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District of Columbia v. Acme Reporting Co.
530 A.2d 708
D.C.
1987
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*2 paid, celled including and that the taxes NEWMAN, Before NEBEKER and interest, any penalties and be refunded to PAIR, Judges, Associate Senior Acme.4 Judge. Acme, presently corporation, a Delaware PAIR, Judge: Senior was, during periods question, the tax Maryland engaged Corporation in the busi- appeal This is from an order of the Tax providing reporting ness of court services Superior Division of the Court which held Maryland and the District of Columbia. the court appel- services of is, been, Acme the official has court lee, Reporting Company (Acme), Acme reporter Board, for the Aeronautics Civil were improperly by appellant, taxed Board, the National Labor Relations (the District).1 District of Columbia The Exchange Commission, Securities and $45,- court ordered the refund to Acme of Defense, Department interest, plus which amount Labor, Representatives, U.S. House court improperly found had been assessed Senate, the U.S. the U.S. Claims Court and by and collected the District. We affirm. majority U.S. Tax Court. of its provided are pur- I govern- suant to the federal contracts with pertinent which, facts for the most ment. Acme does no court part undisputed, may be summarized as Superior either the of the District of Court follows. After an of Acme audit and other Columbia or this court. companies providing servic- es, District, July provided assessed The services Acme’s court Acme for sales tax and use deficiencies in include attendance at and the re- $47,454.60. cording legal proceed- amount of The tax transcription authori- $47,454.60, Although opinion The trial court's this matter is re- the assessment was for ported Reporting in Acme Co. v. District Co- reply admitted in its District lumbia, Wash.L.Rptr. Daily (July petition, Columbia's answer Acme’s 1985). $1,762.13, represented por- the use tax tion, controversy and that it did not was not 2. The measure of the was the sale of tran- part of that intend to seek cancellation scripts litigants by private ordered and did not $45,692.47 dispute is in assessment. receipts by from the sale of tran- appeal. scripts to the District of Columbia or federal governments, exempt who from statute 47-2005(1), imposition penalty 4. The and interest was such tax. See D.C.Code of Columbia. waived ings judicial trials hearings transcripts prepared by em- agencies. before administrative ployed by Each re- the District of Columbia courts. porter responsible producing an accu- The memorandum concluded that the Dis- recording rate and full legal proceed- trict’s sales and use apply taxes did not protect attended so as to tribunal complete Acting record. the District of except Columbia courts *3 as an official the court or purchased administrative when non-party pro- a tribunal, the ceeding being recorded, administer oaths to newspa- such as a witnesses, responsibility bear for all per reporter. exhib- The memorandum directed its, testify as to the accuracy questions of the to Andy, employee James record. Department the of Finance and Revenue (the Department). Relying opinion on the product The final report- of Acme’s court accounting its firm and the memoran- ing services is a verbatim transcript Malech, dum from Mr. Acme determined proceeding engaged Acme was report. that the District’s sales and use taxes did prepared All transcripts are furnished to apply not to monies received for its court government either the court or agency reporting services. holding proceeding or to the proceeding. A certain tangi- amount of In Department November of personal ble property, paper registered bind- sent a notice to all sales and use covers, ing and is used produce Acme to taxpayers concerning the 1969 amendments transcripts reported proceedings. imposing sales and use taxes on The cost of these items constitutes less notice, services. This how- percent than four ever, the amount Acme did not define the term steno- charges its customers for reporting court graphic Department services.” When the services and no charge promulgated is made to regulation to define the customers for such services,” materials. “public stenographic term regulation simply stated that “the term When Acme opera- commenced business typ- services includes tions sought District of it ing services.” 9 DCMR 468.3 § accounting advice from its respect- firm ing applicability of the District’s sales Many, Manag- Mr. M. Edward and use taxes to its court reporting servic- er Liability of the Tax Audit and Division es. accounting advised, letter, firm Department the District of Columbia recording the services involved Revenue, tes- Finance and testified at trial that timony printing it for customers Department were always posi- has taken the subject not to the District’s sales and "public stenographic tion that the term ser- copies and that additional services, sales of reporting vices” includes court resulting par- documents to an “interested but did specifically any refer to written ty” proceeding were not interpretation or oral Department the taxes. which included court within the “public stenographies services.”

