delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Sсhool Districts No. 55 and No. 55-H of Musselshell County, Montana, appeal the order of the District Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District granting Musselshеll County’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The School Districts had filed this action to obtain damages for alleged loss of operating revеnues resulting from miscalculations of the mill levy by the County Superintendent of Schools. We affirm.
We frame the issues as follows:
1. Should the action have been dismissed because the School Districts had no legal authority to sue the County for damages?
2. Did the District Court correctly grant the County’s motion for summary judgment bаsed on legislative immunity?
The facts are undisputed. The Superintendent of Schools for Musselshell County admits that she miscalculated the mill levy rеquired to raise funds needed by the School Districts for fiscal year 1986-87. Through her faulty computations, she arrived at 8.37 mills for the elementary school district general fund levy and 8.69 mills for the high school district general fund levy. Correct figures were 17.14 mills for the elementary levy and 15.25 mills for the high schоol levy.
The County Superintendent reported the incorrect number of mills to the Board of County Commissioners, which levied the 1986 school tаx based on her figures. As a result of the low millage levy, school district revenues were short by $187,498 for the 1986-87 school year. Due to use of reserve funds, operation of the schools was not impacted. *527 Faculty and staff were paid, and no programs or personnel were cut. Since the millage levy was later adjusted, functioning of the school for the following school year was not affected.
Thе School Districts sued the County for recovery of lost revenues and losses of investment income on decreased reserve funds. Thе School Districts also requested an injunction requiring the County to reimburse the Districts for costs and damages that might be incurred in a lawsuit asserting violations of §§ 15-10-401 to -412, MCA, which limit property taxes to 1986 levels. Prior to this action, the District Court had issued an order authorizing the County to utilize corrеct 1986 mill levy figures for purposes of §§ 15-10-401 to -412, MCA.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion of the County on the basis that the Cоunty was immune from suit. From this decision, the School Districts appeal.
I.
Should the action have been dismissed because the School Distriсts had no legal authority to sue the County for damages?
Summary judgment was granted on the basis of governmental immunity. When a case is disposed оf below on a motion for summary judgment before a judge sitting without a jury and the facts are uncontested, “the scope of review is much brоader than in other appeals and the Supreme Court is free to make its own examination of the entire case and reаch a conclusion in accordance with its findings.”
McCain v. Batson
(1988),
In this case the facts are undisputed. The County concedes that the County Superintendent of Schoоls erred in computing the mill levy and that the County Board of Commissioners levied the incorrect tax based on her calculations. Before we address the question of governmental immunity, we need to decide the more basic issue of whether the School Districts, as governmental entities, were authorized to bring suit against the County, another governmental entity.
Since this is a case of first impression, we have rеviewed decisions of other jurisdictions concerning the issue of whether one governmental entity may sue another. In some jurisdictions сourts have resolved the issue based on whether the governmental entity had standing to sue. See, e.g.,
East Grand County School District No. 2 v. Town of
*528
Winter Park
(Colo. App. 1987),
At the threshold of every suit is the requiremеnt that parties have standing to sue. The plaintiff is required to have “ ‘such a personal stake in the outcome of the controvеrsy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens presentation of issues.’”
Olson v. Department of Revenue
(1986),
In examining decisions of other courts allowing suit on grounds other than standing, we note that most do not involve seeking damages from the other governmental entity. For example, courts have permitted challenges to the constitutionality of а statute; actions to oppose annexation of county lands by a city; suits for declaratory judgments construing state revenue laws; and actions to determine title to real property held by the state. See
Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.
(Ky. 1989),
In most situations where a governmental entity has sought dаmages from another governmental entity, as here, the suit has not been allowed. See
Carbon County School District No. 2 v. Wyoming State Hоspital
(Wyo. 1984),
School districts, municipalities, and counties are political subdivisions of the state. As creations of the state, “[ejxcеpt as provided by the state, they have no existence, no functions, no rights and no powers.”
East Jackson Public Schools v. State
(App. 1984),
Generally, courts will not allow suits between governmental entities unless express or impliеd statutory authority exists. The Missouri Supreme Court refused to permit a county assessor’s appeal of a decision of a county board of equalization because no statute authorized such an appeal.
O’Flaherty v. State Tax Commission of Missouri
(Mo. 1984),
We can find no statutory authority granting a school district, a governmental subdivision, the right to sue another gоvernmental subdivision for damages. We hold that in the absence of a specific statutory or constitutional provision, one govеrnmental subdivision may not sue another for damages.
II.
Did the District Court correctly grant the County’s motion for summary judgment based on legislative immunity?
Since we have concluded that the School Districts and the County are not proper parties to this action, we need not consider the immunity question.
Affirmed.