the division majority which extend- court’s order the trial pect of to fiscal assessment the reduced ed until a new assess- years, (and future made) ground that the on the ment could be to do so. On jurisdiction trial court lacked 1976, appellee’s peti- granted April vacated the en banc and rehearing tion question The 29 decision. January the reduced apply authority court’s succeeding years 1974 and assessment en and reconsidered reargued has trial court’s We now hold banc. adjusted determination “for all the lawful constituted another valuation succeeding years until correct and to law” was made is affirmed. is the Burlington) (hereinafter
Appellee District of land in the parcel owner designated officially Columbia improved land Square Lot 214. The known as a structure Avenue, Vermont Hotel, is located on Washington, Corp. Melvin J. Asst. Coun- Thomas Circle. just south of sel, C., with whom Fran- Washington, D. C. the District Colum- February In Counsel, Murphy, Corp. Washington, cis D. of real estate tax- bia issued an assessment C., filed, the time the brief was property. It 1973 for the es for fiscal Wixon, Counsel, Corp. E. Asst. Henry valuation of brief, upon a C., predicated $92.30 Washington, D. were on the March Bur- foot. On appellant. per square * ** argu- participated Judge Judge Judge at oral REILLYwas Chief Court at FICKLING argument; changed ment, of oral his status March time but died on Retired, Judge, September to Chief on participated phases all of the en banc He disposition of this case.
lington appealed
square
years
to the District of
foot for fiscal
1973 and
Columbia
Board of Equalization and
and ordered the District
to refund a tax
Review. D.C.
$15,308.72,
interest,
overpayment
Code
-709.
with
within ten
its order.
days
47-646.1
Following a hear-
ing, the
an
Board issued
order reducing the
we conclude —as did
Preliminarily,
fair market
value
land for
pur-
tax
*3
originally
the division which
considered this
poses
square
per
foot. Burlington
$84.61
appeal
the trial court was in error in
—that
then paid its 1973real property tax liability,
directing the District
to refund the over
valuation,
based on the Board’s
and filed
payment
days
within
of its order.
ten
D.C.
timely petition in the Superior Court con-
1973,
Code
and -2407 control
47-1016
§§
testing
1973,
the
order.
Board’s
D.C.Code
the
it has been
refunding of taxes when
47-2403.2
§
taxes were
“finally determined” that such
requisite
The
erroneously paid.
finality
court,
In
petition
the
filed in the trial
Code,
defined
of the
and
47-2404
it
§
Burlington challenged the Board’s assess-
lapse
mere
of ten
by
days
satisfied
the
ment
on
being
as
based
an arbitrary and
after the
the trial court’s order.
entry of
unfounded overvaluation of the fair market
worth of
estate.
the real
One of Burling-
The District also contends that
ton’s expert witnesses testified that the fair was error for the trial court to have exclud
market
property
value of the
was $64.00
prior
ed the evidence
offer
Burling
per
foot;
square
the
placed
other
it at
ton to sell
The
of
property.
deposition
supported
$67.20. Each witness
his conclu- Burlington’s
reflected that
president
sion
by citing
properties
sales
of compa-
1972,
possible
he had authorized a
sale of
rable size in
Washington
similar downtown
foot,
per square
at
property
$70.00
witnesses,
locations.3 The District’s expert
company
that
had asked
subsequently the
sales,
relying upon
disputed
different
Bur-
per
option
No
square
pur
$75.00
foot.
lington’s evidence and conclusions on fair
chase
those offers. The Dis
resulted from
market value.
trict
asking prices
claims that an owner’s
should be
evidence as admissions
allowed in
The trial court found that
the District’s
and as
fair
probative of
market value.
Burlington’s property
“ostensibly against
contention,4
evidence and was
accept
While
erroneous, arbitrary, and
The
unlawful.”
evidentiary error was harmless in view of
property
valued the
per
other
at trial. The District
testimony given
$67.00
statutory provi-
assessment,
i.e.,
Substantial revisions
851
The
the assessed
affecting
property
value,
sions
real
tax assessments
is the amount
which the tax is
were made in 1974. See District of Columbia
“Equalization”
process
levied
denotes the
im-
1974,
Property
Real
93-407,
Tax Revision Act of
P.L.
plementing
duty
Equaliza-
Board of
401-29,
(effective July
88
1036
Stat.
§§
fairly
impartially
tion and Review “to
1, 1975),
D.C.Code
47-641 to
equalize
the value
real
made
to the
-646. We refer herein
Code sections
board of
assistant assessors
the basis for
litigation,
applicable
which are
to the instant
1973,
assessment.”
47-708.
§
prior
since this
case arose
enactment of
present
laws.
Burlington agreed
3. The District
that the
briefly
2. For
existing
convenience we define
some of the
improvements
insig-
on the land are of
opinion.
concepts used in this
taxation
The
value,
nificant
and that the hotel would have to
(1)
process
term “valuation” refers
by
both
put
be demolished
the land to
to its
which the Board Assistant Assessors de-
“highest and best use.”
assigns a fair market
termines and
value to
property,
particular piece
(2)
real
4. See United
Land in Balti
States
Certain
assigned as
amount so
the value. See D.C.