Subsequently, Acme received from its ac- counting firm copy of a memorandum In Department when the initiated prepared Malech, by Mr. Arnold M. firms, then sales and use tax audits law it the Executive Officer of the District of being observed firms were not courts, Columbia addressed to court charged paid sales or use tax on amounts employed by ers the District of reporting Columbia for court Depart services. The provided guid- courts. This memorandum ment then conducted audits of several com concerning ance applicability panies engaged the Dis- provid in the business of trict’s sales and use taxes to the sales of services.5 Department The record reveals that the has Reporter note that District of Columbia Court never formally conducted a sales and use tax audit of a promulgated Rule which was reporter employed by a District of Colum- provides became effective March fact, conjunction bia court. with this we that sales of

7H first learned that personal service transactions which involve interpreted the term inconsequential sales as elements for which services” to include court servic- separate charges no are made. Acme ar- during Department’s es sales and use gues that its court services are tax audit of Acme in 1982. Acme immedi- exempt pursu- from sales and use taxation ately began collecting sales and use taxes ant receipts from its servic- 2201(a)(2)(B) “personal services transac- es, including the transcripts. As a tions.” District counters that since audit, result of the the District sent the provides “public stenographic servic- July notice dated which assessed es,” its sales are taxable under the tax deficiencies contested in ap- 2001(n)(l)(H) 47-2201(a)(l)(G). and § peal. Ill

II *4 principal argument ap- District’s on Initially, a brief review of the tax scheme peal is that the tax ruling court erred in throughout in effect period of the defi- that Acme’s court services do not (December ciency assessment fall meaning within the “pub- attributed to through 30, 1982) November necessary. services” in D.C. Code The Gross Sales Compensat- Tax and the 47-2001 and 47-2201. The District ing-Use Tax laws of the District are sub- ambiguous maintains that the term is not stantially similar in relation to the issues and that Acme’s clearly activities fall with- today. we address Under D.C. Code 47- § in plain meaning statutory provi- of the (1981), imposed a sales tax is on the dispute. Moreover, sions in the District (de- retail sale of “certain selected services argues interpretation its fined as ‘retail sale’ and ‘sale at retail’ long-standing is a one to which substantial chapter).” this See also D.C. Code 47- § paid. deference must be (1981) (similar provision use tax purchased “service sale”). sold or at retail Acme, however, counters that its court 47-2001(n)(l)(H) (1981) D.C. Code in- § equated services cannot be with cludes within the definition of “retail sale” “public stenographic services” within the and “sale at retail” meaning application of the statutes. An any the sale tangible personal ... construction, statutory the rules of Acme property or contends, service taxable under the compels the conclusion that the chapter.... terms of this pur- For the encompass term does not pose imposed of the tax chapter, Moreover, complains services. Acme these terms shall include but shall not notice, put it has never been either limited to ... the sale of or through statutory language, clear or other- public stenographic ... wise, necessity to collect the contest- services[.] that, Finally, ed taxes. asserts be- 47-2201(a)(l)(G) See also D.C. Code § cause it has never had reason to be aware (1981) (identical provision). use tax statutory of the District’s ostensible inter- it is clear that stenographic servic- pretation, any long-standing claimed admin- es” are taxable under the Code. interpretation by istrative However, exempt from the definition of little, any, weight. should be accorded retail,” “retail sale” or “sale at and there- 47-2001(n)(2)(B) fore not taxable under begin analysis our of the issue We § 47-2201(a)(2)(B) presented by recognizing scope § ently falling to District of Columbia sales and use views such sales as outside the except transcript when a is sold to a non- exemption § § recorded, party proceedings being 2201(a)(2)(B), irrespective of how one defines newspaper reporter. a sary We do not find it neces- "public stenographic exceptions services" pass upon validity of Rule 17. event, any thereto. Acme claims that during period Acme does not made time take issue with the taxation of sales it has non-parties. appar- dispute parties proceeding. were to our is controlled review D.C. Code of services? At the 47-3304(a) (1981). onset, “Decisions of the Su- we stress that there is no rational perior Court in cases are civil tax reviewa- distinguish basis on which to Acme’s court ble the same manner as other decisions system’s from the court of the court in civil cases tried without a application ers in of the term steno- Id.; 17-305(a) jury.” Code see also D.C. graphic services” contained in the relevant (1981). This not set means we will aside provisions. wording of the rele- judgment, except the tax court’s for errors requires vant tax code sections that sale of Co., of law. Riggs v. Aetna Insurance transcripts to interested by Acme (D.C. 1983). 454 A.2d We must must be treated in a manner identical to accept findings the court’s of fact unless fashion which sales local and they erroneous, clearly see District system federal D.C. court reporters are Washington Corp., Columbia Sheraton treated. (D.C. 1985); 499 A.2d Rock Creek issue, In resolving this we focus on the Partnership Ltd. v. Dis Plaza-Woodner “settled rule that tax strictly laws are to be (D.C. trict against construed the state and in favor of 1983), upset and we will not the ultimate taxpayer,” if the statute in controversy legal conclusion of the tax court when its ambiguous. is unclear and 3A Suther- necessarily outcome from follows its find Statutory land, Statutes Construc- ings bound, of fact which we are Dis (C. Sands, 1986); 4th ed. see tion trict Columbia v. National Bank Gould, also Gould v. U.S. *5 (D.C. 1, 1981). Washington, 431 A.2d 3 53, (1917). S.Ct. 62 L.Ed. 211 At the same However, “[rjegard special for the function time, we are mindful of the maxim that competence and of the Tax Court does not ought given “tax laws a reasonable avoiding responsibility warrant our of construction, prejudice without bias or reaching a decision of our own as to the against state, taxpayer either the application of the law to the facts.” Dis carry order to out the intention of the Seven-Up Washing trict Columbia v. of legislature and important pub- further the ton, Inc., App. 93 U.S. D.C. lic interests which such statutes subserve.” denied, 989, F.2d cert. U.S. (quoting 3A at 66.02 Sutherland, 851, always, S.Ct. L.Ed. 1123 As Brandt, 345, State v. 255 Minn. 31 N.W.2d free judg we are to sustain the trial court (1948)). Further, “[sjince obligation grounds ments on different from those on pay legisla- taxes arises only by force of which the trial court relied. v. See Jones action, tive the nature and extent of that Columbia, District 123 A.2d of liability legislative is determined (D.C. 1956). Applying guidelines the above meaning. Therefore, all the rules of statu- hand, to the case at conclude we tory construction are relevant the inter- tax court’s decision does not warrant rever pretation of revenue measures.” 3A Suth- proper reached, sal as the result was al supra at 66.03. erland, though, explain, affirm, as we will we as a law, of adopted matter on a basis not construing Congress, In acts of “we Irish, Marinopoliski the tax court. See language must look first of the (D.C. 1982). and, 445 A.2d unambiguous, statute if it is clear and give plain meaning.” effect to its Office

IV People’s Counsel v. Public Service Com determine, mission, (D.C.1984). today task before us is to law, statutory reading 47-2001(n)(1)(H) as a matter what Con- Our and 47- §§ gress 2201(a)(1)(G) “pub- intended its use of the term does leave us with a clear unambiguous understanding services” the District’s and services,” provisions. phrase “public stenographic sales and use tax so other words, Congress persuade plain did intend to local as to us to conclude that system reporters meaning and federal D.C. court inclusion necessitates and Acme’s its definition of all court in the District. Nei- itself, implementing ther the statute nor its particular significance We find of regulation, simply (1) which states that Congress facts that qualify chose to typing services, term includes 9 DCMR services,” term proposed, “stenographic (1986), ascertaining assist in by adding phrase “public,” the word plain meaning of the term steno- chose to include the within graphic services.” paragraph reads, adopted, “The copying, photo- sale of or for Having determined that we are consider copying, reproducing, duplicating, address- statutory term that on its face is ing, mailing ambiguous unclear, services and for we turn next to an legislative history examination of the sur services.” D.C.Code rounding 2001(n)(l)(H) 47-2201(a)(l)(G). enactment of the statutes in We also question for assistance. Peo H.R.Rep. Cong., note that No. 91st 1st Office of ple’s Counsel v. Public Service Commis (1969)provides imposition Sess. 13 sion, supra, 477 A.2d at 1085. The sales proposed sales tax would include provisions making “public use tax “[c]harges duplicating, addressing, and stenographic services” taxable were enact mailing services, including folding and in- Congress ed within the District of Co serting mailed, of the materials and for lumbia Revenue Act of 1969. The District great services. A deal proposed Congress that the sales and type performed of service is in the expanded use tax base be to increase reve District, by a number of commercial specific proposal nues. One was to extend firms.” the sales and use tax to include taxation of persuaded We are that to include court “stenographic Proposals services.” See within the term steno- Columbia Government graphic services” is inconsistent with the Provide Additional Revenue the Dis legislative history, scant, albeit of the Dis- trict Columbia: Hearing on H.R. 12982 trict’s sales and use tax measures as enact- the Committee on the District Before by Congress. addition, ed Con- Cong., 91st 1st Sess. 10-12 gress, “public” of the word must be ac- (1969) (statement Fletcher, of Thomas As *6 knowledged and accorded some measure of Commissioner). sistant to the propos This significance. It is a basic axiom of con- al August 30,1968, was based on the study given every struction that effect must be advisor, District’s financial Laszlo interpretations word of a statute and Ecker-Rancz, who recommended that if the operate inoperative to render a word sales and use taxes ap were broadened to should 2A be avoided. See ply personal, business, automobile, to con SUTHERLAND, “A at 46.06. statute should not be repair services, tractor and § way construed in such a as to render cer readily could increase by its tax revenues provisions superfluous insignifi twenty percent. as much as tain report specified States, cant.” services embraced Tuten v. United 1008, 1010 (D.C.1982). Thus, categories enumerated because Con business advertising, gress services: duplicating, must intended the addition of steno have graphic, exterminating, signific “public” services to build the word to have some ing, telephone answering, ance,6 reject etc. Id. proposed we the District’s cannot, Admittedly, arguably enough types we and do not claim to broad all services, exactly Congress stenographic including know what intended modi- services, fying "stenographic to the services and services” with the word "public,” sales But such is not the case. capable assessing and use tax. but we are possible Therefore, probable Congress, intending and reasons for addition. the addition First, Congress adopted pro- significance, "public” had the District’s the word to have some posal imposed following verbatim and the tax on all must have attached one of the two services," "stenographic position meanings "public," the District’s to the word either which Congress transcripts intended that sales of satisfies us that court were meant taxed, parties may all court so to all to be to be taxed. "Public” have been added might validity. phrase transcripts have some "steno- those sold as to make taxable graphic qualification parties services” used without to non-interested stenographic comparison elusions which on