County,
F.Supp.
Maryland,
more
47-705.
Code
“Assessment” is
(D.Md.1962);
v. School
of Der
Durika
District
valuation,
by multiplying
attained
(1964);
ry Township,
trial court of the Columbia, 81 U.S. Bank District of tional It plain any appeal relief. is (1946), F.2d 847 App.D.C. assessment, concerning the Board law, case, open both facts and is “the whole would have been on inevitably based consideration.” arguments identical which the Board the term “whole Necessarily 47-2403. rejected in connection with the already had scrutiny of the valuation encompasses ease” assessment, would have been a futile power to fashion the court’s mechanics and procedure taxpayer which the should not be computation proce effective relief from penalized bypassing. We do not believe reading of the District’s While dure. our taxpayer intended that a should Congress the court’s tax statutes does not contravene required repeatedly empty to invoke an any full authority, to exercise its power order seek ob statutory pattern in language between literal conflict adequate from tain relief the court. Addi duty court’s ensure Code and the trial tionally, acquired once the trial court has imposition fair taxes jurisdiction (or lawful and particular over valuation equalization), permitting or in favor of that forum not must be resolved has but only authority obligated City also trial court action. See Sioux broad “grant party County, the relief v. Dakota U.S. Bridge Co. judgment] whose favor rendered is 67 L.Ed. [the S.Ct. entitled, even if the party has demand where an assessment Finally, ed pleadings.” Super.Ct. such relief in his upon a “valuation made accord based not 54(c).10 Civ.R. ing upon figure law” rather deter significance Of decisional is the fact that “erroneous, to be arbi mined the court *6 Burlington contested the entire valuation unlawful,” reject thus trary, and process, merely single not a tax payment. nullity, incap mere ed must be considered a The term “valuation” entails more than a applicability. future able of valid money particular finite amount of for a Co Hamilton National Bank District of year. encompasses proc- It deliberative lumbia, supra. an body culminating ess of administrative perceive no undue onus to We legal in computation a which has a effect sustaining government resulting from our one least until beyond any year, ef- granting prospective court’s process again subsequent is undertaken in a It requires fect assessment. reduced It year. was this whole administrative no that which to do more than conduct, course of its ultimate determina- do, already statutorily required was tion, binding presently and its effect —both is, a of appel- to make new valuation prospectively Burlington and —from to law. This man- property according lee’s and over which the trial requested relief a upon continued reliance date forecloses jurisdiction. The court found figure judicially determined to be arbitrari- com- arbitrarily that the valuation had been excessive, may the District not valid- ly puted, legally and that it therefore was not according “valuation ly contend that a new as a basis for taxation. Under these usable achieved circumstances, 54(c) satisfactorily tri- has compelled Rule law” later notice assess- mailing al court’s the mere a accommodation relief, specific Bur- the trial court do the fact that failure to demand 10. While we not consider petition specifically granting a lington relief to that which its is not limited in party did amend formally requested. has to constitute a include the 1974 assessment assessment, to file identical; simple or even a amend- fig- voided ment based petition pending in the Tax Congress surely ure. envisioned a valua- ment a Superior Division of Court to include re- with more substance than that process tion for fiscal 1974.3 request year fund statutory phrase when it “ac- employed cording to law.” scheme for relief from al- statutory year inaccurate fiscal assessments is legedly conclusion, In note the trial again -2403, in found computa- court’s minor error in arithmetical -2404, administrative remedies and the tion, supra, premature see note 7 and the exhausted before there must be outlined granting refund of the of an immediate court action. taxpayer may pursue Sec- taxes In all other re- erroneously paid. provide -2403 that where tions 47-709 and spects, appealed the order from is affirmed.. following year for the fiscal Affirmed as modified. March dr after March is received before valuation, in without an increase KELLY, Judge, Associate with whom made to the Board of complaint must be MACK, GALLAGHER and Associate from Equalization and Review which sits Judges, join, in concurring part and dissent- April particu- 1 for January through ing in part: (D.C.Code 47-708). If purpose lar After hearing a full as to an assessment adversely such made and decid- complaint is for fiscal year the trial court reduced taxpayer may, ed the after all taxes for Board of and Review’s paid, appeal are to the year entire fiscal equalized assessment of appellee’s property 1 and for the Superior Court after October provided in its order that “the aforesaid Where, however, following. six months reduced assessment . shall consti- in and notice there is an increase valuation tute the full and lawful assessment 1, com- writing is received after March for District of Columbia fiscal plaint unnecessary. to the Board is An pursuant to District of Columbia Code appeal then taken to the can 47-709,1 for all succeeding years Court, after all taxes for the fiscal until another according valuation is made paid, have been 1 and beginning October law.” The decision fiscal year as to following. sixth months support has full agree the evidence and I case, In the instant notice of the fiscal it should be affirmed. Even before this $2,332,400.00 year 1974 assessment of evidentiary hearing, another valu- by appellee received sometime after March appellee’s ation of property had been made 27,1973, and