definition with other “public” clauses, services” as it renders the word may reasonably and obviously meaningless superfluous.7 and comparison be drawn.... If the of one clause with the rest of the statute makes previously, Additionally, indicated as we proposition a certain clear and impose and undoubted provisions at issue sales charges the act must be construed accordingly use taxes on the sale of or reproducing, dupli- copying, photocopying, ought and so construed to make it a services, mailing cating, addressing and consistent whole. stenographic well as services.” supra, 2A at 46.06 (quoting Sutherland, 47-2001(n)(l)(H) D.C.Code §§ Sillem, Attorney General v. Eng.Rptr. 2201(a)(1)(G). When the sections are read (1864)). whole, apparent as a it is the other Application of this rule to the task at taxed, addressing copying, services support hand results further for our etc., mailing, generally are ones associ- today. resolution Section ated services and not with of the Gross Sales Tax Statute and Dictionary services. See 2001(a)(2)(B) Titles, Occupational supra at Compensating Use Tax 202.- §§ statute, provide that specifically Statute enu- 362-014 202.362-010. A unless whole, statute, passed professional per- as a should be construed as a merated whole, meaning and the to be attached to a involving sonal service transactions sales particular term is to from the be ascribed tangible personal property as inconse- surrounding context words quential elements for which no supra, phrases. 2A at made, specifically exempt are SUTHERLAND, 46.05. from the sales and taxes. Acme’s satisfy services all of the

We are also mindful of the rule that determining requirements exemption. This determi- spe- the true construction of a statutory cific one must consider nation follows from the fact that Acme’s personal services the connection of the clause with other statute, services,8 (2) clauses in the the sale of same and the con- involve inconse- transcribed, i.e., litigation occupations. newspaper, See id. at 202.362-014 distinct opposed transcripts to those sold to the interest- and 202.362-010. (As parties litigation. ed to the we stated in Further, proposed the District’s definition at- supra, note 4 we do not have at issue here the tempts distinguish between ser- sales of litigation.) to uninterested large at and services vices offered interpretation logically This flows provides employer. Again, stenographer to an premise from that court "public” to make this the word is not needed generally public, are not offered to the but rath- which, of the District’s sales distinction in the context litigation, er to those involved in all too *7 Stenographers providing ser- and use tax law. frequently, Additionally, is not choice. subject situation, only employer would not be vices to reporting Acme's performed pursuant its court services are apply only contracts, to to the taxes because the to federal and in situations, make certain sales at retail or vendors who reporters directly other court work that if the word retail sales. We also note precludes for the courts. This one who is a distinction, "public” to make this party litigation was needed having from the available consistent, "public" be the word should opportunity then to provide to choose who is to the taxed, le., prior to each service have been added pro- court service that transcribes the photocopying, words, public copying, public etc. See ceeding. In other Acme’s services are 47-2001(n)(l)(H) and 47- sought D.C.Code 2201(a)(1)(G). general public. not out the may “Public” have been added so as to distin- guish public stenographers court from hotels, jurisdiction generally buildings, Although who work in there is no law in this office 8. organizations specifically characterization and for addresses the such as secretarial servic- es, services, holding reporter general public courts and adminis- themselves out to of court the perform stenographic different states to bodies in at least five services. This inter- trative pretation supported directly of whether is the issue the of have considered (4th professional Dictionary Occupational Labor’s services constitute Titles court of 1977), report- personal All of these ed. which service transactions. lists and defines court or (which agree stenographers desig- sale of a court ers and authorities includes the services, transcripts. including stenographers) nation the sale of of and er’s

715 quential tangible personal (1948)). amounts of prop- jurisdiction, N.W.2d this “rea- a made,9 sonableness of construction can erty separate charge for which no often be is by considering consequences tested the of (3) and are not specifically enumerated as a a different one.” District Columbia v. exempt taxable service. because un- of Seven-Up Washington, supra, U.S.App. der and §§ 276, at F.2d If D.C. at 201. we were to 2201(a)(2)(B), Congress in- could not have that, urges, Congress hold as the District to tended tax Acme’s ser- court “public stenographic intended the term ser- 47-2001(n)(l)(H) vices under and §§ transcripts to the of vices” sales 2201(a)(1)(G). par- Acme’s interested today Crucial our the determination is ties, by necessity it would follow that the earlier, rule, ought stated “tax laws transcripts parties by to interested given be reasonable construction ... all District, including in the carry order out the intention of systems, the local and federal court would legislature important and pub- further be likewise to the sales and use such interests which statutes subserve.” chilling tax.10 This have on would effect SUTHERLAND, 3A at 66.02 judicial proceedings within the District— Brandt, State 345, v. (quoting future, 225 Minn. retroactively.11 not but personal tangible personal constitutes the sale of property sale 9. The of in con- tangible personal rather than sale of personal professional or nection with transac- See, Bell, property. e.g., Askew v. So.2d "inconsequential tions is an of element" York, (Fla.D.Ct.App.1971); City Booth v. New tangible price transaction "the sale (1946); 296 N.Y. 68 N.E.2d 870 New Mexi personal property is less than 10% (CCH), 40-742, Rep. para. Ruling co Tax St. charged amount for the services rendered in the 14, 1982); (January 82-185-1 Wash.St. Tax Cas. (1986). D.C.Mun.Reg. transaction." 68-624, (CCH) (Oc Rep. para. WAC 458-20-224 clearly guideline. Acme’s services fall within the 3, 1986); Virginia (CCH) tober West St.Tax Cas. tangible personal property sold—the tran- 64-084, para. 1981). (July Admin. Dec. 80-31-C scripts approximately percent four —is jurisdiction this has addressed relat charged for amount Further, services. ed issues and reached a conclusion that inis separate charges Acme does not make agreement with the above authorities. In Dis transcripts on the invoice for sent to customers. Computer trict Columbia v. Universal Associ ates, Inc., U.S.App.D.C. 465 F.2d 615 course, Of the District of Columbia and the (D.C.Cir.1972), taxability the issue was the government federal would continue to ex- computer software transferred informa empt paying on from the taxes sold punch tion on cards. The court held that the 47-2005(1), (1981). to them. See D.C.Code § purchaser paid for the information on stored comprising cards cards, not for the material thus, explain, To for liability. the statute of limitations as- found no tax Events, years, depending upon In Human Inc. v. is or five District sessment three (D.C.Sup.Ct., April Tax Docket particulars No. 2601 the case. See D.C.Code 1979), provided mailing 47-2029; 47-2213; the lease lists and 47-2011 Al- computer tapes either was labels held to be a though provisions that a court there are allow adopted, service transaction. The did reporter who is found liable back sales court, reasoning the Booth of the New York taxes, use to collect the taxes due from his Bradstreet, Appeals Court of in Dunn & Inc. purchaser, see D.C.Code and 47- §§ 47-2003 York, City New 276 N.Y. 11 N.E.2d (1981), reality, impractical. (1937), opined when the value ability to sales collect taxes retroac- knowledge, of a transaction is information or tively multiple purchasers from the number of information, paying customers legal transcripts past in the District over the written medium which it is transferred. *8 questionable years highly or three five is Relying holdings on the of the above authori costly consuming. quite be would And, and time ties, proceed it follows here course, of it would them- be ings reporter is in which official ultimately who selves liable the deficien- purchasing the information stored in the Also, penalties cies. substantial and interest compos not material imposed, prosecution may be can initi- provides transcript. per es the a 47-2028; 47-2027; ated. See 2029; 47-2030; D.C.Code pro sonal or ceedings of service— (1981). and 47-2213 transcripts. in the form official Moreover, Studios, impossible literally it is chal- also District Columbia v. Norwood Inc., 358, (1964); lenge agency U.S.App.D.C. a 118 court or decision without obtain- 336 F.2d 746 Washington Herald, transcript proceedings, Co a Times Inc. v. District full lumbia, 154, (1954). U.S.App.D.C. charges 94 213 F.2d 23 would additional sales today respect is With all due finally, majority And our determination for its do further reinforced the fact that we wrestling “public” gen- with the word not final on the necessarily have the word statute, erating ambiguity in the I find holding, although issued Today’s issue. quite imposes critical clause clear. It highest jurisdiction, court of this does charges tax on sales or escape not In the of Justice review. words public. Similarly, services to the Blackmun, misperceived “if the Court has 2001(n)(l)(F) charges taxes admission re- will, political it has assurance events,” specting “public exception with an question statutory legis because the is [the “semipub- charges for admission made may set a different course it so lature] mystery in the institution.” There is no chooses.” Amer United Steel Workers of public. word Weber, ica v. U.S. S.Ct. That Acme renders 2721, 2734, (1979).12 61 L.Ed.2d 480 gainsaid. cannot be That it does so sale Affirmed. charge equally unquestioned. is That it privately does so to the —not NEBEKER, Judge, dissenting: Associate I “semipublic[ly]” quite clear to me. —is court, holding If my view were the would reverse and instruc- remand with equally complex I am sure an rationale judgment tions to enter for the District of majority opinion as the could be written. Columbia. However, hardly it is worth the candle to an effort in a