was identical in amount which, to law for fiscal equalized for fiscal year Board’s statutory under the scheme in effect at the time,2 had become final some months before *7 statutory require by the court’s decision. Review of that valua- The scheme does not tion had thus been foreclosed six months in its be revalued property terms that real ruling year, require designation advance of the court’s because of each it does appellee’s mandatory failure to follow the of value for the tax rolls and notification statutory procedures taxpayer. to contest 1974 that value to the establishment, notice, 1973, 47-709, provides: 2. The timetable for § 1.D.C.Code appeal real assessments was substan- estate property The valuation of the real made tially by District of Real revised Columbia equalized completed as aforesaid shall be 1974, Property Tax Revision Act of P.L. 93- Monday May not later than the first annu- 1, 407, (effective July ally. 88 Stat. 1036 The valuation of said real equalized 1975). shall be made and as aforesaid by approved of the Dis- Commissioner 1, July not later than annu- trict Columbia amended, pleadings no 3. Since were not ally, by approved and when Commission- testimony taken on the 1974 assessment. of taxation for er shall constitute the basis succeeding year the next and until another according valuation is made to law .... for Appeals of Tax court, creating the Board at the of the én banc majority A provides that of Columbia concludes without basis the District urging appellee, the Court by be reviewed may assessment of decisions that because the fiscal 1974 review the and that such Appeals same as the property was the appellee’s affirm, or 1973, power have the no subse- court “shall equalized figure for fiscal in is not of the board property was made if decision quent valuation of the course, law, reverse is, modify or to law.4 no accordance with There board, with or without such a con- of the testimony of record from which the decision Moreover, justice it as hearing, is the case for remanding clusion could be drawn. 371, that majority, D.C.Code say, require.” incorrect to does 52 Stat. may all, fiscal 1974 assess- 47-2404(a). the trial court found the Had this been 1940, § “erroneous, un- arbitrary applying ment for strong case would be made in view It would be error if lawful.” to the Fed- finality applicable the rule of any testimony respect lack of with Tax Appeals, Tax now the eral Board of year. that v. the United Dobson Court of States. Commissioner, 239, decided De- 64 S.Ct. to the “tradition majority also turns However, the same or- cember a court” to bol powers al and inherent qualifying another and ganic act contains That holding phrase, ster its in this case. found in the is not to be provision an stating, without so of course obvious the Tax “The find- creating acts Court: inher reference to a court’s traditional and by fact the board shall have the ings of relief. The power grant equitable ent of fact an finding same effect as a is, pursuing appellee fact jury.” court or a verdict of a equity no relief in statutory remedy and seeks 47-2404(a). D.C.Code Stat. if, indeed, any such relief is availa equity an findings equity of fact Since Additionally, spoke ble. the statute which from time jury and the verdict of a have judicial review in Hamilton scope subject to different immemorial been Columbia, National Bank v. District of to know finality puzzling rules of it is 200, 156 (1946), upon F.2d 843 section meant what the draftsmen of this relies, which the differed in one majority in the one rule by including both significant from that aspect under Appeals findings. of Tax reviewing Board brought. this suit is In Hamilton National Columbia, supra Bank v. District of no 42-2404(a) had Since 156 F.2d at the court said: this case language when provisional such power to Our review its of Tax arose, inapposite. case is [Board the Hamilton Appeals] equity decisions is “as under the Green, D.C. In District of Columbia practice case, in which whole both (1973), stated 852-53 310 A.2d App., law, consideration”, facts and open cir- extraordinary” “exceptional scope —“the of a review of an equity be- (deliberate discrimination cumstances court.” [Footnote omitted.] of one class of members tween sought In an earlier Supreme case the Court could be owners), equitable relief statute, However, spoke with some wonder of a tax. enjoin the assessment Pace, saying, District of Columbia v. that resort to case are such the facts of this 406, 407-408, Appellee U.S. S.Ct. inappropriate. relief is equitable *8 (1944): L.Ed. contest at law to adequate remedy had an failed to invoke the his 1974 assessment provisions for review of Board of also Superior Court. See jurisdiction of the Appeals present complexi- Tax decisions Keyes, D.C.App., v. baffling ties almost as as the test of of Columbia District 4(a) (1976). taxability itself. Section of the Act 362 A.2d reach, 47-705, provides: determine information in its 4. separate tract or lot of real of each value shall, Said Board of Assistant Assessors from actual view and from the best sources here, may while it sequence The time
unusual, from preclude appellee did
complaining of the 1974 assessment and, and Review
Board unsuccessful, the tax and paying
it been
appealing Appellee’s Court. jurisdictional require-
failure to meet is,
ment decisive to the my judgment, regard of the court’s order with
invalidity
to fiscal 1974.5 District of Columbia v.
Keyes, supra; George Hyman Construction Columbia, D.C.App.,
Co. v. District (1974);
A.2d 175 District of Columbia v.
Berenter, 466 F.2d
I would affirm the trial court’s decision
relating to fiscal and reverse as
to fiscal 1974. al., Petitioners,
H. Max AMMERMAN et
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RENTAL COMMISSION,
ACCOMMODATIONS
Respondent.
No. 11187. Appeals. Columbia Court March
Argued
Decided July 54(c) hardly permits grant precluded by 5. Rule the trial relief statute.