undertake such dissent.

Therefore, why I I offer a short version of reverse the trial court on the ulti-

would question

mate of law.

The relevant statute taxes “sale of or for ... servic- 47-2001(n)(l)(H) (1981).1

es.” D.C.Code § statutory interpreta- acquisition already costly transcripts agencys make to be accorded an Comm’n v. Democratic even more of a financial burden on future liti- tion. Federal Election Comm., gants. Campaign U.S. Senatorial 70 L.Ed.2d 23 S.Ct. strongly argues interpre 12. The District that its Election in Federal Guided the rationale long standing is a tation of one to Commission, Department’s we conclude paid. which substantial deference must be We interpretation no deference. little or deserves agree generally we should "defer to an a lack interpretation demonstrates The claimed agencys interpretation of the statute which it Further, consistency. failed enforce, duty long interpre has the so as that interpretation until 1982 and then to enforce its tation is reasonable.” Guerra v. District Co against District’s within the Comm’n, Housing lumbia Rental systems. local and federal court (D.C.1985). because we bear statutes, responsibility interpreting ultimate use of the 1. It seems to me that the constant Street, Q in Acme’s brief Tenants N.W. v. District "court services” Comm’n, confusing majority opinion quite un- Columbia Rental Accommodations and the (D.C.1978), synonymous with that it is A.2d we must consider vari less it is understood "stenographic determining proper services.” ous factors in the relevant term deference

Case Details

Case Name: District of Columbia v. Acme Reporting Co.
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Aug 31, 1987
Citation: 530 A.2d 708
Docket Number: 85-941
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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